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A M A HULL 
( i) 
COLONEL YOUNGHUSBAND~S MISSION TO LHASA 1904 
Parliament, the British Government and the 
'Forward Policy 1 in Tibet 
This thesis takes as its focus the Mission led by Colonel 
x Younghusband in 1904 and despatched to Lhasa by the Viceroy of 
India, Lord Curzon; and places it in the context of British 
suspicion of Russia's ambitions in Central Asia at the close of 
the nineteenth and the opening of the twentieth century. It lays 
particular _emphasis on British public--and parliamentary perceptions 
of Russia and her intentions towards ~ritain's interests on the 
frontiers of-India, and traces the devious tactics employed by 
the Unionist Government of A J Balfour in avoiding Parliamentary 
scrutiny of its Tibetan policy as long as possible. It demonstrates 
the embarrassment of Government spokesmen in both Houses,when 
finally debate had to be conceded, and argues that this was in 
itself a reflection of the Government's own deep anxieties about 
Curzon's 'forward policy' in Tibet. The role of a. retired Indian 
civil servant, Sir Henry Cotton, in stimulating opposition and -
co-ordinatirig the agitation both in the press and in Parliament is 
explored, and finally the extent to which Cotton influenced the 
reversal of British policy in Tibet by the incoming Liberal Govern-
ment of December 1905 is indicated. The main primary sources for 
the thesis are Hansard and selected organs of the newspaper and 
periodical press. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Russian Convention is in my view deplorable. It gives up 
all we have been fighting for for years ... Ah me! It makes 
one despair of public life and the efforts of a century 
sacrificed and nothing or next to nothing in return. 
So exclaimed a dismayed Lord Curzon of the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
Convention. (1) To the former Viceroy, Britain's rapprochement with 
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Russia was lit.t le short of a national disaster. From Persia to Tibet, 
Britain and Russia had endeavoured to square their differences, 
apparently bringing the Great Game to an abrupt halt. Yet Britain had 
good reasons to court Russian amity; the Boer war had seriously 
exposed the weakness of Britain's international position- Balfour 
confessed during the War that Britain was 'for all practical purposes 
at the present moment only a third rate power' <2> - and Russia 
remained inveterately hostile to British policy everywhere in Asia. 
Given a British perception of her own international vulnerability, she 
could either attempt to strengthen her position against Russia 
whenever possible, or else adopt a more conciliatory approach. The 
former course offered the prospect of further sterile confrontation; 
the latter of a new security for the British Empire, above all in 
India. 
Anglo-Russian tensions had been the dominant international 
rivalry in Central Asia throughout the 19th century. Central Asia 
repr~sented British India's first defence or buffer against perceived 
Russian machinations. If the Great Game had become a barometer of the 
level of Anglo-Russian mistrust, Russia's seemingly inexorable 
southern advance int9 Central Asia had done little to reassure British 
anxieties about Russia's intent towards India. Yet the 1904 British 
Invasion of Tibet was to be something of a watershed in Anglo-Russian 
2 
relations; it showed fears of Russia in England were diminishing, if 
y4._ \ 
only bec~use Mitteleuropa was beginning to offer more alarming 
progress than the Bear's shado~ A consideiation of the Tibetan 
.intervention in the perspective of Anglo-Russian relations explains 
both why the British felt the need to invade Tibet and, more 
importantly, why the Younghusband Mission was to be the last major 
British thrust in the Great Game. 
By 1903 there had been strong rumours of Russian subterfuge in 
Tibet, and the Vi~eroy, Curzon, had become anxious that Russia was 
stealthily endeavouring to establish a Tibetan protectorate. Curzon, 
an indefatigable Russophobe, was very conscious of continued Russian 
expansion in Asia, and had no wish to have a second Manchuria on 
---
India's doorstep. Curzon realised that Russia ensconsed in Tibet 
would prove most hazardous to the prestige and security of the British 
Raj. To establish a British predominance in Tibet <which was still 
technically a Chinese vassal> and expunge any extant Russian 
influence, Curzon strongly advocated a British Mission. 
But in Britain, the domestic response to British weakness in 
Tibet and circumstantial reports of Russian penetration showed a clear 
preference for avoiding any entanglement with Tibet; jeopardising the 
prospect of improved Anglo-Russian relations for some putative gain in 
.the remoteness of Central Asia hardly seemed a pragmatic course. 
Although Curzon succeeded in inducing the Government to agree to a 
half-hearted authorisation of a Mission to Tibet, ostensibly to deal 
with Tibetan bad neighbourliness, London remained anxious to avoid 
needless provocation of Russia. Moreover the Younghusband Mission, 
engendered by Curzon's impulse of traditional suspicion towards 
Russia, was yet to be countered by the growing impulse to seek Russian 
friendship. Evident:lY both impulses were a response to perceived 
British weaknesses in the face of Russia; in either case the 
3 
(, Younghusband Mission can hardly be seen as evidence of an overtly 
'-
aggressive Imperialism. British Imperialism was acting in response to 
Russia; Curzon was acting in response to alleged Russian penetration 
of Tibet in inspiring the Younghusband Mission, whilst the British 
r •' Government remained so prepared to consider Russian sensibilities it 
repudiated much of Younghusband's Lhasa Convention. 
"' 'f .• ;. 
If the Younghusband Mission should be seen in the light of Anglo-
Russian relations, in Parliamentary terms it can only be seen as an 
unpopular and diplomatically embarrassing enterprise. The Government 
was to do its utmost to minimise debate on Tibet in Parliament. 
Government respect for Parliamentary etiquette all too often became 
expendable, as the Balfour Government determinedly endeavoured to 
prevent discussion on the fraught Central Asian issue. 
An appraisal of British perceptions of Russia explains much as to 
how a keen sense of British insecurity in the Anglo-Russian 
relationship, both before and after the Boer War, led to an ambiguous 
British Tibetan policy. The episode of the Tibetan Invasion arguably 
reveals more about Britain's perplexed attitude towards Russia, than 
to Tibet. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to attempt to elucidate these 
issues. To this end, the thesis will particularly draw upon the 
debates of the Houses of Parliament as printed in Hansard. It will 
also draw upon major journals of record and opinion of the day, 
notably The Times, but also the Westminster Gazette and Manchester 
Guardian. Moreover the thesis will make reference to other printed 
primary sources and contemporary literature of the period, as well as 
the relevant secondary literature on the subject. It is to be hoped 
that the thesis will shed some light on both the Russian and the 
domestic dimensions of Great Britain's activities on the Roof of the 
World in 1904. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Britain and the Struggle for Central Asia 1885 - 1903 
If Russian influence invariably presented a threat to British 
interests, as Curzon believed, then how far was this fear prevalent in 
England, or justified? If the threat of Russia could largely be 
neutralised through friendship, would Britain's Imperial position be 
appreciably more secure? A brief survey of recent Russian attitudes 
towards England, and vice versa, is vital in establishing the 
necessity for an intervention against Russian influence in Tibet. 
Tsar Nicholas II wrote a particularly revealing letter to his 
sister Grand Duche~s Xenia Alexandrova on October 21st ~~9: 
You know I am not conceited, but I do like knowing that it rests 
solely with me, in the last resort, to change the course of the 
war in South Africa. The means are very simple - to telegraph 
an order for the whole Turkestan army to mobilise and to march 
to the frontier. 
Nicholas well realised that Central Asia was England's Achilles Heel; 
he noted that 'even the most powerful navy in the world could not 
prevent us from settling our account with England in this spot, most 
vulnerable for her'. Fortunately for a Britain floundering in the 
Boer war however the time 'was not yet ripe for this. We are not 
sufficiently well prepared for serious action mainly because Turkestan 
is not as yet connected by continuous railway with the hinterland of 
Russia'. Finally, the Tsar observed that he had 'been carried away 
somewhat, but you will understand that, occasionally, the most 
cherished dream comes to the fore'. (1) If a major Russian blow 
against the British Raj was a 'most cherished dream' of the Tsar, in 
spite of logistical difficulties, Russia was well able to perturb the 
British. As the Russian Foreign Ministry astutely observed to its 
newly appointed Consul in Bombay in 1900: 
The fundamental meaning of India to us is that she represents 
Great Britain's most vulnerable point ... on which one touch may 
perhaps easily induce Her Majesty's government to alter its 
hostile policy towards us and to show the desired compliance 
on those questions where ... our interests may coincide. <2> 
Russian conduct in the Boer War was hardly reassuring to the British. 
On 27th June 1900, the British Ambassador in St Petersburg forwar~ed 
to Londbn a documentr purportedly secret instructions to General 
Dukhowski, Governor of Turkestan, for use 'in the event of 
Complications in Afghanistan': 
Instructions are to wait until further Orders. In case of the 
course of events developing with such rapidity as to render 
imperative an earlier invasion of Afghanistan the whole army of 
the Turkestan military district is to, on receipt of telegraphic 
orders, place itself on the alert ... All the military supplies 
in provisions and ammunition for each division of the Military 
Districts must be forwarded to the Frontier ready for any 
eventuality at least at the end of June 1900 and be stored 
there. <3) 
There seems little reason to doubt the authenticity of these 
instructions. A letter from the British Consul in Batum of 13th 
February 1900 to Lansdowne underlined that Russia was certainly 
preparing for an anti-British move while Britain fought in South 
Africa: 
All the important bakers in Tiflis are now engaged in preparing 
large quantities of biscuits for the Russian Military 
authorities, for troops which are despatched to Central Asia. <4> 
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Logistical preparations, such as an adequate bread supply for Russia's 
Central Asian forces, spoke for themselves. 
If Russia viewed Afghanistan as a stage on which Britain could be 
humiliated, then did her ambition extend to conquering India? 
Salisbury believed that it would be 'enough for her if she can shatter 
our Government and reduce India to anarchy'. Certainly if Russia 
invaded Afghanistan, British prestige in India would be jeopardised; 
if the Raj appeared to be flaggi~g Salisbury believed a 'spasm of 
sedition' would start I from one end of India to the other'. (5) The 
Russian Minister ;for War, Kuroptakin, had spoken of 'la grande guerre 
des Indes'; in the event of such a war, Kuroptakin stated he would 
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place 100, 000 men on the Afghan border, later rising to 350, 000. <6> 
The prospect of a Russian invasion towards India's North West frontier 
and another Indian Mutiny rendered the British extremely anxious about 
any Russian activities on India's peripheries. Moreover, Kuroptakin 
made no secret of the Tsar's wish to add Persia, Manchuria and Korea 
to his domains, or of the Tsar's dream of bringing Tibet under Russian 
rule. Unless Britain was vigilant throughout Asia, Russia's 
expansionist urges would altogether eclipse British prestige. Britain 
had a fine line to walk; as long as Britain remained Russia's chief 
rival, opposition to Russia would be at the cost of India and 
Afghanistans' lying dangerously exposed to Russian ill will. 
How avoidable an Anglo-Russian Confrontation in Central Asia 
might be remained a moot point for the British. Even Gladstone in 
1885 had been forced to thro~· down the gaunt let after Russia's 
unworthy behaviour in Penjdeh. Lieutenant Colonel Waters, Military 
Attache at the British Embassy in St Petersburg, produced a most 
revealing report in October 1896; entitled 'a Survey of Russian Aims 
and Power', it gives an insight into how Britain perceived Russia's 
aspirations and motivations. 
On three points practical unanimity has undoubtedly existed for 
several years past (in Russian policy> 
(i) an unrestricted right of way for Russian warships from 
the Black Sea to Mediterranean 
(ii) efficient protection of the Western frontier 
<iii) extension of Russian influence in Asia. 
As to how Russia might achieve her ends Waters observed that 'Russian 
statesmen prefer to let sleeping dogs lie, to do one thing at a time 
when possible, and under the most favourable conditions'. If the 
British position in Central Asia was to be challenged, Russia would 
make sure it was at a time that Britain could receive her undivided 
attention, and when Russia had the physical resources to impose her 
will. 
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Mr Flinch felt that the Russian Bear's quarrel with Japan 'unavoidably' 
diverted him fromr 'performing' his 'programme' for India. 
Russia would prefer peacefully to attain her ends, but her 
military and naval preparations for years past, especially 
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since the late struggle (Sino-Japanese War) amply demonstrate 
that she will not be obliged to rely on moral force in Asia ... 
It has been admitted to me by the Minister of War, among others, 
that on the death of the present Ameer of Afhanistan, the 
question of a coterminous frontier would probably come to a head. 
That Russia failed to challenge Britain on this point when Abdur 
Rahman died in October 1901, said more about Russian priorities then 
lying in Manchuria than any inherent Russian goodwill towards Britain. 
Had Britain been ~efeated in the Boer War it is unlikely Habibullah's 
succession would have been so tranquil. Waters was alive to Russian 
policy seeking the most rewarding course; the prospect of confronting 
Japan in Manchuria was undoubtedly preferable to confronting England 
in Central Asia, for it would 'manifestly be most exhaustive to find 
herself face to face with England in Central Asia, and with England 
and Japan in the Far East, while success in the latter region alone 
would be much more quickly productive for her'. Waters concluded his 
analysis of Anglo-Russian relations with the equivocal reassurance 
that Russia desired peace with England in the short to medium term 'in 
order eventually to be more capable of emphasising words by deeds'. (7) 
Until such time as Britain achieved a rapprochement with Russia, the 
Russian challenge to Britain's position in Central Asia and India 
assumed the proportions of a sword of Damocles. Undoubtedly the 1902 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a sensible move in strengthening Britain's 
position agains Russia in Asia; Britain was no longer without a major 
ally in the region. Yet the Anglo-Japanese alliance was only a tonic, 
not a cure, to Britain's Russian predicament in Asia. Kitchener noted 
in June 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, that Britain would have 
'some time thanks to the Japs', but ominously added that 'at the end 
of the present war there may be a critical moment between us and 
Russia'. (8) 
If therefore Britain had good reason to fear Russia's intentions 
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towa~ds her in Asia, how capable was she of an effective military 
response? British strategy against a Russian advance into Afghanistan 
envisaged a British advance to a line stretching from Kabul to 
Kandahar. India could field a force of 31,700 British troops, 42,000 
native and 240 gu~s, but would require an immediate reinforcement of 
30,000 troops from Britain, followed by a further 70,000. (9) For the 
internal stability of the Raj it was crucial that the British should 
be seen to advance into Afghanistan, if Russia had advanced on Herat 
or Kabul; anything less and the Raj would appear to be flagging in the 
face of Russia. Yet the British advance to Kabul-Kandahar was seen as 
a defensive move in response to a major act of territorial 
aggrandisement by Russia. 
Not only was India's insistence on 100,000 men to prove 
controversial in England itself, but it also underlined the weakness 
of the British Empire in conf<onting Russia. Britain simply did not 
have the resources, short of making major sacrifices, to confront 
Russia. Even before the end of a second month's campaigning, the War 
Office estimated Russia could have a total of 124,000 troops and 248 
guns in action, and that was prior to the completion of the Orenburg-
Tashkent railway (in operation as from 1905). Without the Orenburg-
Tashkent line, by the fifth month Russia could have 150,000-200,000 
men at the Central Asian front; once the line was completed, Russia 
would have 300,000 men in the field at this stage. Britain would 
therefore need 104,000 troops to hold the Kabul-Kandahar front 
following the opening of the Orenburg-Tashkent line; that figure 
excluded the further long term reinforcements of 70,000 men that would 
also be required. (10) Although there were glimmers of hope for 
Britain - the construction of a railway to Kandahar and Jelalabad 
would reduce the tim~ for concentrating British troops on the Kabul-
Kandahar line from 84 to 45 days- strategically Russia's position 
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seemed destined to improve, to Britain's undoubted detriment. A full 
scale Central Asian war would be a dangerous, if not perilous, 
undertaking for Britain; the very fact that British military strategy 
in Central Asia was largely designed in regard to perceived Russian 
intentions says much for which was the stronger power in the area. 
Thus war remained an ever-present possibility a~ long as Anglo-Russian 
relations were strained. Indicative of this is an anxious War Office 
intelligence report of 5th February 1900, which warned that Russia had 
moved up to 150,000 troops to Kushk in the previous two months. It is 
unlikely that these troop movements were altogether unconnected with a 
Russian memorandum submitted to Britain at the same time declaring her 
intent to establish relations.with Afghanistan to discuss 'frontier 
matters•. Although these Russian troop movements in fact only 
involved 4,000 men, the important point is that the British, if only 
for a while, did believe that the Russians were moving up to 150,000 
men. <11) Moreover, even though the Russians did not confront the 
British over Afghanistan on this particular occasion, or force a 
Central Asian crisis on Britain during the Boer War, it was not 
because they were averse to doing so; their abstinence can be 
explained in terms of Manchurian aspirations and a knowledge that time 
was on their side, in the shape of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway. 
If Britain was therefore condemned to a fraught position against 
Russia in defending Afghanistan and thus India, what hope was there 
for improved Anglo-Russian relations? In a memorandum written by 
J A C Tilley on relations between Great Britain and Russia in 1892-
1904, it was noted that: 
There have also been persistent rumours of Russian concentration 
and intended aggression in Central Asia and the General Staff are 
convinced that 'although Russia may not contemplate any immediate 
attack, her preparations are such thatOne could be made in a very 
short period arid with very little additional effort. <12> 
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If the prospects for future Anglo-Russian relations evidently did not 
appear auspicious, what grounds were there in hoping that Russia might 
feel well-disposed towards Britain? Waters' 1896 memorandum was not 
optimistic in what it predicted for the future of Anglo-Russian 
relations. He found Russia's 'distrust towards Great Britain ... 
fervent almost beyond all powers of comprehension'. He had been 
'assured' that Britain was more unpopular in Russia than at the time 
of the Crimean War, and this antipathy was 'general and ... taught to, 
felt and expressed by schoolboys and schoolgirls, the rising 
generation'. Waters anticipated what the effect of any Anglophobe 
education might be: 
Some of the youths now growing up will eventually fill high and 
responsible posts, and their hostility to Great Britain implanted 
in them during their childhood may have far-reaching results. 
If Waters saw no sign of abatement in Anglophobia, he saw at least one 
glimmer of hope: • How often are we told: "I like the English, but hate 
their policy!"' < 13) Evidently if there was to be a major Anglo-
Russian rapprochement Britain would need to make important policy 
changes, as would Russia. For this to happen however, both powers 
<unless one completely caved in) would need to feel threatened more by 
one other power than they felt threatened by each other. This is 
precisely what happened. Britain's solution in Central Asia lay not 
in conflict on the Helmund but in a thawing of Anglo-Russian tensions. 
In November 1901, Lieutenant-General Sir Montagu Gerard commented 
on what still appeared to be a downward spiral in Anglo-
Russian relations: 
I was very disagreeably surprised to find how terribly 
Anglophobia had developed in Russia in the last few years. Ten 
years ago it was confined to the bourgeois class but now it seems 
to pervade all ranks of society and I was told that since the 
outbreak of th~ Boer War not a single member of our Embassy has 
been inside the Yacht Club - the one centre of St Petersburg 
life. 
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Gerard also tellingly remarked that if there were a popular Government 
in Russia there would surely have been a 'National War' against 
England, 'apparently now regarded as a sort of blot on humanity'. <14) 
Gerard's comments emphasised both the difficulty and yet urgency of 
achieving a better Anglo-Russian relationship. A rapprochement could 
only be achieved if there was a mutual willingness to compromise, but 
in view of Britain's difficulties in Central Asia, Russian antipathy 
should not be used as an excuse to avoid seeking at least a modest 
improvement in relations. However, as Cecil Spring Rice, British 
charge d'affaires at St Petersburg, clearly felt, the poor state of 
Anglo-Russian relations was a reflection of the nature of Russia 
itself: 
No one who lives he~can doubt that Russia is a purely aggressive 
power - a growing organism convinced of its conquering mission -
and that whatever we do in the way of friendliness in South-East 
Europe we shall never be forgiven the crime of possessing what 
Russia wants to have. ( 15) 
Obviously there were potent reasons why Britain and Russia had been 
rivals for so long, particularly Russia's determination not to be 
eclipsed by any other power in Asiatic prestige or influence. Yet the 
weakness of Britain's position in Central Asia emphasised that sterile 
confrontation offered scant security to the British Raj. 
If there seemed to be little enthusiasm in Russia for Britain, 
was there a corresponding dislike for Russia in Britain? British 
Parliamentary proceedings offer us powerful insights into the regard 
and esteem in which Russia was held. In a debate on the South Africa 
War on 15th February. 1900, the Earl of Kimberley turned to the 
quest ion of Central Asian security. He observed: 
I am not ascribing to Russia - I should be very sorry to do it -
direct designs ~o attack us in India. I cannot overlook the fact 
that there is going on a movement of troops <to Kushk> which if 
not increasing,· shows at least that the possibilities of the 
future are never far from the mind of the Russian Government. 
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If Russian activities in Central Asia were disquieting, what forces 
inspired a malign Russian countenance towards Britain? As Kimberley 
explained: 
There are in Russia three powerful motives which always activite 
the Russian Government in their conduct of affairs. One of these 
is the power of the Orthodox Church in Russia; the other is the 
strong Slav feeling and the third is the army; and there might 
easily arise a state of things when peaceful as might be the 
intentions of the ruler of the Empire, he might find it extremely 
difficult to resist the pressure put on him. 
Kimberley's comments, depicting an unholy Anglophobe trinity forcing 
the hand of the Emperor, did not augur well for pacific Anglo-Russian 
relations; indeed he concluded his speech by stating of the climate 
created by Russian troop movements in Central Asia, that there would 
'always be a feeling of insecurity and, in the present conditions of 
things, a feeling amounting almost to alarm'. <16) 
If during the dark days of the Boer War Britons could not help 
but look at Russian policy with deep anxiety, even in more placid 
times British Russophiles remained uncommon. Henry Norman, the 
Liberal MP for Wolverhampton South, strongly favoured an Anglo-
Russian rapprochement built on mutual respect. In 1902 Norman had his 
magnum opus on Russia published; entitled All the Russias, aside from 
describing his extensive Russian travels, it discussed the nature of 
Anglo-Russian relations. Citing Salisbury's remark that Britain had 
been 'putting our money on the wrong horse' in an anti-Russian, pro-
Turkish Near Eastern policy, and Balfour's remark that 'Asia is big 
enough for both', Norman observed: 
Their words flew up, but their thoughts remained below, and 
officially we are as suspicious of Russia as ever, and Russia is 
equally disgusted with our informed, incalculable, spasmodic 
policy. Therefore she goes calmly ahead, doing what she pleases, 
knowing that in all probability when England alone desires or 
opposes anything, a few acid despatches and a little calling of 
names in Parliament will be the worst she has to fear. 
Although of a distinctly charitable disposition towards Russia, Norman 
had no doubts that in diplomacy, 'Russia plays a strong game, and 
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plays it sometimes without scruples, but she both respects and likes 
an opponent who plays his own game strongly too'. ( 17> Norman was 
'most earnestly in favour of a rapprochement with Russia'; <18) he well 
realised, as he noted in his earlier book The Far East, that 'if we 
ourselves are not in friendly alliance with her, we shall sooner or 
later have to face her as a member of a combination hostile to our 
interests'. (19) Norman had advocated Anglo-Russian rapprochement 
'before its time';· his advocacy of warmer links was well shown on 22nd 
January 1902 when, in a debate on Persia, he expanded before the House 
on Russia, and her attitude towards Britain; Norman felt that beyond 
question an improved understanding could be achieved with regard to 
public opinion in Russia. By Russian opinion he did not mean popular 
opinion or the opinion of the Russian Press, neither of which counted 
for very much, rather 'some of the very few men who in Russia after 
the Emperor exerted real influence'. <20) Norman was perhaps mistaken 
in suggesting that press and popular opinion counted for little in 
their view of Britain, as compared to the opinion of those who ruled 
Russia. Rather the press and public opinion did matter because they 
frequently reflected the opinion of Russia's most influential men. In 
Waters' 1896 Memorandum, it was noted that General Maslov was 'chiefly 
responsible for the tone of the Novoe Vremya~ similarly Prince 
Ukhtomsky was responsible for the tone of the St Petersburg Viedmosti. 
As Waters appreciated, 'in a country like Russia the Press directs 
rather than expresses public opinion'. <21) Press and public opinion 
were important barometers of leading Russian thought towards Britain. 
If leading Russian papers were calling for a belligerent policy 
towards Britain in Central Asia, it was because men such as Maslov or 
Ukhtomsky favoured s'uch a course. 
Nevertheless, Norman was a perspicacious observer of Russia; he 
argued that 'Russia's one political object was to gain access to the 
15 
warm water, not merely as an outlet of trade or as a strategic outlet, 
but as a sentimental outlet'. If his prognosis of Russian motivation 
was hardly reassuring for India's security, in view of Russia's 
undoubted interest in Afghanistan, Norman suggested that Russia should 
therefore not be denied 'warm water' forever: 
Not many years ago ... it would have been said that the complete 
absorption of Central Asia, and the development of the Russian 
railway up to the frontier of Afghanistan would not have been 
allowed without an entire reversal of the British Government. 
<But now) he <the Hon. Member) had recently been travelling among 
Eastern and uncivilised peoples now ruled by Russia, and he 
asserted without hesitation she was carrying on a great work of 
civilisation there- and he had seen a good deal of it ... he 
must testify his respect for it was truly a work of civilisation 
in the best sense of the word. <22> 
Norman's warm feelings towards Russia were clearly unwelcome in some 
corners of the Commons. Hansard equivocally adds to the above that 
'Earl Percy made a remark that was inaudible in the Press Gallery'. 
Sir Edward Sassoon, Unionist MP for Hythe, expressed concern that 
Norman 'seemed to display very decided proclivities and even 
tenderness to Russian sensibilities'. <23) In 1902 Norman's views on 
closer Anglo-Rusian relations were still outside the mainstream of 
British politics. 
In the same debate, Sir Edward Grey, former Liberal Under 
Secretary at the Foreign Office and future architect of the Anglo-
Russian Convention of 1907, gave a well-reasoned discussion of how to 
handle Russia in Asia. 
There are three possible policies we may pursue towards the 
Russian Government. One is undesirable, the second I think is 
desirable and the third 1 regard as intolerable. The first 
possible policy is that of perpetual resistance to Russian 
expansion everywhere in Asia, on the grounds that somehow or 
other, it would endanger Brit ish interests. The second policy, 
which I think is a desirable one and I believe to be a practical 
one . . . is that of an understanding between two Governments, 
which would result in a fair and frank interchange of views and 
adjustment of ihterests in Asia . . . The third policy ... is a 
policy of drift. I think it is intolerable because Russia 
always gains by it. I would define it as a policy which combines 
in a most extra9rdinary way the disadvantages both of yielding 
and resistance without the advantage of either course . . . We 
have made all the concessions in respect of Russian expansion in 
Asia that ought to have entitled us to reward and friendship in 
return, while we have incurred odium and enmity and friction, 
even though those concessions were made in the end. <24> 
The logic of Grey's argument is clear; British endeavours to appease 
Russia in Asia, if they lacked th~ determination and ability to 
confront Russia if necessary, were a self-defeating exercise: 
Britain's position in central Asia was endangered for no benefit. 
Only an Anglo-Russian rapprochement offered the advantages of a new 
security for Britain in Central Asia and of Russian friendship. 
However, if Liberals seemed particularly ready to achieve an 
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Anglo-Russian understanding, there was by no means unanimity on how to 
win Russian goodwill. In the debate on the Foreign Office vote on 3rd 
July 1902, Sir Charles Dilke pointed out the differences between 
fellow Liberals Henry Norman and Joseph Walton <MP for Barnsley>, and 
himself. Dilke 'confessed he could not understand Walton's position'; 
Walton desired an understanding with Russia, but approved of the 
Anglo-Japanese treaty, 'propositions which appeared to him 
contradictory'. Turning to the question of an understanding with 
Russia, he sought to know 'something a little definite'. 
What are we to yield? What to secure? At one time those who 
desired the understanding wished to offer Northern Afghanistan. 
Now his friend the Member for Wolverhampton South <Norman> wished 
to offer a port on the Persian Gulf <openly advocated in All the 
Russias), while the Member for Barnsley did not. Personally he 
was opposed to giving away things not ours. <25) 
Certainly it seems that across the House there was a desire for 
less tense Anglo-Russian relations; differences of opinion would 
probably arise over how platonic these relations should be. Lord 
Charles Beresford, Unionist MP for Woolwich, expressed in the July 3rd 
1902 debate on the Foreign Office Vote, anxiety about the prospects of 
a lasting Anglo-Russian agreement: 
They all wanted a better understanding with Russia, but how was 
it to be brought about? Russian policy was based on the giving 
of assurances, and there was no case in the history of Russia 
with regard to assurances where they had not been broken when 
Russia was in a position to do so. 
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Beresford did not blame Russian ministers for such behaviour; he 
blamed the Foreign Office for listening to their assurances. <26) Yet 
in spite of past Russian 'skulduggery', an Anglo-Russian rapprochement 
held out gains for Britain as Gibson Bowles, Unionist MP for Kings 
Lynn, noted in a debate on the Army Supply Estimate on lOth March 
1903: 
If this country could come to an amicable arrangement with 
Russia, the whole question of the invasion of India would fall 
to the ground at once, completely and forever. <27> 
Until such a time as Gibson Bowles hoped for actually arrived, Britain 
and Russia would remain cast as long-standing adversaries. If Britain 
remained in strategic difficulties against Russia in Central Asia, at 
least as Sir Charles Dilke observed, Russia's expansion in Manchuria 
exposed her to pressure from the Royal Navy; he noted that 'Russia was 
formerly invulnerable, but Russia by expansion has become more 
vulnerable'. <28) If Britain and Russia came to loggerheads in 
Afghanistan the Bear could at least be singed in Manchuria, but 
Britain would still remain at a severe military and strategic 
disadvantage against Russia in Central Asia. India's North-West 
frontier would continue to be the Raj border most exposed to Russian 
intrigue; and rather than the threat to the North-West receding, 
rumours of Russian penetration of the region adjacent to India's 
hitherto relatively tranquil North-Eastern border began to appear. By 
the early 1900's Tibet was to give the British in India great anxiety 
for the Raj's frontier security. 
The question of alleged Russian penetration into Tibet was first 
raised in the House of Commons by the Russophile Henry Norman. As 
Norman had written in All the Russias, 'to deal with Russia on equal 
terms we must begin by regaining her respect. And we shall only 
accomplish this by holding our own wherever we come into contact with 
her'. <29) Tibet, bordering India, yet over one thousand miles from 
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the nearest Russian border, was undoubtedly a place where Britain 
ought hbt be eclipsed. On 30th September 1900 a Tibetan Embassy under 
a Buriat monk Dorjieff visited the Tsar at Livadia; and on 23rd June 
1901 a further Embassy led by Dorjieff was met by the Tsar at 
Peterhof. This contact with Russia was undoubtedly disturbing to the 
British at a time when the Tibetans were rebutting all Curzon's 
efforts to establish friendly Anglo-Tibetan relations. On 21st June 
Norman questioned Viscount Cranborne, Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, about the second Tibetan Mission to Russia, asking: 
Whether his attention had been called to the Embassy from the 
Dalai Lama of Tibet to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, with 
the alleged object of soliciting the protection of Russia 
against British encroachments; and whether His Majesty's 
Government has made or proposes to make any communications to 
the Russian Government on the subject? 
Cranborne provided only the most limited of answers: 
It has been recently reported in the Russian Press that a special 
Mission from Tibet consisting of seven persons headed by the Lama 
Daroshiyeff <Dorjieff) was on its way to St Petersburg, but His 
Majesty's Government have received no confirmation of this 
statement. <30) 
If Norman's questioning of the Government in London was intended 
to awaken it to a potential difficulty in Anglo-Russian relations and 
on India's borders, the Government remained somewhat uninterested. On 
2nd July 1901 Norman again questioned Cranborne: 
Whether seeing the so-called Tibetan Embassy has reached St 
Petersburg and is about to be received by His Majesty the Tsar 
<in fact the Tsar had already met the Embassy), he can now give 
the House any information upon the subject; and will he state 
whether any communications concerning the so-called Embassy has 
been addressed to the Russian Government? 
Again Cranborne played a dead bat: 
We have heard that a Mission from Tibet has arrived in Russia, 
but we are without detailed information as to its character. His 
Majesty's Government has not addressed any communications to the 
Russian Government on the subject. 
Pressed by Norman 'a't a future time' to make a statement on the 
Tibetan Embassy, Cranborne merely suggested he lay a further question 
on the subject. (31) 
On 12th August 1901 Norman again enquired of Cranborne 'whether 
he can now give the House any information concerning the composition, 
the aims and the results of the recent so-called Tibetan Embassy to 
His Majesty the Emperor of Russia'. Cranborne replied: 
His Majesty's Ambassador at St Petersburg has reported that the 
Tibetan Mission consisted of two envoys, with their suite. The 
principle member of the Mission was the Lama Akban Dargiew, who 
had brought a complimentary letter from the Dalai Lama to the 
Emperor of Russia. His Excellency was assured by the Count 
Lamsdorff that the Mission had no political or diplomatic 
character. <32) 
If it was hardly surprising that Lamsdorff should give such an 
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assurance, Norman was nevertheless disappointed that such an assurance 
should be unquestioningly accepted by the Government. In a debate on 
3rd July 1902 Norman remarked that: 
He had asked several questions with regard to the Mission of 
the Tibetan envoys who were sent to St Petersburg, and he was 
informed that it had no diplomatic significance. He could not 
help expressing surprise that the Foreign Office should accept 
a vague answer that the Mission had no diplomatic significance. 
He also wondered whether the Foreign Office was aware that 'the 
Tibetan envoys had a certain relation to affairs in Mongolia'. (33) 
Russia was beginning to dominate Mongolia and had been especially 
aided by the culturally Russian, though Buddhist, Asiatic Buriat 
tribe. Dorjieff was an eminent Buriat, and as a Russian agent, was in 
close contact with both Russians and Lamas in Mongolia. Norman's dark 
hints of untoward Russian activities in Buddhist Central Asia 
anticipated much of the nature of <alleged) Russian involvement in 
Tibet. 
With perhaps a certain irony, Norman, as the MP who had first 
raised the question of Russian-Tibetan relations in Parliament, was 
absent when on April. 13th 1904 the Commons held its first full debate 
on Tibet, in an atmosphere of crisis provoked by the mission of 
20 
Younghusband into Tibet. The Daily Chronicle of April 15th 1904 
reported: 
The reception of Mr Henry Norman MP by the Tsar ... was of an 
entirely private character, for Mr Norman was not introduced by 
our Ambassador or by any other official personage, and the 
audience, which lasted over half an hour ... was conducted by 
His Majesty's wish, with complete freedom on either side. The 
Tsar began by saying that he had read Mr Norman's book, kept it 
in his private library, and found it the best and fairest account 
in'English of his country. Of course Mr Norman does not intend 
to publish the conversation. <34) 
It is tantalising to wonder whether Norman and the Tsar discussed the 
question of Tibet, arguably the most contentious issue between Britain 
and Russia in April 1904, but more significantly the Tsar showed that 
he was prepared to receive one of the few British public men who 
openly advocated a closer Anglo-Russian relationship. Perhaps he even 
respected Norman's philosophy of an Anglo-Russian friendship built on 
mutual strength. The Anglo-French entente cordiale, of which the 
instruments were signed on 8th April 1904, showed Britain making terms 
with Russia's chief ally. Power-political logic suggested that Anglo-
Russian relations should correspondingly improve. Indeed, in May and 
June 1904 encouraging diplomatic moves in that direction were being 
made. <35) Yet at the same time Russia was at war in the Far East with 
Britain's ally Japan; and British public and Parliamentary opinion 
were apparently bear-hunting in Tibet. Was the Younghusband Mission a 
wayward enterprise,· foolishly jeopardising the future of improved 
Anglo-Russian relations, or was it a necessary move against an 
adversary whose designs on India had to be deterred by force? Coming 
at the specific moment that it did, the debate on the Younghusband 
Mission provided a useful focus for British opinion on this anxious 
quest ion. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Curzon and the Russian Threat in Tibet 
'The school of~politicians who described anxiety at Russia's 
advance as ''old woman's fears" have closed the doors of their 
discredited academy', remarked George Curzon in his 1889 work Russia 
in Central Asia. (1) Ironically Curzon's Tibetan policy was to prove a 
powerful catalyst for admission to that .'discredited academy'; 
although the Viceroy was to achieve Government authorisation for an 
advance into Tibet, he singularly failed to convince Britain of the 
need for a Himalayan foray. Faced with rumours of Russian intrigue in 
Tibet Curzon was adamant that any Russo-Tibetan tryst should be 
frustrated, but in England sympathy for his Russophobia remained 
confined to convinced Imperialists and journals of a Unionist 
persuasion, notably The Times. 
Naturally any responsible Viceroy would have to take strong 
action against a Tibet coquetting with Russia. Yet Curzon was 
arguably over-zealous in his desire to thwart Russian designs, 
particularly as the Home Government was anxious to achieve better 
Anglo-Russian relations. Curzon had little doubt as to Russia's 
overriding aim. In October 1901 he wrote: 
I assert with confidence - what I do not think any of her 
statesmen would deny - that her ultimate ambition is the dominion 
of Asia. (2) 
In Russia's 'proud and not ignoble aim', he was convinced that: 
Acquiescence at Herat and in Afghanistan Turkestan will not 
secure Kabul. Acquiescence in the Pamirs will not save Kashgar. 
Acquiescence at Kashgar will not divert Russian eyes from Tibet. 
Each morsel but whets her appetite for more and inflames the 
passion for a 'pan-Asiatic dominion. (3) 
Curzon remained perhaps too emotionally involved in Russophobe 
sentiment to view the defence of India dispassionately against the 
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wider interests of impro~ed British relations with Russia. An 
understanding with Russia could do more for India's security than an 
advance onto India's glacis hunting for the Bear. Curzon was 
conscious that London did not share his priorities; ~s he wrote to 
Harni 1 ton, 
I have a sort of consciousness that my arguments do not produce 
the smallest effect. If a Government means to sit down .... no 
amount of kicking, even on the most sensitive spot, will induce 
it to rise, and I contemplate now .... that we shall steadily 
throw away our trump cards. <4> 
Curzon was unable to convince the Horne Government that Tibet was a 
trump card at all, and London remained chary of any anti-Russian 
Tibetan Expedition. As Roberts was to put it: 
Either Lord Curzon should have been allowed to pursue his path 
[to Lhasa] unhampered, or the Cabinet should have refused to 
sanction any interference at all. <5> 
London would have done better to deny any Curzon-inspired invasion of 
Tibet, or else fully support such an invasion, rather than the policy 
it adopted of a half-hearted but distinctly dubious backing. 
Yet if Curzon was anxious to dispel alleged Russian influence in 
Tibet, were these viceregal fears justified? Dilke noted that: 
The reality of Russian relations with Tibet in 1902 is still 
unknown and will probably remain so; at the time, it was 
necessarily a subject for guesswork based upon snippets of 
intelligence. <6> 
It is also important to remember that, even if Curzon's fears could be 
fully corroborated, a post-Boer War Britain was reluctant to confront 
Russia over an obscure corner of Asia. London's hope for an Anglo-
Russian rapprochement could well be vitiated by the Viceroy's desire 
for a more forward policy. 
Unfortunately the material available for assessing the extent of 
Russian involvement in Tibet remains problematical. It is clear that 
the Buriat Mongol Dorjieff (named by Cranborne in Parliament> was both 
influential in Lhasa,. and favoured the Russian cause. Although, as 
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Mehra puts it, owing to 'the remarkable paucity of authentic source 
material, Dorjieff' s figure remains shadowy', (7) it is still possible 
to attempt an appraisal of Dorjieff's past. Our principal source is 
Ekai Kawaguchi's Three Years in Tibet, and it provides us with an 
account of this Japanese Buddhist's 1900-02 sojourn in Tibet. 
Although in all probability Kawaguchi was a Japanese spy and may well 
have embellished his text, nevertheless he was an astute observer <he 
would need to be, if a spy> and provides us with an insight into early 
twentieth century Tibet. Kawaguchi had the advantage of actually 
being inside Tibet, an opportunity denied to Europeans by Tibet's 
is.olationist policies; when The Times correspondent, Perceval Landon, 
was himself in Tibet with the Younghusband Mission, he encountered the 
same explanations of Dorjieff' s pas.t as Kawaguchi gives us. 
According to Kawaguchi, Dorjieff rose rapidly in Tibet's Lama 
hierarchy, and when appointed Work Washing Abbot to the young Dalai 
Lama he was said 'to have virtually monopolised the confidence of the 
young Lama Chief'. (8) After the Dalai Lama's coming of age the 
Russophile Buriat, having acquired sudden riches to dispense in Tibet 
for prestige, extended his attention from leading Tibetan Lamas to the 
priestly class, 'due to the large share of attention they wield over 
the masses'. (9) Dorjieff, to Russia's benefit, had constructed a deep 
personal friendship with Tibet's de facto ruler, and established a 
system of patronage throughout the Lama hierarchy, thereby giving him 
influence over Tibet's masses. As John MacGregor has put it: 
Imperial Russia with considerable shrewdness or sheer luck 
devised a way of penetration which took full advantage of 
Tibet's religious occupation. <10) 
If Dorjieff's intrigues would undoubtedly cause the British 
distinct unease, if they were cognisant of them, the jewel in the 
crown of Dorjieff's intrigue was a 'programme of conquest' which 
included a' general plan for the masses'. Cll) In ancient Tibetan 
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folklore the Tsang Kha-pa, the revered founder of the Yellow Hat sect, 
was to reappear to rule a capital called Chang Shambhala, far to the 
North of Tibet. Chang Shambhala was postulated some 3,000 miles 
North-West of Buddhagaya <Buddha's birth place) in India, by a long 
deceased prophet. Kawaguchi stated that Dorjieff had written a 
pamphlet, 'with the special object of demonstrating that Chang 
Shambhala means Russia, and that the Tsar is the incarnation of the Je 
Tsang Kha-pa'. (12) This pamphlet, the existence of which Kawaguchi 
learnt from 'trustworthy sources', argued that the sheer good nature 
of the Tsar, both in his domains and towards his neighbours, combined 
with the geographical coincidence between Russia and Chang Shambhala, 
'proved that Russia must be the country, that anybody who doubted it 
was an enemy of Buddhism'. <13> Such was the success of Dorjieff's 
theological gambit, apparently raising the Tsar to a deity in the eyes 
of many Tibetans, Kawaguchi maintained that; 
Today almost every Tibetan blindly believes in the ingenious 
story, and holds that the Tsar will sooner or later subdue the 
whole world and found a gigantic Buddhist Empire. <14) 
If the prospect of a Tsar converting to Buddhism, if only Tibet showed 
him fealty, was dangled before Lhasa's eyes, British interests were 
also endangered by the fact that Dorjieff was not the only prominent 
Anglophobe in Lhasa's counsels. 
Shata, the eldest of Tibet's four premiers, remained keenly 
Anglophobe; whereas Dorjieff was a Russian agent, Shata probably 
represented a more traditional vein of Tibetan thought, namely the use 
of isolationism to ensure Tibetan independence. Certainly Kawaguchi 
depicts Shata as 'the best informed man in Tibet' in diplomatic 
affairs. (15) Kawaguchi tells how Shata, who had been exiled to India 
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prior to his ascendency in Lhasa, became 'filled with dreams of 
England': 
He was overawed by her power. He must have thought during his 
exile that Tibet would have to choose between Russia and China 
in seeking foreign help against the possible aggression of 
India. <16) 
It was hardly surprising that a Tibetan such as Shata would turn to 
Russia for help, irrespective of Dorjieff's theological exercises 
against Britain; Chinese power was something of a broken reed whilst 
the activities of the Raj's Indian pundit Sarat Chandra Das in 1881 
had clearly emphasised Britain's hostile intent towards Lhasa. 
Kawaguchi believed that, 'should England ever want to transact 
any business with Tibet, she would be obliged to do so by force'. (17) 
If Tibet practised an isolationist policy against all Europeans, with 
an operative such as Dorjieff, Russia had clearly found an inspired 
means of circumventing this policy. It remains difficult to say when 
Russia actually recruited the services of Dorjieff, although it is 
plausible to suppose that he may have been enlisted on Prejvalski's 
fourth expedition, or else in 1885, as the German adventurer Wilhelm 
Filchner maintained. <18> Nevertheless, as Kawaguchi stressed, the 
exercise of this one Buriat gave Russia undoubted prestige in Tibet. 
Particularly damaging, from a British point of view were Dorjieff's 
two diplomatic missions to Russia. Dorjieff's Mission represented a 
bold attempt to establish a Russo-Tibetan dialogue; and these efforts 
were surely aided, if indeed not fostered, by Prince Ukhtomsky and 
Dr P A Badmaev. Ukhtomsky, aside from being the Anglophobe proprietor 
of the St Petersburg Viedmosti, was a close personal friend of Tsar 
Nicholas; he had accompanied him as personal secretary when, as 
Cesarevitch, Nicholas had toured the East. Badmaev, a Buriat, had 
access to the Imperial ear as Court physician and was an advisor to 
the Russian Foreign Ministry on Mongol Affairs; these two men were 
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most probably involved in abetting Dorjieff. Ukhtomsky was clear on 
the role the Buriats could play in aiding Imperial Russia in areas 
such as Tibet: 
Every year thousands of them go on pilgrimage to Mongolia and 
centres of Tibetan learning. Pioneers of Russian trade and good 
fame, representations of the Russian name in the depths of the 
'Yellow' East .... Scarce anyone in Russia guesses what a 
valuable work is being carried on by the most modest Russian 
Lamaite. 
Ukhtomsky felt that the 'true historic value' of these activities 
would be 'appreciated only by the generations to come'. (19) Ukhtomsky 
had a vision of Russian domination of Asia that Curzon would have 
understood; he included Dorjieff in his scheme as laying the 
foundations for Russian domination in Tibet. If by 1900 the Russians 
hoped to use Tibet as one theatre in the Great Game, should the 
British continue to ignore this growing Russian influence, a Russian 
protectorate might well materialise within the next ten years; this 
was Curzon's fear and Ukhtomsky's hope. 
Certainly there were strong grounds for British anxieties. 
Curzon said of the first Tibetan Mission to Russia that Tibet was, 
'much more likely in reality to look to us for protection than to 
Russia', (20) but Dorjieff' s second Embassy confounded this prediction. 
Although Lamsdorff assured the British Government of the non-political 
and non-diplomatic nature of the Mission, as Candler remarked: 
We were asked to believe that these Lamas travelled many 
thousands of miles to convey a letter that expressed the hope 
that the Russian Foreign Minister was in good health and 
prosperous, and informed him that the Dalai Lama was happy to 
be able to say he himself enjoyed excellent health. <21) 
Moreover, Dorjieff had brought Russia and Tibet sufficiently 
close that, according to Kawaguchi, and Filchner in his Sturm uber 
Asien, arms were sent from Russia to Tibet. Kawaguchi reported how in 
December 1901 or January 1902, a convoy of 200 fully laden camels 
arrived in Lhasa, which he subsequently learnt were from Russia. 
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Kawaguchi apparently learned from one indiscreet but reliable 
Government officer that, prior to this convoy of arms from Russia, 
'another caravan of 300 camels arrived some time before', whose cargo 
'consisted of small fire-arms, bullets and other interesting objects'. 
Indeed the Government officer 'was quite elated, saying that now for 
the first time Tibet was sufficiently armed to resist any attack 
England might make against her'. <22> 
Filchner, although a less immediate source, and somewhat 
sensationalist, nevertheless has an interesting account of another 
Russian spy, Zerempil, bringing an arms convoy into Lhasa on November 
12th 1902. Filchner reports that Zerempil, under the auspices of 
Dorjieff as War Minister 'started a factory of Martin Henry 
rifles'. <23> If Filchner' s and Kawaguchi's accounts are substantially 
correct, Britain evidently had a seriously deteriorating security 
situation on the North-Eastern frontier. 
Against this background of Russian intrigue in Tibet, it is 
hardly surprising that there were rumours of a secret Russian treaty 
concerning Tibet. In April 1902 Reuters had reported that the Russian 
Minister in Peking, de Lessar, had suggested to Prince Ch' ing that 
Tibet should become independent, while rumours of a secret Russo-
Chinese agreement abounded in Peking, Nepal and India. <24) In May 
1902 Kang Yu Wei told the Bengal Government that a secret treaty, 
granting Russia a protectorate over Tibet, had been reached between 
Russia and Jung Lu, head of the Chinese Grand Council. <25) By 
September 1902 Parr, the Chinese-employed Customs Official at Yatung 
in Tibet, and the British Ambassador at Peking, Satow, had reported 
eleven and twelve article Russo-Chinese treaties respectively. <26> 
Terms reputedly included a transfer of Chinese rights in Tibet to 
Russia, in return for which Russia would support the maintenance of 
Chinese territorial integrity, and would help suppress internal 
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disturbances in the Chinese Empire. Further measures of this secret 
treaty included Russia's winning the right to establish her 
Government's agencies in Tibet, and the granting to China of consular, 
commercial and extradition rights. Russia also undertook not to 
forcibly introduce Christianity, and to allow Chinese participation in 
Russian mining and railway activities. The twelfth clause, reported 
by Satow, saw a Russian assurance to respect sacred places during the 
construction of a railway line in Tibet; evidently Russia hoped to 
link Tibet with the Trans-Siberian Railway - a military nightmare for 
Britain. Indeed, from December 1902 into 1903, the Contemporary 
Review in London published a series of interesting and seemingly well-
informed articles on the secret Russo-Chinese treaty; Alexander Ular, 
the author, sought to acquaint the British public with what he saw as 
the peril facing Britain in Tibet. Ular' s background remains obscure, 
and his name may well be a nom de plume; in 1902, in Paris, his book 
Un Empire Russo-Chinois was published, which warned of Russian 
activities in China, including the secret treaty over Tibet. 
In his December 1902 article, Ular discussed the implications of 
the Russo-Chinese agreement over Tibet - an agreement whose existence 
seems probable, even though it was never admitted by Russia or China. 
Ular commented that it was 'really wonderful to see how little 
impression the Tibet Convention has made on English public opinion', 
in view of 'the sudden apparition of an Anglo-Russo frontier of more 
than two thousand miles'. <27> He also warned: 
The connivance of the Tsar and Dalai Lama opens, for the future 
of Asia, a curious prospect of common, temporal and spiritual 
domination over the greater part of the East. <28) 
Ular was undoubtedly (if not particularly> alarmist; yet his anonymous 
sources were either very well-informed in Russo-Chinese diplomacy, or 
else Ular was a capable but inventive writer. However, as the 
Contemporary Review was a respected publication, it seems improbable 
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that Ular's writings were complete invention. He argued that in 
establishing herself in Tibet, Russia was reserving a region for her 
future co~mercial and industrial expansion. Her inability to compete 
successfully with western commerce made it essential that Russia took 
territory for her future benefit, wherever she could. Ular believed 
that economic superiority would be the 'ultima ratio' in Asia's future 
affairs, <29) and for that reason England could be more confident of 
her future in Asia than Russia. Ular's solution to the Russian 
ascendancy in Tibet was based on this belief: 
At this moment the two great British Empires in Asia, the 
political one, India, and the purely commercial one, Central 
China, are separated from each other; and the Tibet Convention, 
together with French projects of colonisation in Yun-Nan and 
Sze-Chuan, are apparently intended, to a large extent, to 
prevent any chance of remedying such isolation. (30) 
Ular recommended that: 
If an intimate connection between those Empires could be 
realised, the effect of the Tibet Convention would be 
virtually neutralised. (31) 
In a further article in January 1903 concerning the implications 
of the Russo-Chinese agreement over Tibet, Ular argued that: 
If the moral and political situation of England in Asia has 
remained disastrously stagnant in the face of the White Tsar's 
splendour, this is to a large extent an effect of our European 
habits, which oblige us to accept Oriental statements as 
true. <32) 
Asian diplomacy was 'the art of bringing about faits accomplis without 
giving the adversary any opportunity of retaliation'. (33) Ular 
praised Curzon's recognition of the need to employ Asiatic methods in 
Tibetan diplomacy, using the 1890 Anglo-Chinese Sikkim treaty 'as a 
pretext for tearing the veil' off Russian, Tibetan and Chinese 
relations. <34> That Curzon had succeeded in despatching a Mission 
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augured ill for the Russo-Chinese treaty. Ular argued that Russia had 
made two fatal errors in her Tibet policy: 
The first blunder consisted in continuing to keep secret the real 
results of Russian policy, forgetting that the results of Asiatic 
methods must nowadays be ratified by European rivals .... the 
second blunder, which made the first irreparable, was the 
dismissal of M Witte, the great architect of Asiatic Russia. <35> 
Certainly under Plehve Russia's Asiatic policy missed Witte's 
experience, and Ular believed that Curzon, in a 'masterpiece of 
Asiatic policy' had 'obliged Russia, without striking a blow to avow 
tacitly her impotence to maintain her present standard of power' in 
Tibet. (36) 
If Ular's insights into the question and ramifications of the 
secret Russo-Chinese treaty concerning Tibet were undoubtedly bold in 
both evidence and judgement, and though he may have appeared an 
unsubstantiated sensationalist to contemporaries, his writings 
nevertheless convey the crucial importance Tibet was assuming in 
Anglo-Russian relations. Further reports of Russian diplomatic 
machinations towards Tibet continued in November 1902. Hardinge in St 
Petersburg learnt of a secret understanding between the Russians and 
Tibetans; (37) in return for certain religious privileges for Russian 
Buriats, the Dalai Lama had apparently agreed to the residence of a 
secret Russian agent in Lhasa, one Badengieff <Badmaev), and to the 
entry of Russian Orthodox Missionaries. One further treaty was 
reported on 27th February 1903 involving the Chinese Amban and 
Licoloff, a Russian Emissary. <38) 
Against such a background of alleged Russian intrigue both with 
Peking and Lhasa, it was not unreasonable for Curzon to fear that 
Russia was active in some form in attempting to establish a sphere of 
influence in Tibet. Indeed, given the uneasine~s in the Anglo-Russian 
relationship, it would have been surprising if Russia had not been 
interested in Tibet. An Anglophobe Tibet, largely free of Chinese 
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tutelage, represented a natural and potentially profitable direction 
for Russia's attentions. If the British remained uninterested in 
intervening in Tibet, there was every reason to suppose that Tibet 
could become a valuable addition to the Russian Empire. Britain's 
abstention would be Russia's opportunity. 
Yet Britain's non-interventionist policy towards Tibet could be 
maintained only as long as Tibet appeared a secure buffer for her 
North-Eastern frontier, immune from Russia's destabilising influence. 
Moreover, Russia's position in Tibet still remained tenuous; the 
activities of a Dorjieff were of lasting value only while they 
continued to be discreet. If Russia overplayed her Tibetan hand, by 
unwittingly revealing evidence of her diplomacy to the British, she 
could still snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Certainly Curzon 
thought he had caught the drift of the Russian game; he saw a shady 
Russian endeavour to establish a protectorate at India's backdoor. 
However, if Curzon was to argue for a positive intervention in Tibet, 
how had Anglo-Tibetan relations reached such a nadir that a British 
invasion seemed the only means to prevent Tibet from nestling under 
Russia's arm? 
On June 11th 1900 Curzon had noted of the salient problems in 
Britain's relations with Tibet: 
It is really the most grotesque and indefensible thing that at 
a distance of little more than two hundred miles from our 
frontier, this community of unarmed monks should set us 
perpetually at defiance; and that we should have no means of 
knowing what is going on there; and that a Russian protectorate 
may, at no distant date, be declared without our having any 
inkling of what was passing. C39) 
Curzon's remarks point to the failure of India to achieve any 
effective means of contact with Tibet; this situation was to lead to 
further misunderstanding, and encourage Tibet to look towards Russia. 
Anglo-Tibetan relations had been strained by British domination of 
Sikki~ a Tibetan f~udatory, and these tensions were well-expressed in 
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Britain's eviction in 1888 of Tibetans occupying the Gnatong area of 
Sikkim. Tibet had traditionally pursued an isolationist policy, and 
Britain's encroachment on Sikkim did not reassure her about the Raj's 
intentions, a sentiment underlined by the discovery of Sarat Chandra 
Des's secret Missio~ of 1881 to Tibet. If Tibet looked to her 
suzerain China to defend her interests against Britain she was to be 
disappointed; the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, which recognised 
British predominance in Sikki~ and the 1893 Tibetan trade 
regulations, emphasised that Tibetan isolation from India could not be 
underwritten by China. Tibet chose to ignore the 1890 and 1893 
agreements, and trade was frustrated, border posts were uprooted and 
Sikkimese pastures overrun by Tibetans. However, these were only 
symptoms of Anglo-Tibetan misunderstanding; if Britain could 
apparently tolerate such irritants, the advent of a Russian dimension 
in Tibet changed the Tibetan question from that of a minor border 
difficulty into a Great Game trial of strength. 
Kawaguchi had remarked of Tibet that: 
England had opportunities to score a greater success than that 
achieved by Russia, and had she followed the Russian method her 
influence would now have extended far beyond the Himalayas. <40) 
Even if Kawaguchi overrated the possibilities for Indian Intelligence, 
nevertheless a skil. ful Indian Buddhist, armed with gold, might have 
done much to frustrate Dorjieff in Lhasa; the British failure to find 
such a man did much to necessitate a 'forward' response by India. 
If Britain was to counter Russian intrigue in Tibet she 
desperately needed means of communication; without contact with Lhasa 
Britain simply could not compete with Russia. Curzon endeavoured to 
write to Lhasa: Captain R L Kennion attempted to forward a viceregal 
letter to Lhasa through Western Tibet, apparently without success. 
Vakil Ugyen Kazi, the Bhutanese Minister in Darjeeling, who claimed to 
have met the Dalai Lama in 1898, was chosen to write to Lhasa on 
Curzon' s behalf, expressing viceregal hopes for improved 
relationships. Vakil Ugyen Kazi wrote two unsuccessful letters, yet 
evidently 1·etained some goodwill in Tibet, for in June 1901 he was 
asked to escort a train of animals to Lhasa. Whilst Dorjieff 
continued to entrench his position in Lhasa, Vakil Ugyen Kazi took 
Curzon's second personal letter to the Dalai Lama; the viceregal 
letter was returned on the grounds that tradition forbade the Dalai 
Lama from receiving letters from foreigners, except with the Amban's 
approval. 
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Curzon's frustrated attempts to even secure a hearing in Lhasa's 
counsels contrasted sharply with Russian success in Tibet. Curzon 
keenly felt that conciliatory attempts to counter Russian intrigues 
had been exhausted, and scathingly branded Vakil Ugyen Kazi 'as a liar 
and in all probability, a paid Tibetan spy' in ihe light of alleged 
indiscretions in Lhasa. (41) Ironically, following a major 
investigation into Tibet policy, Curzon learnt that such had been 
Britain's failure in thwarting Dorjieff and Russian intrigue, that 
both of Dorjieff's. Missions had actually travelled through the Raj, 
unknown to Indian intelligence. 
The Viceroy was determined to take Tibet policy closely in hand; 
resolved to suffer Tibetan bad manners no longer, in June 1900 Captain 
J C White reclaimed the Sikkimese pasture of Giaogong from the 
Tibetans. Although Curzon proposed that Tibet's Chumbi Valley should 
also be occupied and new frontier posts raised, the India Office felt 
this approach unnecessarily provocative. Moreover, although Britain 
could of course apply pressure on the Tibetan frontier, such pressures 
were equally likely to push Tibet further into Russia's influence, as 
Tibetan fears of Britain were substantiated. The India Office 
favoured a less overtly hostile British response to Tibet, the Lee-
Warner Plan. Thus Nepal would act as British surrogate, and would 
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take action against Tibet, on the grounds that Russian penetration of 
Tibet threatened Napalese security. Curzon viewed this plan as 
distinctly undesirable, as, to his mind, it exposed London's temerity 
in the face of Russia, and would encourage Napalese pretensions. 
Unlike London, ever anxious to consider St Petersburg's 
sensibilities, Curzon remained steadfast in his resolve to frustrate 
Russia in Tibet. Curzon believed that British policy towards Tibet 
had been inhibited for too long by China's nominal status as Tibet's 
suzerain; 'the whole thing is a farce' argued the Viceroy 'each party 
alternately parading and disavowing the other'. <42> On 8th January 
1903, in a major despatch the Viceroy contended that the possibility 
of Russian domination over Tibet demanded a radical new approach. 
Although China would be informed that Britain would begin talks with 
Tibet in early 1903, the myth of her suzerainty was to be exposed. 
China's role as intermediary would be forfeit. Britain would 
therefore commence talks in the Spring of 1903 at Lhasa, which would 
encompass not only the Sikkimese frontier, but 'the entire question of 
our future relations, commercial and otherwise, with Tibet'. <43> This 
British Mission would be accompanied by an appropriate armed force. 
The Viceroy did not seek to deny that the situation in Lhasa, a 
product of Russian machinations and the <reputed> Sino-Russian 
agreement, had eclipsed trade as India's foremost Tibetan concern. 
Although Curzon's despatch persuaded the India Office of the need 
for a British Mission to Tibet, at Cabinet on-19th February 1903 
Balfour and Lansdowne remained unconvinced of the need for a Mission. 
Balfour doubtless felt that Curzon's proposals were typical of an 
Imperial proconsul; as he once noted: 
The rulers in its [the Empire] outlying portions have great local 
knowledge, but no responsibility and little thought for the 
general situation. <44> 
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Nevertheless it was apparent that developments in Lhasa were becoming 
increasingly serious: faced with Curzon's approach of confronting 
Russia if necessary, the Government sought the more moderate path of a 
diplomatic solution. Thus on 8th April 1903 Lansdowne exchanged 
denials of any intent to alter the status of Tibet with Russia's 
Ambassador in London, Benckendorff. Indeed on 11th and 18th February 
1904 Lansdowne was able to extract from Benckendorff an acceptance 
that, as the British .shared a common frontier with Tibet, they had the 
right to ensure Tibet respected her treaty obligations by force if 
necessary. Yet how reliable were Benckendorff's initial assurances? 
St Petersburg itself was unable to corroborate whether or not Russia 
had a secret agreement with Tibet, and, in any case, remained 
unwilling to endorse its representative's admissions. Curzon remained 
unsatisfied; on 8th January 1904 he wrote to Hamilton: 
If you ask me whether Benckendorff's apparently categorical reply 
denying Russian activity removed my suspicions, I say 
emphatically no. (45) 
Yet, having accepted Benckendorff's assurances, the British 
Government could no longer intervene in Tibet on the grounds of 
Russian intrigue. Curzon was probably right in his belief that, 
although Britain had prevented an impending Russian protectorate in 
Tibet for the interim, Russian interest in Tibet remained unchanged. 
Certainly if Dorjieff and Russian influence in Lhasa were to be 
dislodged, a Mission would have to be sent; such a Mission would be 
justified on the old issues of the frontier and trade. 
Rather than attempt to confront Cabinet opposition to a mission, 
Curzon believed re-opening negotiations on the border would emphasise 
the impossibility of negotiating with the Tibetans anywhere other than 
Lhasa. The Mission would become necessary by default. Any failure on 
the part of the Tibetans or Chinese <whose suzerainty the Cabinet, 
unlike Curzon, wished to respect) to send suitably accredited 
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delegates would surely necessitate the advance of the British Mission 
to Gyangtse. In May 1903 Francis Younghusband was selected to lead 
the Mission. The very fact that Younghusband's first negotiating 
site, Kamba Jong, was clearly inside Tibet established a precedent -
the issue at stake was not whether the Mission should advance into 
Tibet, but where should it stop? 
By November it had become apparent that the Kamba Jong 
negotiations were unsuccessful; on 6th November 1903 London acceded to 
a British advance as far as Gyangtse, should it prove necessary. The 
sentiments expressed in this November 6th telegram, sent to Curzon 
authorising such an advance, were to become the Balfour Government's 
stated Tibetan policy. The telegram affirmed that although the 
Cabinet had sanctioned an advance, 
They are clearly of the opinion that this step should be taken 
purely for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction; that it should 
not be allowed to lead to occupation or to any form of permanent 
intervention in Tibetan affairs: and that it should withdraw as 
soon as reparation is obtained. They consider the action 
proposed necessary, but the question of enforcing trade 
facilities must be considered in reference to the above decision, 
and His Majesty's Government are not prepared to establish a 
Mission in Tibet permanently. <46) 
Although a temporary occupation of Tibet's Chumbi Valley was also 
allowed for, there was clearly to be no question of a permanent 
British occupation of Tibet, or the establishment of a permanent 
British Mission in Tibet. Yet Curzon had finally achieved the means, 
namely a British advance into Tibet, to put Dorjieff and all his works 
to flight. At last the British Government had accepted the need for 
an intervention in Tibet - yet whereas London saw the Mission as a 
limited operation to achieve satisfactory relations with Tibet, Curzon 
saw the Mission as a major foray against Russian designs on Lhasa. 
Indeed Curzon remained hopeful that, once a Mission had been 
despatched, the pace of events would force the 'timorous' Home 
Government into condoning a permanent British presence is Tibet. Of 
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course, Curzon was right to be anxious about securing the Raj's 
interests in Tibet, yet he was undoubtedly insensitive to seeing 
Britain~s, as opposed to India's, point of view on the Tibet question. 
Confronting Russia in Tibet would do little to help wider Imperial 
security, whereas an Anglo-Russian rapprochement held out the prospect 
of major security gains. Extricated from Anglo-Russian rivalries, 
Britain could strengthen her position against the incoming menace of 
German power. Many Britons questioned the wisdom of a foray into 
Tibet, which, in spite of Government protestations to the contrary, 
appeared inspired by the Russian 'bogey'. Indeed, had the Government 
shown the same strength of purpose in the face of Calcutta that it 
showed in thwarting Parliamentary debate on the fraught diplomatic 
issue of Tibet, it is unlikely the Younghusband Mission would ever 
have happened. It was one thing for the Government to authorise an 
advance into Tibet, but another to justify it at home. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Agitation Against the Younghusband Expedition: Debate Frustrated 
From its very inception, the Younghusband Mission was viewed by 
many British MP' s in a dubious light; Unionist backbenchers, Liberals 
and Irish Nationalists were all to share a deep concern at a Tibetan 
enterprise primarily designed against Russia. Following the South 
African imbroglio, parliamentarians were particularly restive at the 
prospect of overseas military interventions, and could see little 
point in provoking Russian animosity over an issue as obscure as 
Tibet. Younghusband himself retrospectively 'quite realised the 
difficulty which any Government at home has in securing support from 
the House of Commons in a matter of this kind'. (1) Younghusband was 
well aware that Central Asian forays were domestically unpopular; of 
September 1903, when his Mission was stationed at Kamba Jong, he 
remarked 'it was high treason for me to whisper the word Lhasa to my 
nearest friend, such agitation did the sound of it cause in 
England'. (2) Younghusband retained little sympathy for that 
parliamentary and domestic opinion which held back British responses 
to Russian intrigues: 
As long as what an officer may do is contingent on the 'will' of 
'men in the street' of grimy manufacturing towns in the heart of 
England, so long must our action be slow, clumsy and hesitating, 
when it ought to be sharp and decisive. (3) 
Yet parliamentary and domestic opinion remained the ultimate arbiters 
of Central Asian policy; unfortunate and unpopular undertakings could 
politically prove hazardous (if not a virtual 'kiss of death') to the 
fortunes of a Ministry, [as had befallen Beaconsfield's administration 
over Afghanistan]. If Younghusband perceived parliamentary and 
popular sentiment as unhappy indulgences which aided Russia in Central 
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Asia, it was perhaps ironic that MP's were particularly concerned 
about the constitutional propriety of the Mission; certainly MPs such 
as Gibson Bowles were more vexed over its constitutional implications 
than over Russian intrigues in Lhasa. Sections 54 and 55 of the 
Government of India Act 1858 were explicit: 
Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her 
Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden or urgent 
necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the sanction 
of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the ~expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the 
frontiers of such possessions by Her Majesty's forces charged 
upon such revenues. 
Given that the Younghusband Mission enjoyed a sizeable military escort 
under General MacDonald, and that Indian revenues were paying for 
these forces, the Younghusband Mission was in clear breach of this Act 
of Parliament. The Unionist MP for Kings Lynn, Gibson Bowles, 
strongly resented the Government's convenient ignoring of Sections 54 
and 55 of the 1858 Act so that the Viceroy could bear-hunt in the 
Himalayas. On 3rd December 1903 he wrote to The Times: 
Is it intended to obtain the consent of both Houses of Parliament 
before applying the revenue of India to this particular military 
operation beyond the frontier?(4) 
With Parliament in recess the Government could afford to ignore such 
criticisms; although the Government's position remained clearly 
unconstitutional, the Government was more concerned that parliamentary 
sanction of the Mission's military nature would actually jeopardise 
its aim of minimising the Mission's military dimension. A low-key 
invasion of Tibet would be less likely to arouse Russian ire, and 
would help diminish Tibetan resistance. Were the Tibet Mission to 
become a major military undertaking, in any subsequent Anglo-Tibetan 
treaty, a British presence would probably be required to uphold its 
terms; for the Government to seek Parliamentary approval of the 
Mission's military aspects was to play Curzon's game of Long term 
involvement in Tibet coupled with intended insensitivity to Russia. 
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However, Gibson Bowles rightly remained attached to the need to 
uphold the 1858 Act; any other course was clearly illegal. On 
February 2nd in the House of Commons he observed that if there were 
'concurrence' of Tibet, then it was a 'Mission'; if not, it was an 
'invasion', stating his belief that in this invasion the relevant 
sections of the 1858 Act had 'been disobeyed and the Law broken'. (5) 
Yet the Government continued to flout the 1858 Act until April 13th; 
and even then its decision to seek Parliamentary approval for its 
military involvement in Tibet was not inspired by a concern for 
constitutional propriety. Rather, the deaths of 700 Tibetan soldiers 
in a battle with the Mission at Guru on March 31st 1904 had exposed 
the Government's false position beyond repair. Although Gibson Bowles 
might have been the Unionists' constitutional conscience, clearly the 
Government had been an unrepentant sinner, only unintentionally 
redeemed by Guru and its aftermath. 
If the Younghusband Mission had been born constitutionally 
illegitimate, with a Russophobe birthright, the British public viewed 
it with a mixture of ill-ease and quiescence. Opposition to the 
Mission would centre on Radical circles. The Boer War had certainly 
left an anti-imperialist imprint on the public mind, but would that 
sentiment apply to intervention in Tibet? Radical hopes of arousing 
public indignation focused on a retired Indian civil servant of 
radical tendencies, the former Chief-Commiiioner of Assam, Sir Henry 
Cotton, who had become a Knight Commander of the Star of India in June 
1902. Cotton was to mount a virtual one-man campaign against British 
involvement in Tibet; the obscurity of the Tibet question doubtless 
made other Radicals shy away from organising similar campaigns, which 
added to Cotton's authority as the foremost extra-parliamentary critic 
of _the Government. 
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Younghusband and Curzon would have found it particularly galling 
that Cotton, as a former employee of the Indian Civil Service, was 
organising a campaign that saw Britain as posing a greater threat to 
Tibet than anything Russia had to offer. Cotton had no sympathy for 
the Russian bogey; and his commitment to radicalism was well shown in 
1904 when he headed an Indian National Congress delegation that 
sought, and was refused, access to the Viceroy. Cotton was adopted in 
the Spring of 1903 as Liberal candidate for Nottingham East and the 
Tibet question doubtless brought his career much needed publicity, 
although his sheer vociferousness and singlemindedness in condemning 
Government policy have brought him excessive notoriety. Nevertheless 
Cotton succeeded in arousing the interest of parliamentarians and the 
public in the Tibet issues. Cotton particularly used The Times 
letters page, and public meetings, in his endeavour to politicise 
public perception of the Younghusband Mission. As he himself noted: 
The use of The Times in my Tibetan campaign was invaluable. I 
was able to state the case against the invasion of Tibet in the 
most prominent and public manner possible and, though I fought 
practically single-handed, there can be no doubt my letters 
attracted considerable attention. (6) 
In attempting to create a climate of domestic opposition to 
intervention in Tibet, Cotton realised that Parliament was the pivotal 
public forum. Although he was not to become an MP until 1906, he was 
in close contact with Opposition parliamentarians, and advised them on 
Tibetan concerns. Cotton later recalled: 
The late Lord Spencer asked me to go and see him at Spencer 
House, and I coached up other noble Lords and Members of 
Parliament over the matter. (7) 
The Opposition, of which Spencer was Leader in the Lords, had little 
sympathy with an 'unnecessary' Tibetan policy implicitly directed 
against Russia, and was willing to make use of Cotton's help. Cotton 
was also closely involved with members of the Commons, particularly 
Thomas Lough, Liberal MP for Islington, who on January 28th 1904 
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co-hosted an anti-Government Tibet meeting at the Westminster Hotel, 
London, with Cotton. As the Liberals initially knew little about 
Tibet it is likely that Cotton was consulted by Campbell-Bannerman, 
Trevelyan and Bryce; and other keenly interested Liberals such as 
Roberts, Weir, Lambert and Lawson. Cotton may also have been 
consulted by Irish Nationalists who were active on this issue, such as 
O'Neill and Flynn. 
Cotton, by his own account attended the Tibetan debates in the 
Lords and Commons(8), and was present in the gallery of the Commons on 
April 13th when Brodrick paid him the ultimate compliment of publicly 
refuting his writings in the press, and endeavouring to discredit him 
as a critic. Certainly Cotton felt the Government had been 
insufficiently brought to task in Parliamentary debates: 
My Lords and Gentlemen were slaves of the Blue-book - small 
blame to them, considering the profusion and confusion of 
information therein supplied - and had no mastery of its 
contents. (9) 
If Balfour's government took a dim view of Cotton's attempts to 
challenge its policy of a limited Tibetan intervention, it took an 
even dimmer view of backbench restlessness on the Tibet issue. Gibson 
Bowles certainly demonstrated an unwelcome liveliness on the 
backbenches, and his attitude to the Government's evasion of the 1858 
Government of India Act was a further instance of this. Following 
rumours in the press that in the forthcoming session <1904) certain 
members of Parliament would 'not be treated by the party whips as 
followers of the Government', Gibson Bowles wrote to Acland-Hood, 
Chief Government Whip, to discover the truth about these allegations. 
Although Acland-Hood had 'no hesitation' in reassuring Gibson Bowles 
that the rumours did not apply to him, and were untrue, it was clear 
enough that the Government wished to discourage backbench 
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insubordination. <10) A less independent MP than Gibson Bowles might 
have taken the hint. 
Of course many Unionists, particularly as there was a whiff of 
Russia in Tibet, favoured an invasion. As Cot ton remarked: 
The imputation of Russian intrigue anywhere is generally 
sufficient to rouse the indignation of Englishmen. And so the 
Russian bogey was deliberately trotted out in the case of 
Tibet. (11) 
A Unionist such as E R P Moon, ~1P for St Pancras North, favoured a 
robust policy towards Russia; on the Council of the Central Asian 
Society, and closely concerned about the affairs of the Chinese 
Empire, he was particularly interested in Tibet. On 23rd July 1903 he 
had stated in the House of Commons that: 
In taking measures to meet the Russian advance in Asia we must be 
on our guard at every point ... Not only should we treat 
Afghanistan as a buffer state, but we should treat Persia as a 
buffer state, and also all these outlying dependencies, which 
the Chinese called Colonies, such as Eastern Turkestan, Mongolia 
and Tibet. 
Moon clearly favoured Tibet as a buffer against Russian expansion, and 
warned that as regards Tibet and Mongolia Britain should do all it 
could to help China 'consolidate its rule over those parts of the 
world'. <12> 
Moon represented a strand of Unionism that was out of sympathy 
with an over-conciliatory attitude towards Russia. Indeed in 
assessing the motivations for the Mission on April 13th 1904, he saw 
three overriding reasons: the protection of British 'prestige and 
honour', the resumption of Anglo-Tibetan trade, and 'to protect India 
against attack'. {13) For Moon and many other Unionists with a Curzon 
world-view, Russian subterfuge in Central Asia was no mirage but a 
chilling reality. 
Indeed the Balfour Government was hampered in its Tibetan conduct 
by an uncertainty as to what its policy should be; the November 6th 
telegram ~as in fact stated Government policy, a limited intervention 
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with no long term British involvement. But there were to be sharp 
differences of emphasis in the Government as to the purpose of 
intervention. Brodrick, the new Secretary of State for India, saw the 
Mission as a clear means of demonstrating British might to Tibet <and 
Russia). Foreign Secretary Lansdowne felt that intervention in Tibet 
could be used as a quid pro quo with the Russian Government, for 
instance in securing Russian adherence to the Anglo-French 
understanding on Egypt. <14) Curzon, however, remained convinced of 
the necessity of obtaining some permanent means of British influence 
in Tibet, such as a Resident; he hoped that the pace df events in 
Tibet might make the appointment of a British Resident inevitable. 
The Unionist Government lacked the confidence of Curzon in Tibetan 
affairs or the conviction of Cotton's anti-interventionist beliefs. 
Balfour, who inclined to a moderate approach to Tibet out of deference 
to Russia and China, found his Government caught between the 
contradictory advice of a Viceroy and a former Chief Commissioner of 
Ass an 
Defending the Government's conduct in Tibet was largely the 
responsibility of the Secretary of State for India; unfortunately 
Brodrick lacked the necessary parliamentary flair to be an inspired 
speaker or defender of government policy in the House. Hamilton, his 
predecessor at the India Office, had predicted that Brodrick's 'never 
failing gaucherie' would prevent him from 'ever becoming a popular or 
a really capable Minister'. <15) Similarly Balfour's private secretary 
Sanders believed Nature had endowed Brodrick with 'a strange and 
unhappy genius for producing strained relations in the course of 
public business'. <16) Brodrick was symbolic of the dearth of talent 
in Balfour's Cabinet; the lack of first class debaters in the 
Government must have had some bearing on the Unionists determination 
to frustrate Commons debate on Tibet wherever possible. In the Lords 
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where, under Lansdowne, the Unionists had more capable orators, 
debates on Tibet were more readily acceded to. Gibson Bowles likened 
the UnioniGt front bench, in the face of sallies from Campbell-
Bannerman, to 'the Lords of the Philistines [who] sit on the roof 
making sport, [while] there is beneath them a blind Samson bowing 
himself beneath the pillar to bring down the whole structure on their 
heads'. <17) Yet if Brodrick can be defined in terms of mediocrity, so 
can much of the post-Salisbury Cabinet. Brodrick was a mediocrity 
within a mediocrity. 
The opening ~ounds in the controversy over Tibetan policy, and 
how it affected Britain's international relations, came towards the 
close of 1903. The outgoing Hamilton had stated, in response to a 
Parliamentary question from Herbert Roberts on 6th August 1903, that, 
as regards Younghusband at Kamba Jong, it would be 'contrary to·the 
public interest at this stage ..... to lay on the table the 
instructions to the British Commissioner'. (18) On November 6th the 
Government at last sanctioned a major advance into Tibet; with 
Parliament in recess there were limited opportunities to discuss the 
implications of Britain's dramatically changing relations with Tibet. 
It fell to Sir Henry Cotton to be the first to publicly challenge 
British involvement in Tibet. 
The eminent geographer Douglas Freshfield had written to The 
Times on November 3rd about both the geography and.the history of the 
North-Eastern frontier, and had noted how the Indian Government had 
decided not to submit to the 'premeditated insult' of the Tibetans' 
failure to send suitably empowered plenipotentiaries to meet 
Younghusband. He warned, quoting from Joseph Hooker: 
We forget that all our concessions to these people are 
interpreted into weakness. <19) 
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Replying from his St Johns Wood home on 2 December, Cotton was 'true 
/ 
to his salt', when he expressed his innate radical sympathies, and his 
aversion to using alleged Russian intrigues as an excuse for attacking 
the Tibetan underdog. He robustly defended the Tibetans' wish to 
avoid trade with India: 
The trade of Tibet is with China .... The sentiment of Imperial 
reciprocity of which we hear so much nowadays is very strong at 
Lhasa. <20) 
Cotton clearly wished to defend Tibetan rights in the face of an 
aggrandising Viceroy and a bullying Britain. 
That Cotton was read by Parliamentarians, and helped stir debate 
on Tibet, was shown by Gibson Bowles then writing to The Times stating 
his anxieties over the Government's unconstitutional position over the 
1858 Act. <21) An unhappy Freshfield also contributed to that issue; 
he viewed Cotton's 'hypothetical criticism' of British policy as 
'somewhat premature' and calling 'at least for the present, for no 
reply'. <22) The Times Editorial thought Cotton's letter deserved a 
response; it inveighed against 'irresponsible commentators at home' 
who, 'with the smug self-sufficiency characteristic of the Little 
Englander .... deal with the rest of the world with as much confidence 
as if it were the village green or a neighbouring football field'. <23) 
Thus were laid down the parameters of the Tibet debate which, inspired 
by Cotton's controversialism, took place in The Times over the proper 
direction of Britain's policy in Tibet. 
On December 4th Cotton again wrote to The Times: 
We have sent an armed mission into Tibet, and because the 
Tibetans have ignored its existence we are waging war against 
them. <24) 
He believed that the real reason for the military campaign lay in the 
desire to increase India's trade with Tibet; certainly Russia did not 
appear in Cotton's explanation for the British intervention. Cotton's 
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letter ensured that Tibet, as a controversial issue, would not quietly 
slip out of the public consciousness. 
On January 9th Cotton renewed his campaign; he expressed the hope 
that when Parliament met, 'some further light' would 'speedily be 
thrown upon what appears to be a remarkable instance of wanton 
aggression'. Citing Gibson Bowles and Sir Charles Dilke as MPs 
already deeply concerned over the unconstitutional evasion of the 1858 
Act, he warned The Times readership: 
A clearer evasion of this statute than the present military 
operations involves can hardly be imagined. 
Yet it was his observation that The Times had 'practically abandoned 
the hollow pretence that our advance is a countermove against Russia' 
that stirred most debate. <25) British greed rather than Russian 
designs, Cotton believed, had inspired the Younghusband Expedition. 
The Times strongly refuted Cotton's suggestion that it no longer held 
Russia as a factor in the Tibet invasion; its Editorial on January 
16th asked whether Cotton had ever heard of the Tibetan missions to 
Russia, and Russian Missions to Tibet, and affirmed its view that 
'Russian intrigue' had been 'busy in Tibet for some years past'. <26) 
Although Cotton did not believe so, clearly Curzon in handling Tibet 
had been reacting in response to Russian intrigues at Lhasa. A 
Viceroy, no matter what his sympathies or otherwise towards Russia, 
had to be vigilant on India's glacis; as The Times noted: 
Even Sir Henry Cotton must admit that it would not be to the 
advantage of India to have a repetition at Lhasa of the 
underground efforts we have been able to overcome at Kabul. <27> 
Other readers rebutted Cotton's remarks on the 'hollow prebence' 
of Russian involvement in Tibet; 'Spectator' on January 11th 
questioned whether, if the Russian Government cherished hostile 
designs towards Tibet, it was 'likely that they would inform Sir Henry 
Cotton?' <28) Tsebu Chu, a reader evidently acquainted with the 
region, confessed: 
I can hardly imagine Sir H Cotton is as ill informed as would 
appear from his letter. <29) 
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Nevertheless Cotton's letters were maintaining a high public profile 
in The Times; the invasion of Tibet would not go unchallenged. 
On January 18th Cotton wrote again to The Times re-stating his 
conviction of the illusory nature of the Russian 'phantom' in Tibet. 
As regards Russian intrigues, Cotton maintained, there was 'no limit 
to the gullibility of a certain class of Englishman in these matters: 
It is the idlest delusion to suppose that the Tibetan authorities 
have given or will give any more encouragement to Russians than 
they do to Englishmen. 
A comparison of Dorjieff's mission to Russia with Curzon's frustrated 
attempts to achieve a dialogue with Lhasa clearly would not support 
this assertion of Cotton's. Cotton ended his letter by assuring The 
Times readership that Russia already had her hands too full to engage 
in 'schemes of aggression in Tibet',confidently adding that 'history 
records no attempted invasion of India across the Himalayan 
frontier'. (30) 
The following day 'Sikkim', corresponding from the StJames Club, 
wrote to The Times challenging Cotton's remarks. He was not inclined 
to be as generous as Cotton in considering alleged Russian intrigues; 
as to whether there had been a Russian Mission to Lhasa, 'Sikkim' 
believed that the fact that there was no Russian political officer in 
Lhasa was 'no proof that such negotiations have not been carried on'. 
The first reports of Russo-Chinese negotiations with regard to 
Port Arthur and Manchuria were also dismissed as 'wild 
statements' by politicians of no less sagacity than Sir Henry 
Cot ton. 
Finally, as a part hi an shot to Cot ton, 'Sikkim' noted how in 1793 a 
Sino-Tibetan army had actually crossed the Himalayas, descending on 
Nepal with 70,000 men. (31) Even so, Cotton remained unconvinced of 
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any potential for a Russian threat to India from Tibet. Indeed, it 
would be surprising if the Contemporary Review did not have Cotton 
among others in mind when it condemned those politicians, 'who 
fervently worship radicalism at home, and humbly sacrifice at the 
shrine of absolutism abroad'. C32) 
. Cotton had succeeded in maintaining Tibet as a controversial 
issue in .the public eye during the Parliamentary recess; he was 
particularly keen to fire the interest of MPs, with the 1904 session 
of Parliament due to commence on February 2nd. Suitably close to 
Parliament, Cotton held a public meeting on January 28th at the 
Westminster Palace Hotel. C33) The meeting was convened by the New 
Reform Club in concert with the British Committee of the Indian 
National Congress and the London Indian Society. Radicals present 
included Mr T Lough MP, Mr Humphreys-Owen MP and Mr J A Hobson. It 
was perhaps fitting that J A Hobson should be present; inspired by his 
detestation if imperialism, his magnum opus, Imperialism was published 
in 1902; it warned: 
Vast countries in Asia such as Persia, Tibet, Siam, Afghanistan 
are rapidly forging to the front of politics as likely subjects 
of armed controversy between European powers with a view to 
subjugation. C34) 
If Tibet was not to prove an area of 'armed controversy' between 
Britain and Russia, thereby proving Hobson's prediction concerning 
Tibet unduly pessimistic, it was simply that Tibet was not worth the 
risk of a major dispute to either party. Hobson moved the motion 
which was so worded as to prove controversial: 
That this meeting protests against the invasion of Tibet by a 
British armed force on ~he grounds 
(1) that the Government has published no information to show 
that it is other than an unwarranted act of aggression 
upon a neighbouring state, and 
C2) that a heavy burden of expenditure is being placed upon 
the already overtaxed people of India for an enterprise 
beyond the frontier dictated not by the necessities of 
Indian policy, but by the pursuit of some undisclosed 
Imperial project. 
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And that this meeting calls upon Parliament to exercise its 
authority and to insist the Government shall either show an 
adequate cause for this expenditure or withdraw its forces from 
beyond the frontier without delay. 
As Chairman, Lough stated that the failure of the Government to 
provide an offical explanation for the Mission or to obtain any 
Parliamentary sanction rendered such a protest necessary. Lough could 
only see the Mission as 'part of a recrudescence of a bad spirit of 
warlike enterprise'; but, as the main speaker, it fell to Cotton to 
inveigh against the Government's invasion of Tibet. He feared that 
India's apparent forward policy was 'traceable to the desire of 
officials to attain glory and distinction by adding to His Majesty's 
Dominions, to KCB-mania, as Lord Lawrence called it'. He resolutely 
espoused the Radical belief that the fear of Russian aggression 'was 
never less reasonable than in the case of Tibet'. Turning to the 
Government's 'palpable and gross violation' of the 1858 India Act, he 
remarked that, 'if it were argued that this was not a military 
campaign, he could imagine no baser subterfuge'. Following Cotton's 
speech the resolution was passed unanimously; only one note of dissent 
had been sounded in the meeting when Mr J DRees 'took exception to 
the language of Mr Hobson', who had referred to the 'diabolical 
policy' practised by Curzon and his frontier agents. It was somehwat 
ironic that Rees should have been the sole voice of protest at 
Cotton's meeting; when Cotton retired in 1910 as MP for Nottingham 
East, he was succeeded by fellow Liberal J D Rees. 
The Times gave further publicity to Cotton's meeting in its 
editorial, criticising it as a 'little group of politicians who are 
always "agin the Government"'. <35> Although The Times pointed to 
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Dorjieff's rumoured activities as refuting Cotton's view of events in 
Tibet, it must be given credit for providing Cotton's anti-
interventionist Tibetan campaign with the oxygen of publicity. 
Without Cotton's contributions, the Government's Tibetan intervention 
would surely have been less controversial. 
When Parliament at last met on February 2nd 1904, MPs and Lords 
were keen to question the Government over the implications of the 
advance into Tibet, particularly as regards its constitutional and 
Russian ramifications. In the Lords Earl Fitzwilliam sought to 
reassure the Opposition: 
The policy involved in the Mission .... is not to acquire 
territory, neither is it conceived in any aggressive spirit. 
The object in view is to obtain assurance that treaty obligations 
will be observed and that encroachment may not be renewed. <36) 
However, Earl Spencer remained concerned over the Government's non-
observance of the 1858 India Act, and questioned whether the Mission 
constituted 'a mere friendly group of visitors' sent by the Government 
of India, or did it mean more?<37) Both from a constitutional view 
and from the need not to provoke Russian hostility, Spencer's question 
deserved a clear answer. Lansdowne replied that the Government did 
not admit 'that the Tibetan Mission which is described in the <King's) 
Speech as a political mission, is a military operation'. <38) 
Lansdowne's reply was less than honest; as MacDonald's military force 
was accompanying the Mission into Tibet, inevitably his forces were on 
active duty. Had there been no question of forcing the Tibetans into 
better neighbourliness towards Britain, and had there been no Tibetan 
resistance anticipated, a military operation alongside the Mission 
would not have been required. 
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The Mission was clearly a military operation if only to provide a 
secure environment for Younghusband to negotiate in; to pretend 
otherwise was misleading. In the Commons Gibson Bowles insisted that: 
If there is concurrence of Tibet, then this is a Mis~{on: if not 
it is an invasion. <39) 
As Younghusband's expedition lacked Tibet's concurrence, it was 
transparently an invasion based on military power. Gibson Bowles 
remained implacably hostile to the Government's evasion of this simple 
truth as regards the 1858 India Act. Indeed he challenged 'any 
Gentleman on the front bench to answer his contention that the 1858 
Act had been broken'; <40) his offer was declined. On Februa1-y 4th, 
when Brodrick failed to give an honest reply to his question as to 
whether the British had been invited into Tibet, Gibson Bowles angrily 
retorted: 
That is no answer to my question, whether the Tibetan Government 
have given permission for this expedition to enter their 
territory. <41) 
Clearly the Government had a malcontent on Tibetan policy 
uncomfortably in the midst of its backbenchers. Yet the Government 
maintained its dishonest attitude; on February 17th, in answer to a 
question from Herbert Roberts, Liberal MP for Denbighshire West, on 
the Government's constitutional impropriety, Brodrick stated, in a 
triumph of legerdemain: 
The fact that an escort accompanied the political mission does 
not necessitate any action under Clause 54 and 55 of the 
Government of India Act. <42) 
The first major opportunity to scrutinise Government conduct came 
in the Lords on February 26th 1904. Opposition Lords chose to 
concentrate on the Russian dimension of the Tibet question and Lord 
Reby, former Governor of Bombay, proposed that 'a humble address be 
presented to His Majesty for further papers relating to Tibet' <the 
first Tibetan Blue Book having been published in February). Reay 
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delivered a capable speech, although the detail of his speech, culled 
from the Blue Book, lends weight to Cotton's belief that 
Parliament5rians were in danger of becoming 'slaves to the Blue Book'. 
Reay was unconvinced that Tibet's refusal to receive or send letters, 
the removal of the boundary pillars, or the usurpation of grazing 
rights could 'justify an advance into the heart of Tibet'. Reay also 
believed that the frustrated export efforts of the Indian Tea 
Association to Tibet could not explain such a Mission. Rather he 
turned to the question of Russia, stating his belief in how remote was 
the 'direct contact of Russia with Tibet'. Reay fully accepted 
Lamsdorff's July 8th 1901 assurance of the non-political nature of 
Dorjieff's Mission, as well as Benckendorff's assurances to Lansdowne, 
of which he remarked: 
I cannot conceive that any declaration could be clearer or more 
definite than the declaration of the Russian Government. 
Reay suspected that British mistrust of Russia lay behind the Mission: 
It is inherent to our political position that wherever we 
advance, there should be mistrust in England. 
In view of this Anglo-Russian mistrust, rather than permit sterile 
misunderstandings to continue, Reay hoped Lansdowne would show a 
willingness to enter into 'amicable discussion' with the Russian 
Government to attempt to remove, 'once and for all, the cause of 
reciprocal suspicion of motives'. 
that: 
Reay concluded his speech by seeking an assurance from Lansdowne 
Colonel Younghusband will in no circumstances be allowed to 
advance beyond Gyangtse, and whether the Indian Government has 
been informed that an occupation or advance upon Lhasa will not 
be authorised by His Majesty's Government. <43) 
He was clearly concerned that the November 6th telegram would be but a 
staging post on the road to Lhasa. Reay's speech also voiced the 
Opposition fear that the foray into Tibet, inspired by the Russophobe 
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Curzon, could threaten the prospects for improved Anglo-Russian 
relations. Reay' s concerns remained very real dangers. 
Hardwicke, for the Government, argued that the Government could 
have abandoned all hope of having any relations with Tibet at all. 
That it had decided to pursue a policy of positive intercourse with 
Tibet proved that it was now carrying out 'the one policy' that had 
been adopted towards Tibet by Viceroys as disparate as Elgin and 
Curzon. But if Hardwicke detected a clear continuity in Anglo-Tibetan 
relations he was mistaken; prior to 1900 Anglo-Tibetan relations had 
been a localised affair on the Raj's peripheries, yet after this time, 
as Hardwicke himself put it, there were 'matters of far more 
importance .... to be considered'. Russian contacts with Tibet meant 
that Anglo-Tibetan relations became siphoned into the whirlpool of 
Great Game rivalry. Hardwicke's speech went on to become an admission 
of the changed nature of Anglo-Tibetan relations. 
Hardwicke contrasted Tibet's unwillingness to have 'intercourse' 
with Britain to her willingness to have 'intercourse with another 
power': 
We do not care whether the object of the mission sent from Tibet 
to St Petersburg was commercial, political or religious, it makes 
no difference to us. But we know the result of that Mission and 
the result of the intercourse has been to inspire the Tibetans 
with the feeling they have the power of Russia behind them. They 
have said openly "We do not fear England, we have Russia behind 
us". 
However, the Government, although prepared to admit a clear 
Russian dimension to the Tibetan problem, was anxious to disassociate 
the Russian Government from these difficulties. Tibet's erroneous 
perception of Russian intentions lay at the heart of the question; 
however for Russia's benefit, Hardwicke made clear, that in any Anglo-
Russian 'amicable discussions', the matter of Tibet would not arise as 
the British Government did not recognise the Russian Government to 
have 'any locus standi in Tibet'. Unfortunately for the British 
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Government, Russia did have a de facto locus standi in Tibet through 
Dorjieff; had Russia enjoyed no locus standi in Tibet, the 
Younghusband Mission would never have existed. Hardwicke was unable 
to offer any definite announcement as to whether the Mission would 
advance beyond Gyangtse (if only because the Government did not know 
itself>, and ended his speech by offering the curious prospect that 
should the Buddhist potentate, the Dalai Lama, prefer to appeal 'to 
the arbitrament of the sword and to provoke hostilities', then Britain 
'must necessarily accept that challenge'. <44) Hardwicke' s readiness 
to pick up the Dalai Lama's gauntlet came at a time the Government was 
emphatically denying that the Younghusband Mission could be considered 
a military enterprise. 
However, the intervention of a former Viceroy, Ripon, was to 
provide a major indictment of Government conduct towards Tibet. 
Ripon's criticisms were particularly effective as being the first 
occasion 'throughout the whole of the Government of Lord Curzon' on 
which, 'either in Parliament or out of it', he had ever said 'a word 
of criticism'. Ripon claimed to find it 'not a pleasant task' to 
criticise his successor, but Curzon's Tibetan foray demanded he speak 
out, as 'every step in that policy' had been 'inspired by a Russian 
scare'. In the case of Russian involvement in Tibet Ripon believed: 
We have now nothing more than rumours of a Russian agent. There 
is no proof .... that any Russian agent has been to Lhasa. 
Even of the Tibetan Mission to St Petersburg Ripon felt, somewhat 
generously, that it could not be maintained that it had been sent 
'with the authority of the Government of Lhasa'. 
If Curzon can be accused of excessive zeal in seeking to oppose 
Russian influence at Lhasa, Ripon can equally be accused of an 
excessive willingness to give Russia the benefit of the doubt as 
regards Russian penetration of Tibet. However, Ripon was justified in 
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expressing his anxiety at Curzon's plans for long term British 
involvement in Tibet; he believed that the demand for a permanent 
British agent (at Lhasa) would be 'the most fatal of all proposals'. 
Furthermore, Ripon warned: 
If you get to Lhasa and force your treaty upon the Tibetan people 
you will throw their sympathies to the opposite direction, namely 
to Russia. 
Ripon undoubtedly believed a forward policy in Tibet to be inherently 
flawed; yet he remained worried about its wider implications. He 
warned that those 'animated by hostility to this country' should not 
be given the chance to misinterpret British intentions in Tibet as a 
pretext 'to embroil us with Russia'. Ripon felt this fear 
particularly justified at a time when the Russian people were 
'naturally excited' about the Russo-Japanese war, for any idea that 
Britain was 'attempting to start a march on them' would be a 'grave 
danger'. <45) Although Ripon believed Russia had no right in Tibet, 
nevertheless she had an interest in Tibet, and he clearly felt that 
Britain ignored Russian sensibilities at her peril. Certainly he 
provided a distinguished drubbing of the Government's behaviour in the 
Tibetan question; Ripon's speech can only be criticised on the grounds 
that in his eagerness to denounce the forward policy in Tibet, he 
failed to give the instances of Russo-Tibetan contacts a fair hearing. 
Rosebery, however, gave a particularly effective speech on the 
Tibetan question; although unenthusiastic over a forward move, he was 
more sympathetic as to its causes. Confessing himself to find 'so 
melancholy a resemblance' to the onset of the first Afghan War, 
nevertheless he felt it no longer possible to withdraw the Mission 
without 'some substantial result' and to make 'a firm impression on 
the Tibetan mind and imagination'. Rosebery was in no doubt that fear 
of Russia had inspired the Mission; of the border and treaty 
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difficulties with Tibet he perceptively observed they were 'very 
suitable causes for a quarrel if you want to pick one': 
There is only one justification for the policy of His Majesty's 
Government, and that is the question of whether there is any 
understanding between Russia and Tibet which might be of a 
character dangerous to our interests in Asia. 
Certainly Rosebery was not one of those who held that 'because the 
Asiatic dominion of Russia and Tibet are a thousand miles apart, that 
altogether deprives them of their significance': he was prepared to 
accept that Russian activities were more than a figment of Curzon's 
imagination. He realised that distance in Central Asia was relative; 
he believed that the Dalai Lama and his authority was to Russia, as 
well as to Britain and China, 'a matter of great significance and 
importance' . 
Rosebery's speech was both conciliatory and firm on the question 
of Russo-Tibetan contact; although categorically accepting Russian 
denials of any Russo-Tibetan agreement, nevertheless he plainly 
attached 'considerable weight to the Tibetan Embassy to St 
Petersburg', viewing it is an act 'unwarranted by consolidation of 
neighbourly amity', .which therefore assumed 'a political significance 
which it is not easy to overlook'. He felt this Embassy to be 'a 
serious symptom' and expressed the hope that Lansdowne could reveal 
more about the relations between Russia and Lhasa. Rosebery's 
observations and criticisms were intelligent and pertinent; he was not 
a 'hostile critic' and he gave Government policy fair consideration, 
although he did accept that to such a critic reading through the Blue 
Book, forcing Indian tea on Tibet might appear the Government's real 
objective. <46) 
It fell to Lansdowne to state the Government's position, 
particularly since, as Rosebery had hinted, Russo-Tibetan relations 
might not be entirely platonic. Lansdowne refuted suggestions of a 
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'forward policy' and argued that British relations with Tibet over the 
frontier question had been a 'history of British patience and 
forbearance'. In answer to Rosebery's remark that some critics might 
see the intent to force Indian tea on Tibet as the real reason for the 
Mission, Lansdowne noted that so little was British pressure on this 
issue that, in 1893, 'at the request of the Chinese we dropped 
the question of tea, for no less than five years'. Similarly 
Britain's good relations with Nepal and Bhutan, so Lansdowne argued, 
meant it was not necessary to impute 'sinister designs upon our 
Tibetan neighbours'. As Lansdowne realised, Russia lay at the heart 
of the Tibet question; he stated the Government's view of Tibet's 
stat us thus: 
Our view is that the Independence of Tibet should be recognised, 
but that if any power is to exercise a preponderance in that 
country, that power can only be Great Britain. 
In other words, there was no room for Russia in Tibet. So as not to 
embarass St Petersburg, Lansdowne diplomatically added: 
Whether there had been any question of communications between 
Russia and Tibet or not, it would, in my belief, have been none 
the less necessary that some step should be taken to bring the 
Tibetan Government to reason. 
In arguing that the Russian dimension of the Tibet question had no 
bearing on the decision to enter Tibet, an entirely specious argument, 
Lansdowne sought further to disassociate Russia from collusions in 
Lhasa by firmly blaming the Tibetan Government: 
What seems to me to aggravate our difficulties in this case is 
not so much anything which the Russian Government has done, as 
what the Tibetans imagine the Russian Government to intend or to 
have in contemplation. 
Although Lansdowne sought to dispel 'idle rumours' of Russian troops 
or Russians in Lhasa, nevertheless he did not seek to deny the 
'indisputable evidence' that the Tibetans were 'deeply convinced that 
'they may count upon Russian support'. The point Lansdowne's speech 
conveniently avoided was how the Tibetans had come to believe they 
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could rely on Russian support. As Dorjieff and his Mission to Russia 
indicated, the Russian Government was hardly a blameless party. 
Lansdowne concluded his speech by stating that in view of Tibetan 
behaviour 'no other course seemed open to us' but to send a 
Mission. <47) Yet as a former Viceroy and Foreign Secretary, Lansdowne 
recognised that Russia's role in Tibet had not been entirely 
incidental, even though his speech, for obvious diplomatic reasons, 
encouraged that impression. Indeed whether Tibet was Russophile 
because of what she imagined Russia would do, or was Russophile 
because of a definite Russo-Tibetan compact, the effect was still the 
same: within three hundred miles of Calcutta was a Russophile and 
Anglophobe state. The Younghusband Mission was the Viceroy's attempt 
to lance the Russian boil on India's glacis; if anything, Tibet was 
the incidental party. 
In the House of Commons, anxieties about the Government's 
ultimate intentions in Tibet persisted. Brodrick had given th~ 
Commons an assurance on February 4th: 
The object of the Mission is not to annex any portion of Tibetan 
territory, but to prevent a recurrence of the difficulties 
arising from the attitude of the Tibetan Government in respect 
of the Convent ion of 1890. <48) 
MPs, however, remained restive about the Government's Tibetan policy, 
and they were alive to the fact that, should the Tibet Mission begin 
to use force, the Government would be seriously embarrassed on both 
Russian and constitutional grounds. The Opposition backbenches 
continued to ask awkward questions of Brodrick; Irish MPs such as 
Redmond, Swift MacNeill and Flynn also endeavoured to discomfort the 
Government. On 9th March Redmond, Nationalist MP for Clare East, 
asked Balfour 'whether he will arrange that the House of Commons shall 
have an opportunity of considering the question of the expedition to 
Tibet before the expedition makes further advance'. Unsurprisingly, 
63 
in view of the political and diplomatic delicacy of the issue, Balfour 
refused: 
At the present moment I do not think anything would be gained by 
a discussion of this question and I do not propose to make any 
arrangement as suggested in the question. C49) 
If the Opposition front bench preferred to hold its fire on the 
Government's Tibet position, presumably until such time as Tibet 
policy could be criticised without appearing unpatriotic, Gibson 
Bowles had no such armistice with the Government. On 17th March he 
sought to know if an 'order' had been sent to the Government of India 
'directing hostilities to be undertaken in Tibet'. Brodrick replied 
that no such order had been given, though the Mission was instructed 
to defend itself in the event of an 'attack'; Brodrick also informed 
Gibson Bo~les, who had also asked if Tibet had assented to the 
Mission, that the Government 'did not make the advance of the Mission 
dependant on their consent'. An angry Gibson Bowles retorted: 
Then does my Right Honourable Friend say that to send an armed 
expedition int~ that country is not an hostile act? 
Brodrick was saved from the embarrassment of answering Gibson Bowles' 
question by the Speaker's intervention, ruling the supplementary 
question out of order as a 'debatable matter of opinion'. C50> 
However, pressure in the Commons on the Government's position was 
to grow; that Britain should have invaded Tibet at the instigation of 
a Viceroy renowned for his hostility to Russia, and that the Commons 
should be denied the opportunity of debate, remained clear proof of 
continued Government bad faith towards the Lower House. On 28th March 
Trevelyan, Liberal MP for Elland, sought an assurance from Brodrick 
that 'if fighting takes place .... the Government will recognise the 
expedition as a military one, and take the necessary steps to secure 
the consent of both Houses of Parliament, as required by Law'. 
Although Brodrick promised the Government would 'undoubtedly comply 
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with the Law as expressed in Sections 54 and 55 of the Better 
Government of India Act', it was evident enough that the Government 
would avoid the issue until it was no longer avoidable. C51) On the 
same day, Lough asked Brodrick when the House would have the 'promised 
opportunity' of debating the matter CTibet>, to which Brodrick replied 
that no such promise had been given; in apparent frustration the 
Nationalist MP for Cork County North, Flynn, (though 'out of order') 
endeavoured to repeat Lough's question. C52> It was clear that the 
Government intended to thwart a major Tibet debate in the Commons for 
as long as possible. 
However, Parliamentary custom provided that, prior to the Easter 
recess, MPs·could raise any matters of interest to them; thus during 
the Consolidated CNo 1) Bill, also on 28th March, Trevelyan addressed 
the Tibetan question. The Government could not prevent him discussing 
the Tibetan issue; for his part Trevelyan insisted that it was 'the 
duty of the House to consider why they were moving forward in a quasi-
military manner'. As the first MP able to discuss the Tibetan 
invasion in the Commons, he approached the matter 'in a spirit of 
inquiry', noting the absence of any 'explicit statement of the reasons 
why the Mission was going forward at all'. He did not consider that 
the catalogue of 'small incidents and annoyances on the borders' of 
India, or Lhasa's policy of isolation, justified the invasion; rather 
it was the 'old bugbear of Russia' that had inspired the British 
intervention. Trevelyan believed that, as regards the fear of Russia, 
there was less occasion for it than had 'ever occurred in the history 
of England'. If invading Tibet was strategically flawed, neither 
could Trevelyan believe the rumours of Russian envoys in Lhasa, 
particularly as Lansdowne had accepted Benckendorff's assurances. 
Thus he could only conclude: 
It seemed a very strong measure, with the small evidence of 
Russia's intention, and the immense territory that the Russians 
would have to traverse to send an armed force into a harmless 
country. 
Trev.elyan was certain of the effect British intervention in Tibet 
would have on Russia: 
It was obviously, if anything, a challenge to her, an irritant, 
an attempt to steal a march upon her, just at the moment she 
was engaged elsewhere. 
Yet even if Britain was endeavouring to steal a march upon Russia 
during her difficulties with Japan, that was exactly what Russia had 
done in North China during the Boer War. Trevelyan, however, could 
not accept the British invasion was a justified response to Russian 
penetration; rather the Mission would simply create 'hostility in 
Russia where none previously existed'. <.53) 
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Not only had Trevelyan concluded this speech with a clear censure 
of British behaviour in Tibet; he continued to pressurise the 
Government on Tibet by submitting a question for 29th March. 
Trevelyan sought 'information regarding the intention of the 
Government' concerning the Mission's advance. The Government, 
however, had every intention of rebutting unhelpful questions by over-
curious MPs; after Trevelyan uttered a few words outside the scope of 
his question, conduct which was 'out or order', the Speaker 
interjected with a highly revealing remark: 
Mr Speaker called the Hon. Member's attention to the fact that 
there was a notice on the paper dealing with the question of 
Tibet which precluded the merits of the expedition being now 
discussed. <54) 
To prevent embarrassment to itself, and its relations with Russia, the 
Government was not only verbally denying the House the opportunity to 
debate Tibet, but was employing underhand parliamentary tactics to 
frustrate the possibility of any such debate. Sir Robert Reid, 
Liberal MP for Dumfries Burghs, spoke immediately after Brodrick's 
reply to Trevelyan's question: 
He very much regretted that the House was prevented from 
discussing the subject of the Tibetan expedition by reason of 
the fact that a Motion dealing with the question had been set 
down by a Private Member on the other side. The result of the 
Rule was that the House might be prevented from discussing 
questions of the most vital importance by the uncontrolled 
caprice or design of an individual member. (55) 
The Rule to which Reid referred is explained by Redlich as: 
An application of the rule of procedure which forbade motions 
of an anticipatory nature; it is out of order to introduce a 
bill or a motion which appears to cover all or part of the 
ground taken up by a motion or bill already among the orders 
of the day, even for a later date. 
Thus the Government could be 'protected from all discussion' of an 
unwelcome subject such as Tibet if an MP, 'by arrangement with the 
Government, or even without any formal communication with them', set 
66 
down a bill or motion at an opportune time, either for a 'distant day 
or leaving the date for discussion right open' <56); thus as long as 
such a bill or motion remained amongst the orders, the Government 
could thwart unwelcome discussion on Tibet. Although ignorant of the 
source of the blocking motion, Reid pointedly remarked: 
They might fairly assume the Government could have some little 
influence in preventing its being on the Paper if they desired 
to exercise it. 
Reid expressed the hope that the Government might do this 'if some 
responsible member of the Opposition, not necessarily on the front 
bench, desired to raise a discussion'. (57) It was no coincidence that 
Redlich, writing of the 1904 session, observed of the Government's 
tactics: 
The Balfour Cabinet managed with the help of blocking motions to 
elude all discussion of the delicate questions of Protection and 
of the employment of Chinese labour on the Transvaal - arousing 
by so doing much indignation among the Opposition. (58) 
It is salutary to think that, had there been no Guru disaster, Tibet 
would surely have joined this list. 
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At Guru on March 31st 1904 the Government's contention that the 
Younghusband Mission was a peaceful enterprise was exposed beyond 
repair; a heavily outnumbered, though well armed, Younghusband Mission 
came to blows with the Tibetans, leaving seven hundred Tibetans dead. 
The Government stood in clear constitutional breach of the 1858 India 
Act, with the military nature of the Mission self-evident. However, 
the Government remained fortunate in that the Parliamentary recess 
lasted until April 12th; it had almost a fortnight for passions to 
cool following first reports of Guru reaching the press on April 1st. 
The Times felt little sympathy for the Tibetan plight, believing that 
the 'ignorant recklessness of the Tibetan leaders at Guru finds its 
counterpart in the entire policy of Lhasa', and remained convinced 
that only Great Britain of the Powers had the right to 'exercise a 
preponderance in that country'. <59) However, there was a great 
feeling of revulsion in Radical circles at the Guru incident, as well 
as unease in the country. It fell to Cotton to express Radical 
dismay. On April 8th he forthrightly condemned the 'recent slaughter 
of Tibetans' and castigated the Government's Tibetan conduct. Cotton 
also sought to raise the spectre that Younghusband said was to haunt 
his Mission, that of Cavagnari: 
Do we intend to follow our precedent of Sir Louis Cavagnari at 
Kabul and establish a permanent British envoy at Lhasa? 
Cotton was not convinced by Government protestations of no annexations 
or protectorate in Tibet, noting that it would not be the first time 
that 'circumstances have been held to alter cases'. (60) As Cotton's 
fear was Curzon's hope, Cotton wrote again to The Times on April 11th. 
In an endeavour to expose the Government's version of the diplomatic 
background surrounding the Tibet invasion, he called into question 
Hardwicke's and Lansdowne's assurance of February 26th to the Lords, 
of China's' full cognisance and consent', and 'knowledge and 
\ 
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concurrence' of the British intervention. In what The Times called 
his 'quixotic earnestness in the defence of Chinese suzerainty over 
Tibet', Cotton also questioned the truth of a reference in the King's 
speech to 'the concurrence of the Chinese Government' in the Tibet 
intervention: 
I hope my language will not be considered too strong if I say 
these statements are devoid of foundation . . . . We have 
literally ignored the Chinese protests and have spurned their 
suzerainty. Is it not a very dangerous policy calculated to 
throw China into the arms of Russia?<61) 
These charges against Government assurances were undeniably serious, 
and were designed to encourage increasing scrutiny by MPs of the whole 
question of Tibet. The Times Editorial replied to Cotton's charged in 
deep displeasure: 
Sir Henry Cot ton's language is not strong, in fact it is not 
strong at all. It is excessively discourteous but that is quite 
a different thing. 
It concluded by wishing Cotton 'a more respectable client and Tibet a 
less maladroit advocate'. <62> 
Cotton's views did not go unchallenged by other letters. 
A H H MacClean chided Cotton for practically giving the lie to 'the 
statements contained in the King's speech and the speeches of the Earl 
of Hardwicke and Marquis of Lansdowne'. <63) 'Sikkim' criticised 
Cotton's robust defence of Chinese suzerainty; he remained unconvinced 
of the substance of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet, and questioned 
Lhasa's behaviour as a loyal Chinese feudatory, particularly in view 
of her contacts with Russia. <64) Cotton's real achievement lay, not 
in the popularity of his arguments outside Radical circles, but in his 
ability to stir discussion on the Tibet issue. In the period after 
Guru and prior to the House's re-assembling, Cotton's letters ensured 
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that the columns of 'the Thunderer' remained alive with debate on the 
invasion of Tibet; MPs reading The Times during the Easter recess 
would want explanations for British conduct in Tibet from a Government 
in clear violation of the 1858 Government of India Act. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Debate Achieved: the Tibet Revenues Bill of April 1904 
On April 13th 1904 Brodrick wrote to Curzon that: 
A number of our Members went to the Whips early in the afternoon, 
and told them that they intended to vote against the Government, 
unless it was made clear that we adhered to the policy laid down 
in the telegram of November 6th, and did not intend to keep a 
permanent mission in Tibet. 
Brodrick recognised that: 
The slaughter ten days before naturally barbed the contentions 
of those who urged that the Tibetans were an inoffensive people 
who only wanted to be left alone. <1) 
There was also a strong precedent for voting against a Government in 
violation of Sections 54 and 55 of the 1858 India Act; as Gibson 
Bowles had noted on February 2nd, in 1878, over the declaration of war 
in Afghanistan 'the Member for West Birmingham, Lord Hartington, and 
Lord James of Hereford all voted against the Government on this very 
ground'. <2> 
Clearly, both in the eyes of the backbenches and the Opposition, 
Government conduct towards Tibet had been reprehensible; yet the 
Government proved sufficiently able to mollify MP's anxieties that in 
the April 13th debate on Tibet, it achieved a handsome majority of 209 
<Ayes 270, Noes 61). The motion presented to the House was: 
That this House consents to the revenues of India being applied 
to defray the expenses of any military operations which have or 
may become necessary beyond the frontiers of His Majesty's 
Indian Possessions, for the purposes of protecting the Political 
Mission which has been despatched to the Tibetan Government. 
If the retrospective nature of part of the Motion was itself an 
admission that the Government had been outside the Law, MPs 
displeasure at the Government's unconstitutional conduct was not 
reflected in the division of the House; only an unequivocal Government 
promise of upholding the November 6th telegram had allayed the 
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Common's restiveness. Certainly the Government's new-found concern 
for constitutional propriety and reiteration of the November 6th 
telegram did induce Gibson Bowles to vote in the 'Aye' lobby; 
otherwise Gibson Bowles would surely have led a Unionist revolt. Yet, 
although those in the 'Noes' lobby had only constituted a 'bakers 
dozen' of Liberals and 49 Irish, it was the Opposition Front bench's 
decision to walk. out, rather than vote in either lobby, that ensured 
the Government's undeserved success in the vote on Tibet. Certainly, 
in view of the Government's majority of 209 in the Tibet division, one 
would not have guessed the Government's trepidation at the prospect of 
a debate it had hoped would never happen. 
The 'Political Notes' of The Times on April 13th provide an 
insight into the Government's post-Guru Tibetan difficulties: 
The fact having leaked out that Mr Lo.ugh contemplated moving the 
adjournment of the House of Commons yesterday in order to call 
attention, on the grounds of public urgency, to the question of 
Tibet, Sir Alexander Acland-Hood <Government Chief Whip> made 
special mention of the matter in his 'Whip' as a reason for the 
prompt return of Ministerialists after the Easter holiday. 
Consequently Unionist members were present at the commencement of 
business in greater numbers than would otherwise have been the 
case. (3) 
Lough, as demonstrated by his chairing of Cotton's protest meeting at 
the Westminster Palace Hotel, had been in the forefront of efforts to 
oppose Government Tibetan policy. Evidently Lough had helped 'bounce' 
the Government into calling a debate at long last. Parliament 
reassembled after Easter on April 12th, Balfour announced that on 
April 13th the Government would propose a motion on Tibet; in effect 
the Government had ack~owledged that parliamentary pressure and public 
concern had made a Tibet debate inevitable. The Polibcal 
Correspondent of The Times noted how both sides were 'issuing urgent 
whips in view of an important division on party lines' (4); that the 
Opposition would abstain could not have been predicted by the 
Government. 
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It is therefore of particular interest to note how the Opposition 
anticipated the debate; a study of the Westminster Gazette, as 
representative of mainstream Liberalism, and the Manchester Guardian 
as exponent of a more radical Liberalism, is especially useful in 
understanding how the Government's Tibet conduct was perceived. The 
Westminster Gazette on April 13th commented that whereas, previously 
the Government had 'steadily denied' that the Mission was the 'kind of 
military operation' requiring Parliamentary sanction under the 1858 
India Act, now 
The sudden discovery that the attack on the Mission and the 
engagement which followed <Guru) brings it under the definition 
is in itself a sharp criticism of the whole affair and the 
manner in which the Act of Parliament is commonly evaded. 
Clearly unhappy with Government policy the Westminster Gazette turned 
to the question of Russia's attitude to the intervention in Tibet, 
expressing the hope that 'some steps' had been taken to consider 
Russian sensibilities. The Westminster Gazette believed that since 
Both Russia and Great Britain profess to have no other designs 
on Tibet other than to procure trade facilities and to prevent 
the spiritual influences which radiate from the sacred city of 
Lhasa being used to their disadvantage amongst the Buddhists of 
Asia. If these professions are honest, the right solution is 
that they should agree with each other to leave Lhasa alone. 
The Westminster Gazette also gave warning that 
If it is the control of spiritual influence that we are thinking 
of, we may be quite sure that we are not at all likely to 
supplant Russia in the affection of the Tibetans or of Buddhists 
generally by an armed expedition against their holy places. 
Wisely the Westminster Gazette further maintained that 'we must relate 
this expedition to the whole of our policy'; the Gazette particularly 
held improved Anglo-Russian relations at a premium. 
A bad mistake in a matter like the Tibet expedition, which causes 
the same kind of exaggerated suspicion in Russia as supposed 
Russian designs do in this country, might give a disastrous set-
back in this direction and go far to neutralise the good effects 
of the French treaty. (5) 
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Clearly the Westminster Gazette was unenamoured with the excesses and 
risks of the Government's Tibetan involvement; there was nothing in 
the Westminster Gazette to indicate a Liberal readiness to abstain on 
a Tibet motion in the Commons. 
If the Westminster Gazette foresaw a 'dangerous, fruitless and 
undignified' future for the Mission, the Manchester Guardian shared 
even less enthusiasm for this' invasion of Tibet'. As Cotton had 
demonstrated, Radicals were unwilling to compromise in the face of a 
British Imperialism 'amok' on the Roof of the World. The Manchester 
Guardian of April 13th believed the Government's introduction of a 
Tibetan bill to be an ingenuous attempt to 'legalise' the invasion of 
Tibet, and noted that this 'filibustering expedition' had been 
'organised by those Indian Officials who would also have had the 
organising of a lawful war against Tibet, if such a war had been 
authorised and declared'. Certainly the Guardian felt that Tibetan 
'imperfections' in conforming to European diplomatic methods had 
provided Indian expansionists with convenient casus bellorum to 'round 
off our estate'. The Guardian could only conclude verbal legerdemain 
was all that stood between the Government and an illegal violation of 
the 1858 Act. Such was the Guardian's mistrust of the Government's 
intentions t~ it believed, with the 'necessary resolution once 
obtained' Tibet 'will be gloriously harried and taught we are in 
earnest' and 'made to hate us more than Russia'. (6) The Little 
Englander instinct of the Puardian viewed the Government's conduct in 
Tibet with a bitter cynicism; the Government had no hope of engaging 
any Radical sympathy. Radicals, not unreasonably, saw the 
Younghusband Mission as evidence of a bellicose Imperialism; Sir 
Wilfred Lawson, the Liberal MP for Cambourne, demonstrated this point 
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.H cartoons 
TIBET 
"The co:~d~t~:t of tla: Chumbi people continues excellent. 
They takt.: of:· tl11.:ir hats ami bow to the ~lis;;ion." 
01£, the men of Tibet 
.-\rc a glorious set ; 
na i~ I' Pa j>t' r. 
In a battle they knu\\. the way how, 
\\'hen the foemen appear, 
To let them draw near, 
.-\ml take off their hats with a bow. 
Good humour prevails 
In those hilb and those dales 
\\'here the " ~ [iss ion" at present is set ; 
And our troops all declare, 
Thou.,.h the\·'cl tin·ht anvwhere, ~ • ~ J 
Thev prefer it by far in Tibet. 
Now what a delight 
Is in this way to fight, 
.-h·oidiwr all worn' and row; ~ o killing ·and stabbing-, 
:\ t) loot in~· and grabbing, 
You off with \·our hat and \·ou bow. 
. ' 
It's nice fnr the i\lission 
To hokl the position, 
Of being a popular pet; 
And charming, indeed, 
Of its exploits to read, 
But <dy did it go to Tibet? 
D<·tonbcr I')OJ. 
Sir Wilfred Lawson MP questioned why it had been necessary for the 
Younghusband Mission to enter Tibet at all. 
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when on April 12th he called out to (an unresponsive) Brodrick 'Are we 
at war with Tibet or not? I see the Viceroy speaks of "the 
enemy"' . (7) 
However, Liberals of a less Radical disposition, although 
prepared to criticise the policy and motivations that caused the 
despatch of the Mission, were unwilling to be cast as unpatriotic or 
ungrateful to the Younghusband Mission. The Liberal Front Bench 
realised there was little popularity in criticising a British military 
endeavour, and had no wish to leave the party open to charges of an 
unhealthy Little Englander stance. Although Opposition leadership 
naturally remained unprepared to support the Government in any 
division, a walk-out had the advantage of registering Liberal 
displeasure but not at the cost of being seen to 'undermine' the 
Mission. The Opposition decision to walk out at the end of the Tibet 
debate was prudent; for the Government, such a Liberal manoeuvre could 
not have been predicted. 
It fell to Brodrick to open the debate on Tibet for the 
Government. He began his justification of Government conduct to the 
House by noting, with no intended irony, that the Government's motion 
was purposely designed 'in accordance' with the 1858 India Act. 
Citing legal advice (which unsurprisingly supported Brodrick's defence 
of the Government's record), Brodrick maintained that no parliamentary 
sanction had been required for the despatch of a Mission 'accompanied 
by an armed protecting force'. Rather he argued that had Parliament 
been asked for revenues for the Mission, it would have made what was 
only a negotiating mission appear otherwise. Thus, regrettable as the 
Guru incident was, nevertheless it was the responsibility of the 
Mission's forces to defend themselves; had the Mission not done so, 
the outcome of Guru might well have been reversed, and the Guru 
incident ought at least to prove a powerful incentive for the Tibetans 
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to negotiate. Brodrick's justification for the Government's tardiness 
conveniently ignored the fact that the Younghusband Mission had 
invaded Tibet; British military forces on operational duty were the 
backbone of that invasion, a circumstance in sharp violation of the 
1858 Act. 
Brodrick sought to add strength to his arguments by countering 
the vigorous Press campaign launched against the Government's Tibet 
policy by its inveterate Tibetan critic, Cotton. Brodrick held: 
Sir Henry Cotton has written with great knowledge and with great 
resource on this subject, but with an entire want of sympathy 
apparently with the objects of the Viceroy and Government of 
India. 
Not only were Cotton's efforts to warrant a public rebuttal from 
Brodrick, but Cotton was actually present in the Commons during this 
debate and had also had a letter published by The Times on this same 
day. In his letter Cotton not only supported his previously published 
assertion that 'statements from the King's Spe~ch and from Lord 
Lan isdowne and Lord Hardwicke .... were without foundation', but 
insisted The Times also publish an annexed note <using the Blue Book 
as his evidence) proving that 'even stronger language' in his 
criticisms would have been 'justified'. (8) The Government had every 
reason to want to discredit Cotton; Brodrick had the means to attempt 
to do this. Brodrick noted that in a despatch of June 25th 1894 
Cotton, then Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, had pointed 
out that the Tibetans were levying a 10 per cent ad valorem tax on 
Indo-Tibetan trade, in violation of the 1893 Anglo-Chinese Tibetan 
Free Trade agreement. Moreover, as Cotton's despatch disapprovingly 
noted, the Tibetans had also closed the town of Phari, thereby 
preventing merchants from reaching the Tibetan mart at Yatung. 
Brodrick remarked how: 
Sir Henry Cotton in very pregnant language, points out that this 
was inconsistent with the terms of the treaty and a matter for 
serious consideration. 
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Yet if Brodrick had exposed Cotton, the great defender of Tibet, as 
accepting, whilst on the spot, the recalcitrant nature of the 
Tibetans, he still felt there was a 'more important' point to 
consider. Tibet's policy of denying the Sikkimese their age-old right 
of access to the Chumbi Valley was viewed by Cotton as a 'very serious 
matter'. Cotton concluded in his June 25th 1894 despatch, that in 
view of all these difficulties, the Government of India should 
consider the weakness of Chinese authority in Tibet. Brodrick also 
noted that Cotton, the self-appointed defender of Chinese suzerainty 
in Tibet, in a 'subsequent letter', actually authorised 'that Mr 
White, who was then demarcating the frontier, should proceed to do so 
without regard to the Chinese representative'. Brodrick had certainly 
made a bold attempt to embarrass Cotton, whose actions did contradict 
opinions expressed in his writings. Brodrick mischieviously added 
that 'although all weight should be given to the opinion of a 
distinguished public servant' so long as Cotton was 'the man on the 
spot' it was he 'perhaps, of all others, who was most engaged in 
calling the attention of the Government of India to the serious 
nature' of Tibetan affairs. (9) The Government had certainly 
discredited Cotton's criticisms to some extent through Brodrick's 
speech. It is worth considering how Cotton refuted these charges; in 
April 14th's Times Cotton felt 'surprised that political capital 
should be made out of letters signed by me in my official capacity ten 
years ago, which express opinions very different from those I am now 
well known to hold'. Cotton explained that 'the policy indicated in 
the letters quoted by Mr Brodrick in the House of Commons was not 
mine, but that of my official superior'. Although Cotton accepted 
that 'the position is a difficult one' nevertheless 'a secretary 
cannot be held personally responsible for all he signs'. <10) If 
Cotton's explanation of his apparently contradictory behaviour towards 
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Tibet when in India represented a brave attempt to limit the damage 
done to his reputation, nevertheless Brodrick's attentions were a 
compliment to Cotton's efforts. Brodrick's determination to embarrass 
Cotton showed that Cotton's writings had been noted by the ·Government; 
unfortunately for the Government, Cotton may have been bloodied by 
Brodrick's speech but would still remain unbowed in the Press. 
Having made a bold attempt to discredit Cotton's standing, 
Brodrick turned to Tibet's disregard for good neighbourly relations; 
Anglo-Tibetan relations had not been helped, he argued, by the Dalai 
Lama's sending of a deput~tion to St Petersburg 'on a so-called 
religious mission to which it was perfectly clear the Tibetans 
attached very considerable political significance'. Brodrick was keen 
to approach the Russian dimension of Tibet in a firm but diplomatic 
manner: he observed how Lansdowne and Benckendorff had 'threshed out' 
the whole Tibet issue, but was at pains to add: 
Lhasa is not a place in which we are moved by any jealousy of a 
foreign Government or by the desire to establish anything at the 
expense of a foreign Government. But we cannot shut our eyes to 
the fact that Lhasa is within 300 miles of the Indian frontier 
and that Tibet does not touch on any portion of Russian territory 
at a distance of less than 1,000 miles. 
Certainly the Government wanted to make clear that Russian involvement 
in Tibet was distinctly unwelcome; it was preferable to speak firmly 
to Russia than to permit Tibet to degenerate into a misunderstanding 
impeding a rapprochement. Historically Brodrick noted, Tibet had only 
enjoyed relations with three powers - her suzerain China, Nepal and 
India - and any extension of influence by another power could hardly 
be viewed by the Government 'without concern'. As the Secretary of 
State confessed: 
I cannot imagine anything that would be less desirable than that 
in any portion of the Chinese Empire which abuts on British 
territory, we should be exposed to those <border) negotiations 
through a more or less inanimate third party which have so far 
occupied the diplomatic mind of Europe in some other portions of 
the Chinese Empire during the last few years. 
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Following Brodrick's discourse on Anglo-Russian relations over 
Tibet, he turned to the breakdown of Anglo-Tibetan relations. 
Brodrick warned that the British Government's 'earnestness', in the 
face of Tibetan provocation, was not to be 'mistaken or trifled with'. 
In the light of the failure of the Kamba Jong negotiations (an advance 
initially being sanctioned as far as Gyangtse by Hamilton on October 
1st 1903 should negotiations demonstrably break down), Brodrick 
explained that the November 6th telegram had 'strictly' limited the 
Mission's objects- namely no British occupation of Tibetan territory 
or establishment of a Permanent Mission in Lhasa. The Younghusband 
Mission was to obtain 'satisfaction for the past' and a 'modus vivendi 
for the future'; unfortunately there was little unanimity between 
London and Calcutta on these questions. Certainly Curzon continued to 
intensely dislike the abstentionist declarations of the November 6th 
telegram ('that fatal telegram' as he termed it) and, in private, 
Brodrick was to write to Ampthill: 
I believe that Curzon would have declared a protectorate over 
Tibet without a moment's hesitation. (11) 
For his part Curzon was frustrated by the Government's constantly 
committing itself to the November 6th telegram. On August 4th 1904 
Curzon remarked: 
Brodrick in particular has pinned his faith in so many 
Parliamentary answers and Primrose League speeches that it <the 
November 6th telegram) has attained in the eyes of the Government 
an almost canonical sanctity. 02) 
Clearly, for the Government, the November 6th telegram not only 
represented a policy, but a suitable leash for the Viceroy. 
Nevertheless, in Parliament, Brodrick was cast in the role of 
Viceroy's defender. Indeed his speech sought to make a case for 
Curzon's pacificity. 'I have' he stated 'seen it suggested in various 
quarters that His Majesty's Government have been impelled forward, and 
unduly harried into action by the acquisitiveness of the Viceroy'. 
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Rather he contrasted Curzon's viceroyalty's use of 9,000 troops in 3 
expeditions <up to 1902), with Dufferin' s use of 43,000 troops in 5 
expeditions, or Elgin's use of 53,000 troops in Tirah and Chitral 
alone <Elgin's viceroyalty saw 7 other expeditions). If Curzon 
suffered by appearing a more bullish Viceroy than his actions actually 
indicated, Brodrick's defence of Curzon was also somewhat deceptive. 
In his memoirs, Brodrick took except ion to Winston Churchill's 
description in Great Contemporaries of Curzon's viceroyalty as 
pursuing 'an essentially pacifist frontier policy, carrying with it a 
definite anti-military outlook'. (13) Brodrick ih fact believed that 
such was the inherent 'aggressiveness of his policy as regards both 
Tibet and Afghanistan' that if in practice an 'essentially pacifist 
frontier policy' had been employed, the credit 'was due to A J Band 
his colleagues'. <14) Brodrick remained convinced that 'Curzon's 
special obsession as to the advance of Russia in Central Asia' marred 
his judgement. <15) Unfortunately Brodrick's view of Curzon was too 
partisan, and was reflected in a perverse satisfaction at endeavouring 
to frustrate Curzon's Tibetan objectives. Frustrating Curzon may well 
have been a sound course for British policy, but Brodrick clearly 
I 
appreciated having a constitutional veto over the Viceroy as Secretary 
of State for India. Brodrick had been a close friend of Curzon since 
Eton and Balliol days, and although Brodrick wrote 'There was no 
question of jealousy or competition as our paths were wholly 
different' <16), it appears likely Brodrick may have been inspired by 
elements of rivalry or pride, if not jealousy. Assuredly he had no 
intention of being Curzon's protege as Secretary of State for India (a 
position constitutionally superior to that of Viceroy), and as Fleming 
pertinently observed: 
Men who knew them both might have predicted that their lifelong 
friendship would not emerge altogether scatheless from the 
stresses to which the tug of war between India and Whitehall was 
bound to subject it. (17) 
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It was no coincidence that Brodrick and Curzon ceased to be friends 
during this period, and by 1905 Curzon was convinced that his 
erstwhile associate had been 'unsleeping in his malevolence' <18). 
If Brodrick had been less than sincere in defending Curzon in the 
House he was at least correct in identifying a root cause of the 
actual Tibetan problem; namely Tibet's interpretation of Russia's 
actual intent ions. The quest ion was not so much: 
What Russia proposed to do, but of what the Tibetans were under 
the impression they would obtain from the Russian Government in 
the way of support against the legitimate demands of His 
Majesty's Government. 
Hence British policy should be, Brodrick's speech concluded, that 'If 
we lay down that any power is to be dominant, that power must be 
British'. <19) Brodrick's speech was undoubtedly a suprisingly 
competent performance. It had reassured the Commons that the November 
6th telegram remained Government policy, it had severely embarrassed 
Cotton, and it had justified Government conduct both to Tibet and 
Russia. It was regrettable however that the speech failed to openly 
admit that the Government had been in clear breach of the 1858 India 
Act. 
As Leader of the Opposition it was quite natural for Campbell-
Bannerman to seek to expose the inadequacies and inconsistencies of 
the Government's Tibet policy. If Campbell-Bannerman was uncertain as 
to whether the November 6th telegram represented Government policy, he 
was certain that 'that despatch does not express or convey the policy 
approved and suggested by Lord Curzon'. He remained anxious that the 
Viceroy 'exaggerates for what he may consider a great stroke of policy 
events of comparatively small importance' in Anglo-Tibetan relations. 
Campbell-Bannerman was concerned that Curzon's views might have 'an 
evil effect' on some of Britain's neighbours; this appraisal of 
Curzon's behaviour tallied with Brodrick's. Confiding to Ampthill, 
Brodrick remarked: 
But the truth is that Curzon's attitude about this and 
Afghanistan frightened the Cabinet to death. 
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Clearly many in both Government and Opposition found it difficult not 
to view the Viceroy as something of a 'bull in the China Shop' of 
Imperial policy. 
Campbell-Bannerman considered the three main areas of alleged 
border difficulties with Tibet. He saw the question of pasture 
disputes on the Sikkim-Tibet border as little more than a case of 
wandering sheep. He also believed the knocking down of British border 
pillars in a 'wild country' to be unremarkable. Campbell-Bannerman 
further held that although there had been trade difficulties with 
Tibet, an invasion and slaughter of that 'reclusive' land's 
inhabitants would be unlikely to increase trade. Rather he turned to 
the issue that most MPs must have seen as the real motivation behind 
the Mission, namely to prevent Russia's 'coquetting with Tibet'. If 
Anglo-Tibetan border troubles were an excuse for intervention to 
thwart this tryst, then obviously, as Campbell-Bannerman sought to 
learn: 
Is it the opinion of His Majesty's Government, as is stated by 
Lord Curzon, that the Russian Government have established 
relations with the Tibetan Government which are intended to be 
to our detriment? 
Certainly he believed Curzon to have broken down 'the scruples and 
hesitations' of the Home Government in invading Tibet, and held that 
Curzon's desire to establish a permanent British Resident at Lhasa had 
'associations connected with the name of Cavagnari'. Although 
Campbell-Bannerman accepted that it had been impressed on Curzon that 
the November 6th telegram was Government policy, nevertheless he 
believed that Tibet policy remained a trial of wills between 'the 
Government of the King in this country' and 'Lord Curzon and his 
Government of India'. Indeed, Campbell-Bannerman's remark closely 
echoed sentiments that Balfour himself had already expressed to the 
King; on that fateful day of November 6th 1903 Balfour admitted: 
The Cabinet are apprehenisve that the Viceroy entertains 
schemes of territorial expansion, or at least of extending 
responsibilities which would be equally detrimental to Indian 
interests and the international relations of the Empire. <20) 
Naturally Balfour would be unprepared to publicly acknowledge the 
strains between London and Calcutta. Nevertheless, as Campbell-
Bannerman doubtless intended, this volley must have struck home. 
Campbell-Bannerman then suggested that the Motion might be made 
subject to the November 6th telegram since 'such a move would be a 
"guarantee and pledge" of the Government's good faith as regards the 
future of Tibet, not only to the House but also to Russia and China'. 
However he remained at pains to assure the Government that the 
Opposition would not 'do anything which will either endanger the 
Mission' or 'diminish the dignity and authority of the Indian 
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Government and Imperial Government in that quarter of the world'. (21) 
If this remark hints at the Liberal decision to walk out of the 
Chamber when the division came, it also emphasised the Liberals' wish 
to be supportive of the Mission itself. Campbell-Bannerman had given 
a capable speech; The Times, however, of April 14th took strong 
exception to this speech. Accusing Campbell-Bannerman of 'a flippancy 
which is unworthy of his position' The Times chided him for 
endeavouring 'to entrap the Ministry into a pledge, not as he was 
careful to say, merely to Parliament', but to 'the great states which 
we have brought into the matter or are necessarily interested in the 
matter - Russia and China' regarding the future of Tibet. The Times 
believed 'A more mischievous proposal it would be difficult to 
conceive'. Somewhat unfairly The Times pressed home its attack by 
arguing that in achieving an Anglo-Russian rapprochement: 
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Few things, we imagine, could do more to increase those 
difficulties than the habit of a certain radical school amongst 
us to defend the pretensions of Russia against their own countr}'· 
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's discovery that Russia has a right 
to be consulted in the future of Tibet is an exaggerated example 
of this tendency. Her own Government have disclaimed this right, 
but the Leader of the Opposition is apparently more Russian in 
this respect than the Russians themselves. <22) 
If Campbell-Bannerman had made an important contribution to the 
Tibet debate, Lord George Hamilton's speech proved of equal merit. As 
Secretary of State for India from 1895- 1903 Hamilton's views were of 
special interest; although he accepted the minor nature of Anglo-
Tibetan border difficulties he believed: 
The gravity of the situation is such that Tibet has wilfully and 
deliberately for nearly ten years past ignored a treaty <the 
1890 Anglo-Chinese Convention) which with the utmost deliberation 
was entered into on her behalf <by China). 
He rightly felt that a 'definite arrangement' with Tibet was 
essential, but pointedly added that 'while I was at the India Office I 
think we perhaps erred on the side of patience and forbearance'. 
Turning to the question of Russia and Tibet, Hamilton defined himself 
as one who believed there was sufficient room for both Russia and 
Britain in Asia; however, 'if there is one spot in Asia which is 
absolutely outside the sphere of Russian influence, it is Tibet'. 
Whilst expressing the hope that Britain and Russia could come to terms 
in Asia, Hamilton was conscious that: 
It is exceedingly difficult to accept without reserve the 
assurances we receive from high Russian officials .... It 
happens again and again that an assurance is given by the 
Ministers of one department of which the Ministers of other 
departments are utterly unaware. 
If this was true within Russia, it was doubly true of Ambassadors 
isolated abroad such as Benckendorff. Hamilton would have been right 
in thinking that Benckendorff's assurances were only valid in London; 
for all his assurances Benckendorff had no control over what other 
Russian agencies might be undertaking in Tibet. Taking his line of 
argument further, Hamilton postulated the possibility that if: 
Some irresponsible agent of Russia in Lhasa hoisted the Russian 
flag in Lhasa, would not the situation become very difficult? 
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It is easy enough for a great country like Russia to undertake 
not to hoist her flag; but if one of her officials does hoist it, 
it becomes very difficult to remove it; and, if the Russians did 
not do so, the Tibetans would suppose they had the support of the 
whole power of Russia. 
In concluding his speech, Hamilton made clear he was 'strongly 
opposed' to 'any movement which would result in the annexation of a 
portion of Tibet or making ourselves responsible for any portion of 
the administration'; nevertheless he felt the Government was right in 
declining 'to allow any foreign influence to enter into or interfere 
with Tibetan affairs'. (23) 
If Hamilton had given an undeniably competent speech, 
particularly alive to the dangers of ignoring Russia in Tibet, 
Cotton's ally, Thomas Lough, saw more danger in British activity in 
Tibet. He remarked 'The whole country has received with the most 
profound feeling of remorse the news of the slaughter' at Guru, and 
was anxious to know whether the Government was still bound by the 
November 6th telegram. Lough also felt that the Government had failed 
to consider the Tibetan perspective of border difficulties. He noted 
that the Indian Government <under Elgin) had previously recognised a 
claim to Sikkimese pastures; that trade marts were problematical to 
establish; and he also contended that the erection of border pillars 
by the Indian Government was itself a provocation. Having addressed 
the question of localised difficulties with Tibet, Lough turned to the 
Russian dimension: he wanted to know: 
Was it because Russia had done something to our detriment or was 
it because of a frontier difficulty that this armed Mission had 
been sent into Tibet? 
With the Tibetan Mission to St Petersburg in mind, Lough remained 
sceptical that such contacts had been anything other than religious, 
and challenged the Government to speak 'with greater plainness on the 
subject'. In ending his speech, Lough roundly condemned the 'military 
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character' of the Government's Tibet 'enterprise' and confessed 
himself perplexed as to what was Government policy in Tibet. <24) 
The next speaker, E R P Moon, was less inclined than Lough to 
give Russia the benefit of the doubt. As evidence of Russia's bad 
intent he quoted the Novae Vremya of June 17th 1903 which argued that 
'a rapprochement with Russia must seem' to the Dalai Lama 'the most 
natural step as Russia is the only power capable to counteract the 
intrigues of Great Britain'. Moon also considered the 'rather 
suspicious character' Dorshieff <ie Dorjieff) who according to The 
Times' Tibetan correspondent 'exercises a predominant influence in 
Lhasa': he noted this was the selfsame individual who had led the 
Mission from Tibet to Russia. Indeed Moon, who also approvingly 
quoted Curzon in his speech, remained in no doubt that 'this Mission 
must be sanctioned'; to do otherwise would only serve Russia's 
purposes. (25) 
C P Trevelyan, from the Liberal benches, rightly argued that 
'sufficient attention had .not been given to the way in which the House 
had been treated by the Government' over the Tibetan issue: 
Prior to the Easter vacation the House had had no real 
opportunity of discussing it and had been treated in a very 
cavalier way. 
Trevelyan complained that: 
Now, however much the House might object to this Mission, its 
power had been altogether nullified .... all the House could do 
was raise its protest. 
Trevelyan proceeded to deliver a stinging criticism of the way the 
Government had evaded its 'constitutional obligation to obtain the 
consent of Parliament' for 'any military expedition outside the 
frontiers of India'. Trevelyan claimed that this evasion 'had been 
deliberately decided on; Parliament was actually sitting; and for 
weeks and months the military expedition was waiting to advance into 
Tibet'. The Government's explanation for its conduct 'was that it was 
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a political Mission', but as Trevelyan added 'it was accompanied by an 
armed force of 1, 000 or 2, 000 men'. With justification Trevelyan 
insisted, 'Obviously the expedition was a military expedition and it 
was playing with words to call it a political Mission'. ·Events had 
proved Trevelyan right. 
As to the motivations that inspired the Mission, Trevelyan was 
quite sure that neither trade difficulties nor the removal of boundary 
pillars represented convincing explanations. Indeed, he noted that 
trade between Jndia and Tibet had increased from 7 lacs in 1890 to 9 
lacs in 1902. Rather, Trevelyan believed: 
The chief reason why the Indian Government had brought this 
question <trade) to the front was their alarm at the action of 
Russia in Tibet .... the real gist of the matter was whether 
Russia had such relations with Tibet which would justify our 
Government in believing they had designs of establishing 
themselves (in a manner that would) constitute a danger to the 
Indian Empire. 
Trevelyan saw little significance 'in Dorjieff's Mission to St 
Petersburg: he noted Lamsdorff's assurance to Sir C Scott that any 
suggestions in the Russian Press of this Mission having a political or 
diplomatic nature were 'ridiculous and unfounded'. Rather he over-
generously believed Dorjieff's Mission to be 'similar in character to 
that which was sent out by the Pope to the faithful in foreign 
countres'; in this instance the Dalai Lama was the Buddhist Pope. 
Trevelyan also gave no credence to rumours of a Russian agent or 
treaty at Lhasa; rather he sought to learn what were the Government's 
intentions in Tibet, 'Was it the intention of the Government to ask 
for a British agent to be permanently established at Lhasa?' he asked, 
'If so, that was a very disputable proposition'. In ending his speech 
he could only conclude that the Tibet invasion was a 'somewhat ignoble 
little raid'. <26) Although this speech was insufficiently prepared to 
consider that the Russians might have been engaged in untoward 
activities in Tibet, nevertheless Trevelyan had delived an inspired 
attack on the Government's cynical manipulations of Parliament. 
Certainly the Government earnestly deserved the criticisms Trevelyan 
made of its shabby Parliamentary conduct. 
89 
Gibson Bowles also did not hold back from criticising the 
Government's Tibetan record; he felt that the debate dealt 'first of 
all' with whether the 1858 India Act had been broken. Gibson Bowles 
had no doubt that the Government had broken the Act, and believed the 
Tibet 'expedition had never been anything else other than a military 
expedition', against another state. Moreover he was particularly 
critical of Brodrick's citing of legal advice as justification for the 
Government's tardiness in requesting Parliamentary sanction for the 
Mission; he remarked that Brodrick's legal authority 'was probably 
instructed by the person desiring the opinion'. As it was, 
Parliament's subsequent consent 'was now required for the Mission'; 
the Government had 'made nonsense' of the 1858 India Act. 
As regards Russia, Gibson Bowles expressed the belief that there 
was room for both Russia and Britain throughout Asia. Even in Persia 
Gibson Bowles was certain that an Anglo-Russian agreement could be 
reached, and 'if an agreement was possible in Persia, how much more 
possible was it in regard to Tibet!'. Although Gibson Bowles was 
prepared to accept that 'it should be object of the policy of the 
Government to keep Russia out of the country', he did not believe 
there to be 'the slightest danger' of a Russian occupation in Tibet. 
Gibson Bowles had little doubt as to the motivation of the 
Younghusband Mission, believing 'a fear of Russia lay at the bottom of 
the whole business'. Disinclined to give credence to rumours of 
Russian intrigue in Tibet, Gibson Bowles took the view that 'the only 
thing' Russian Ministers 'had at heart was the progress of Russia in 
the East'. Certainly Gibson Bowles 'shrewdly suspected' that Anglo-
Russian hankerings for control of the Dalai Lama, and his great 
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authority amongst Asia's Buddhists, had inspired the Mission; the 
desire 'was entertained to some extent by Russia and very strongly by 
the present Viceroy of India'. 
Holding that Curzon had been 'anxious' to invade Tibet, Gibson 
Bowles was concerned that the pace of events in Tibet might force the 
Government to Curzon's remedy of a Permanent Resident in Lhasa. If 
the Government would strictly adhere to the November 6th telegram, and 
Balfour could assure the House that there would be no annexations or 
Resident in Tibet then, Gibson Bowles explained, 'it would be the duty 
of Hon. Members to pass this Resolution'. (27) Gibson Bowles' 
readiness to support the Mission must have been a great relief to the 
Government; the potential leader of a Unionist revolt againstTibet 
policy had given a recommendation to support the Government's Motion. 
Of course, Gibson £owles had been stridently critical of the 
Government's breach of the 1858 India Act, sceptical of Russian 
involvement in Tibet and hostile to the Viceroy; but he had supported 
the Government. There was now no question of a backbench revolt. 
In the penultimate speech of the debate, the Liberal Henry Fowler 
contended what must have been apparent to the House: 
That there have been two currents of opinion on this question 
one at Whitehall and another at Calcutta. 
Fowler emphasised the need to maintain Parliamentary control over the 
Viceroy's powers; to do otherwise would be 'a great blunder'. Fowler 
also looked to the Prime Minister to state unequivocally the 
Government's future Tibet policy. As regards Russia, Fowler believed 
'Asia is vast enough for Great Britain and Russia', and felt sure that 
Russia had no 'serious aggressive designs on India'. Fowler remained 
convinced that 'There is no reason to fear any aggression from Russia 
as far as Tibet is concerned'. However, if Fowler was dubious as to 
any Russian threat to Tibet, nevertheless he was emphatic that, as far 
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as the Mission was concerned 'The country will not allow them to be 
deserted'. Fowler's position reflected the Liberal dilemma; although 
critical of Government policy, he had no wish whatsoever to 
'undermine' the Mission. Believing a non-interventionist policy 
represented the best hope for future Anglo-Tibetan relations, Fowler 
ended his speech by requesting the Prime Minister 'to tell us whether 
he adheres to the despatch of 6th November'. <28) 
As Prime Minister, it fell to Balfour to defend the Government's 
Tibetan record; he began his defence by chiding Opposition criticisms. 
He attacked 'a disposition to minimise the causes that had produced 
the Mission in Tibet' on the part of Campbell-Bannerman and Opposition 
MPs. Balfour believed 'that kind of political arithmetic is rotten 
from the beginning', particularly as 'the Indian Government depends 
absolutely on the opinion held of them by their ~wn subjects'. If 
Balfour believed that India could not afford to ignore Tibetan bad 
neighbourliness, he also maintained that after 14 years of 
negotiations, the Indian Government could hardly be accused of undue 
haste. Indeed Balfour expressed the opinion 'that unless the Mission 
were sent into Tibetan territory no negotiations were possible at 
all'. Clearly, Balfour had not been intimidated by Opposition 
criticisms. However, in turning to the Russian aspect of the Tibetan 
problem Balfour had to maintain the utmost discretion: affirming his 
commitment to the maintenance of British prestige in Asia, he took a 
phlegmatic view of the 'peculiarity of the Central Asian position'. 
Balfour felt that Anglo-Russian relations were complicated by: 
The character, I will not say of the Russian Government, but of 
the ambitions of many of the officers .... in the outlying parts 
of the Russian Empire. 
Certainly Balfour felt: 
I am not one of those who in the year 1904 think the Central 
Asian question can be so easily disposed of by reference to the 
large maps as it was in 1874. 
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However, Balfour saw no advantage to Britain Cor his Government) in 
adopting a 'forward' stance in Tibet. Balfour thus affirmed that the 
November 6th telegram represented 'in very precise t~rms' the policy 
of the Government. As for MP's fears that events in Tibet would force 
the Government to change that policy, Balfour reassured the House 'I 
contemplate no such unhappy contingency'. Balfour was emphatic that 
any possibility of a British annexation of Tibet would be 'one of the 
greatest misfortunes that could possibly happen to the Indian 
Government or to this country'. Nevertheless, in a veiled warning 
about Russian interest in Tibet, Balfour remarked that: 
It must be distinctly understood that if Tibet were, by any 
unhappy accident, to become the centre for intrigue and influence 
of any power other than Tibet, our difficulties and our 
responsibilities would not be diminished, but greatly increased 
by leaving Tibet alone. 
If this comment was a discreet justification for the Mission, Balfour 
was at pains to make clear that 'I do not want anything to do with the 
Tibetans in a political sense'. However, Balfour stated that his 
Government could no view with indifference a situation in which the 
Tibetan 'will to exclude foreign influence' were 'used against us, but 
is not to be used against others'. Balfour concluded his speech by 
fully accepting Russian assurances of disinterest in Tibet, and 
assuring the House that no contingency would 'compel the Government to 
abandon . . . . the November 6th telegram' . C29) 
Although Balfour paid fulsome tribute to Curzon in his speech, 
(if not in private) his assurances of the Government's adherence to 
the November 6th telegram were so unequivocal that any hopes Curzon 
might still have entertained. of events in Tibet changing Government 
policy were now politically impossible. Balfour's speech had 
irrevocably nailed the Government's colours to the mast [it also 
cleverly avoided any mention of the Government's constitutional 
impropriety toward the 1858 India Act]. Indeed, the House received 
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Balfour's reassurances well; with the possibility of a revolt 
eliminated, the Unionists fully backed the Government in the 'Aye' 
lobby. The Liberals had little wish to vote against Balfour's 
assurances, and by deciding to walk out \vere able to register 
displeasure with the Government's conduct of relatidns with Tibet, 
whilst in no way being stigmatised as undermining the Mission. Some 
Liberals voted with the Government including Sir Charles Dilke, whilst 
what The Times called 'a handful of extreme Little Englanders' (30) 
including Sir Wilfred Lawson, voted with the Irish against the 
Government. Certainly The Times Political Correspondent felt 'It 
could not be foreseen that so many Liberals would refrain from 
opposing the Motion'. <31) Plainly the Government had achieved a clear 
victory in the division on Tibet, if only by default. 
The 'Political Notes' of The Times of April 14th had no 
difficulty in interpreting the outcome of the Tibet debate as proof 
that 'no shadow of doubt' was now left 'concerning the British 
people's warm approval of Lord Curzon' s Tibetan policy'. <32) The 
Westminster Gazette however, reflected Liberal anxiety that the 
Government's large majority on Tibet should not be misconstrued as a 
clear Parliamentary acceptance of Unionist Tibet policy. Only Liberal 
abst~t\\;:~oi";S had given the Government its handsome victory; indeed April 
14th's Westminster Gazette roundly refuted The Times' analysis of the 
vote, stating 'We do not believe it showed anything of the kind' 
<namely approval of Curzon's Tibet policy). Rather the Westminster 
Gazette argued: 
It is one thing, now that the Mission has become an expedition 
for Parliament to say that it consents to our soldiers being 
supported in the position in which they had found themselves, 
but a very different thing to say the Mission ought ever to have 
started. <33) 
If Unionists had good reason to be content with the Government's 
fortunes and the Opposition's dilemma in the Tibet debate, at the 
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other end of the political spectrum, Radicals were despondent. Not 
only had Brodrick succeeded in embarrassing Cotton, but Parliament had 
effectively accepted the Government's' flat violation' of the 1858 Act 
in a 'very unsatisfying debate'. (34) The Manchester Guardian noted on 
April t4th how the 'celebrated clause 55' of the 1858 India Act had 
originally been designed to 'prevent India developing a most 
objectionable form of Home Rule', whereby 'a narrow bureaucracy 
independent alike of Indian and English public opinion' would conduct 
its own forward policies. Since Curzon had [apparently] frustrated 
this intention, abetted by the Government, clearly Parliamentary rule 
had also been compromised .. The Manchester Guardian could only 
conclude: 
If the consent of Parliament, which is thought necessary now, was 
not necessary last Autumn, the Government must admit we are now 
at war. If, on the other hand, the deaths of the Tibetans made 
no difference to the character of the expedition, as Mr Balfour 
says, then yesterday's r·esolution was tantamount to a demand that 
Parliament should sanction a filibustering expedition after the 
event. (35) 
Certainly to many of a Liberal or Radical perspective the Government's 
intervention in Tibet would have appeared as incomprehensible as it 
was dishonourable; the Government had invaded a far-off land, ignored 
Parliament, violated the La~ and been dangerously insensitive to 
Russia. The Tibet Mission was a strange and unhappy enterprise 
inspired by a maverick Viceroy; as the Westminster Gazette wryly noted 
of Curzon: 
Had he been a Liberal Viceroy we should have said that he had 
been misled by a desire to fight against clericalism. Is not 
the <Tibetan) Golden Army one of monks?(36) 
That at least would have been explicable. 
• * • * • * • 
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With the advantage of a clearl\majority, the Tibet Revenues Bill 
passed into the Lords for debate on April 19th 1904. On an altogether 
calmer occasion than that of April 13th, not least because of the 
Unionist preponderance in the Upper Chamber, Hardwicke delivered the 
opening speech for the Government. Claiming that the incident at Guru 
was the 'real reason' for the Motion before the House, he questioned 
(regarding the need to observe the 1858 India Act) 'Why did not His 
Majesty's Government come to Parliament earlier? He argued that: 
By doing so we should ipso facto have defeated our own object. 
We should have turned out what we earnestly desired to be a 
peaceful Mission into a military Mission. 
If Hardwicke believed such a course, albeit constitutional, would have 
·undermined Government assurances of Younghusband' s 'paci fie movements' 
not least to Russia, nevertheless had the Tibetans 'not allowed their 
troops to attack Colonel Younghusband's escort, we should not have had 
to come to Parliament with any motion of this kind'. <37) Hardwicke 
made a competent, 'fSol'viQ..t.:)\.-o.t. t' 1 f th G t b. 1 :~. sophls 1ca case or e overnmen e1ng a 
victim of Tibetan circumstances, even though, through failing to 
dampen viceregal ardour, it was as much architect as viet im. 
For the Opposition, Spencer held to his previously stated belief 
that 'it seemed impossible to conceive that a Mission with an escort 
of such dimensions . . . . could be considered a wholly peaceful 
Mission'. Spencer was also convinced that the Government's appraisal 
of the Tibetan question had been 'over-sanguine and self-deceiving'. 
Spencer's speech registered Liberal dismay at the Government's 
capacity for embroiling Britain into avoidable and indulgent colonial 
wars. A resigned Spencer could only conclude that the resolution 
ought to have been 'proposed to Parliament long ago'. <38) 
Yet it was the speech of former Viceroy Northbrook that lent a 
badly needed element of credibility to the Government's Tibet Motion. 
The shibboleth of Northbrooke's viceroyalty in India had been 
'masterly inactivity': he was the perfect candidate to give the 
Government's Tibet policy some moral standing, a quality it 
conspicuously lacked. Northbrooke believed that the Tibet Revenues 
debate was: 
One of those occasions on which the Parliament of the country 
has the responsibility put upon it of protecting the improper 
application of the revenues of .... Empire. 
Emphasising that since his departure from India he had taken 'every 
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occasion that has presented itself to advocate the interests of India 
in this House', Northbrooke announced: 
I have to inform your Lordships .... you can accept this 
resolution with perfect propriety. The Mission is undoubtedly 
taken in the interests of India. 
Northbrooke went as far as to commend the Government for its 
'moderation' in handling the Tibet issue; one despatch Northbrooke 
believed to be proof of the Government's good intentions was from 
Hardwicke to Spring-Rice for communication to the Russian Government 
<quoted in the Blue Book) stating: 
This step [despatching the Mission] must not be taken as 
indicating any intention of annexing or even permanently 
occupying Tibetan territory. 
Certainly Northbrooke considered this despatch a valuable surety of 
Government non-interventionist intentions. Inclining to the 
Government's view rather than Curzon's, of future Anglo-Tibetan 
relations, he also contended that Britain should avoid any Resident in 
Tibet ('a dangerous thing'), at least until such time as Tibet was 
more familiar with diplomatic convention. Plainly, the former Viceroy 
shared the Government's hopes of a completely platonic relationship 
with Tibet. 
As regards Anglo-Russian relations and the Tibet question, 
Northbrooke believed: 
Plain speaking to Russia is the right way to treat affairs of 
this kind. I believe that difficulties and perhaps, even war, 
might have beenided if we had spoken perfectly plainly to Russia 
in former years in somewhat similar circumstances. 
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It was essential, Northbrooke held, that 'Russia must perfectly well 
understand our position with regard to Tibet'. Nevertheless 
Northbrooke was anxious that an issue such as Tibet should not 
preclude Anglo-Russian goodwill, and hoped that 'at some more 
favourable time than the present' Britain and Russia might 'enter into 
a similar arrangement' as the Anglo-French Entente. (39) Clearly 
Northbrooke had provided an eloquent defence of Government conduct in 
Tibet; and above all, though it was Northbrooke's record in India, and 
readiness to have an Anglo-Russian Entente built on mutual respect, 
that meant Northbrooke's speech could not be idly dismissed by 
critics. The Government's battered moral standing could only benefit. 
Lansdowne, in closing the debate for the Government, recognised 
the importance of Northbrooke's endorsement of Government policy by 
remarking that Northbrooke's speech must have removed 'any lingering 
·doubts' over the Tibet Motion's 'propriety'. Lansdowne contended that 
the 'only question' now at stake was at what moment the Mission 
assumed a 'military complexion'. Studiously ignoring the fact that a 
powerful escort had accompanied the Mission throughout its Tibetan 
sojourn, Lansdowne professed to believe that the Mission could have 
maintained 'its political character to the last', achieving its object 
'without a single shot being fired'. However, Lansdowne acknowledged 
that the 'unfortunate collision' at Guru had left the Government with 
no alternative but to 'regularise' its unconstitutional position. 
Lansdowne was keen to answer suggestions made by Spencer of 
Curzon's 'antagonism towards His Majesty's Government'. Lansdowne 
assured the House that the Government and Viceroy 'were completely at 
one' and then admitted that the 'only point of difference of opinion' 
was 'whether negotiations should or should not be conducted at Lhasa, 
and whether a British agent should be left at that place'. In effect, 
Lansdowne had publicly acknowledged that the Government and Viceroy 
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were in disagreement over the entire direction of Tibet policy. 
Perhaps for Curzon's benefit, rather than for the House, Lansdowne 
assured his audience that the Viceroy 'loyally accepted the policy of 
His Majesty's Government and has given effect to it'. The Government 
would expect no less from the Viceroy in the future. Lansdowne 
affirmed that Government policy would remain explicitly as set down in 
the November 6th telegram; however, perhaps as a conciliatory gesture 
to Curzon, and unl.ike Balfour, he would not give an assurance that 
'whatever happens, we are never to move an inch beyond the limites 
therein laid down'. 
Finally Lansdowne turned to the fraught question of Russian 
relations with Tibet, arguing that 'we have to consider not only the 
attitude of Russia towards Tibet, but Tibet towards Russia'. Thus: 
Comings and goings between the monks of Lhasa and the Buddhist 
subjects of the Tsar have resulted .... in creating in the minds 
of these extremely ignorant and superstitious people a belief 
that they might rely on Russian sympathy and assistance. 
The Foreign Secretary felt that such an impression 'must have been 
rudely dispelled by events'. (40) Clearly a little Cthough not 
unwarranted) Russophobia helped justify the Mission in the Lords. 
With the conclusion of the debate, on Question, the Motion was 
agreed to. The Tibet Revenues Bill had legitimised the Government's 
circumvention and evasion of the 1858 India Act; its passage had also 
. d4 
seen the Government make a capable, if occas1onally~1ngenuous, defence 
of its entire Tibet conduct. The Government had endeavoured to refute 
suggestions that its Tibet policy had been 'a kind of Rake's progress 
.. .. egged on by a militant Viceroy' ; (41) however the Government had 
behaved in an exquisitely rakish manner, both in its deliberate 
frustration of Parliamentary requests for an opportunity to debate 
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Tibet policy and in its subsequent introduction, of a bill which 
justified its violation of the 1858 India Act. Clearly the Government 
had shown itself to have the cunning, if not the skill, of a rake - or 
even a Dorjieff. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Government, Parliament and the Lhasa Convention 
Following the Government's successful defence of its Tibetan 
conduct in mid-April 1904, the question of British intervention in 
Tibet no longer enjoyed the sense of impending crisis that had been 
evident in Parliament and Press at Easter. The Mission had been 
constitutionally legitimised, a repetition of the Guru incident had 
been avoided, and the Russo-Japanese war had eclipsed Tibet as the 
major foreign news event. Unfortunately for the Government, by mid-
May 1904 it was becoming apparent that the Tibetans would not 
negotiate at Gyangtse. Tibet was not about to fade as a political 
issue. Tibetan intransigence was not only rendering the November 6th 
telegram more difficult to uphold (after Gyangtse negotiations could 
only be held at Lhasa), but the Mission itself was increasingly 
subject to Tibetan 'hit and run' tactics; the Mission's security in 
Tibet inevitably presented the Government with a military headache and 
a political liability. It was therefore only a matter of time before 
the Government would have to authorise an advance to Lhasa or recall 
the Mission. 
An unchastened Cotton sensed that events in Tibet were once again 
'coming to a head' and re-opened the question of Tibet in The Times 
letters page on May 11th. Cotton believed that Britain now lay at a 
'critical position' in her relations with Tibet, and decried how 
'already the ban-dogs of the Press are whooping on the Government to 
advance to Lhasa and to assume the permanent control of the foreign 
affairs of that country'. Although Cotton acknowledged the 
Government's reticence at being embroiled in Tibetan affairs, 
nevertheless he feared that the 'imperious Viceroy' was about to 
achieve his designs. 
Cotton was convinced that the April 13th debate in the Commo"ns 
had been of a 'profitless character': 
Mr Balfour succeeded in his object of allaying the Opposition; 
no doubt he believed the assurances he gave, and the House in 
its ignorance accepted them. 
Yet Cott~n felt these assurances had little practical value, for in 
the face of continued Tibetan opposition, any settlement would be 
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enforced 'at the point of a bayonet'. Cotton pessimistically believed 
that the Government would prove 'as wax' on the high road to 
fulfilling Curzon's ambition of establishing British primacy in Tibet. 
Cotton believed Curzon's prospects to be good, noting that the press 
generally supported him, and public opinion on the subject was 'as 
pathetic as the House of Commons'. Remarking that for obvious reasons 
Britain could now afford to ignore the 'uneasiness of Russia', Cotton 
questioned whether it was too late to check Curzon's policy and to 
insist on adherence to the 'wishes, desires and intentions of His 
Majesty's Government (1), In fact Cotton seriously underestimated the 
Home Government's determination to stand firm against Curzon's wishes 
to exercise British authority over Lhasa, particularly as Balfour had 
given his word to the House that the Government entertained no such 
ambitions. Nevertheless Cotton had undoubtedly addressed the current 
crux of Tibet policy: was Younghusband to advance on Lhasa? In its 
editorial of May 11th The Times considered the Tibetan issues raised 
by Cotton; it concluded: 
There are today, as Sir Henry very truly declares, but two 
alternatives before us. We must either go to Lhasa, or we must 
withdraw our Mission and re-open negotiations on the frontier. 
To state these alternatives is to make clear which of them the 
nation will expect the Government to adopt. (2) 
Once again Cotton had been successful in raising the question of 
Tibetan policy; and Parliament also sought to pressurise the 
Government for an announcement on future British policy towards Tibet. 
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On May 12th Brodrick was closely questioned by MPs, including Gibson 
Bowles, who asked Brodrick whether the Government still intended to 
prohibit the advance of the Mission as far as Lhasa, as did Lambert in 
a similar question. For once, Brodrick gave MPs a clear answer: 
His Majesty's Government have arrived at the conclusion that 
recent events in Tibet make it inevitable that, unless the 
Tibetans consent to negotiate at Gyangtse, the Mission must 
advance to Lhasa. If necessary, we shall take steps to 
negotiate at Lhasa itself. 
Radicals such as Cotton would have been justified in interpreting this 
announcement as clear evidence that the Government was succumbing to 
Viceregal pressures; the Russian Government would also have been 
justified in doubting British assurances of disinterest in Tibet. 
Brodrick concluded his announcement with a self-contradictory 
statement, confirming that the Government did not intend 'in any way 
to depart from the policy laid down in the telegram to the Viceroy of 
the 6th November last' <3> - even though it had just authorised an 
advance on Lhasa! 
Even The Times had its doubts about a Tibetan policy that denied 
Britain the fruits of victory a la Curzon, or the advantages of a 
withdrawal from Tibet, namely the Mission's safe return and an end to 
armed Anglo-Tibetan confrontation. The Times believed that the 
Government's adherence to the November 6th telegram had been 'couched 
in terms that are too positive', and felt that events in Tibet 'might 
have warned Ministers that it is not always prudent or expedient to 
announce their intentions too precisely beforehand'. The Times of May 
13th also affirmed its belief that in any British imposed treaty on 
Tibet there had to be guarantees 'and it is not easy to see how such 
guarantees can be secured without some form of intervention of a more 
or less permanent character in the affairs of Tibet'. (4) Unlike the 
Government, The Times was clearly prepared to accept the application 
of Viceregal logic to British policy in Tibet. 
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Nevertheless radicals remained implacably opposed to any advance 
on Lhasa; their frustration was demonstrated when Flynn unavailingly 
asked Brodrick on 16th May, whether: 
In view of the despatch dated 6th November 1903, sent to the 
Viceroy of India, the contemplated armed expedition to Lhasa 
will be delayed until this House has had the opportunity of 
deciding on the propriety of taking such action. 
Unsurprisingly the Government had no intention of acceding to any such 
debate and Brodrick coldly informed Flynn that the advance on Lhasa 
had actually been sanctioned, 'unless, within a period to be fixed by 
the Government of India, the Chinese Amban arrives at Gyangtse 
accompanied by a competent Tibetan negotiator'. A frustrated Flynn 
demanded: 
Have the Government dropped the policy enunciated by the Prime 
Minister and adopted Lord Curzon's forward policy? 
Although the Speaker's intercession of 'Order! Order!' ended Flynn's 
outburst <5>, it was clear that to those of a radical persuasion the 
advance on Lhasa was anathema. Flynn did have a valid point though; 
the House was entitled to discuss the implications of an advance on 
Lhasa. Winston Churchill echoed Flynn's sentiment on May 16th: 
He trusted that an opportunity would be afforded before the 
Whitsuntide adjournment for discussing not only the immediate 
security of the forces employed in Tibet, but the moral and 
political considerations involved in that most unworthy and 
unprovoked act of aggression and crime. (6) 
Churchill was to be disappointed, for the Government was determined to 
deny any opportunity for the Commons to debate its amended Tibet 
policy. Government intransigence was well shown on May 18th when 
Lambert <Liberal MP for South Molton, Devon) asked Balfour whether in 
view of the fact that the House was at present debarred from 
discussing the Tibet expedition, he would give a Parliamentary day for 
'the discussion of the new development which has taken place'. 
Somewhat smugly Balfour replied: 
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There is no new development of which I am aware, nor can I 
promise the day asked for. If any real reason for discussing 
this question were to arise, no doubt an occasion would be found. 
A justifiably truculent Flynn then demanded that the Prime Minister 
should 'advise his friends to remove the blocking motion on paper'. 
Although Hansard records that 'no answer was returned' <7>, it was 
evident that the Government preferred to use blocking motions to gag 
Parliamentary debate, rather than defend the advance on Lhasa to the 
House. Clearly the Government had no wish to explain to the Commons 
how it had allowed its avowed policy of the November 6th telegram to 
be superseded. MPs however were well aware of the Government's volte 
face, as Theodore Taylor demonstrated on May 16th, when he remarked: 
Only the other day he heard the Prime Minister state that the 
country was going to withdraw from Tibet; but now they were told 
the expedition would advance. (8) 
Yet if the Government's ingenuous desire to prevent a further debate 
on the invasion of Tibet was achieved in the Commons, at least in the 
Lords under Lansdowne a debate was conceded. On May 17th what was to 
be the last of the Tibetan debates occurred in the Lords; although 
intended as a debate of inquiry with no set motion or vote, the 
Opposition was anxious to use the opportunity· to ascertain Government 
intentions, now that Younghusband had authorisation to advance to 
Lhasa. Spencer contended that events had proved right past Opposition 
criticisms of Government Tibet policy, and sought to know whether the 
Government stood by Balfour's and Lansdowne's previous assurances 
despite Brodrick's announcement of an advance to Lhasa. Spencer 
rightly believed Brodrick's announcement had constituted a 'rapid 
change' in policy, and remained anxious about the Mission's prospects 
in view of 'similar occurrences in India in years gone by which had 
led to serious disaster'. (9) 
In defending what many of the Opposition would now see as a 
forward and Russophobe policy approaching fruition, Hardwicke 
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endeavoured to justify an advance on Lhasa on the grounds 'were we to 
have no redress simply because we could not get into communication' 
with the Tibetan authorities. Hardwicke professed to believe there 
was nothing contradictory between an advance on Lhasa and previous 
policy declarations. Hardwicke supported this curious line of thought 
by remarking: 
Nothing has ever been said, so far as I am aware, by any member 
of His Majesty's Government that debars us from going to Lhasa 
if all our efforts at negotiating at Gyangtse fail. 
Hardwicke certainly gave the impression that the November 6th telegram 
had faded in importance. Arguing that 'we are ... at war with Tibet', 
he was unable to offer Lords opposite 'any definite pledge as to the 
exact form the settlement-will take when hostilities are 
concluded'. <10) If Hardwicke's speech was at something of a variation 
with Balfour's assurances to the Commons, it is quite plausible that 
he was acting at Lansdowne's behest in 'softening' domestic opinions 
for concessions to Britain's advantage to be wrung from the Tibetans. 
Thus Lansdowne would have a quid pro quo from Tibet to exchange for 
Russian co-operation in Egyptian finance. Unfortunately for 
Lansdowne, Balfour, undoubtedly mindful of his assurances to 
Parliament, wished for no other benefits from Tibet other than for his 
Government to successfully extricate itself from the siphon of Tibetan 
politics. 
Following Hardwicke's speech, Tweedmouth for the Opposition 
expressed exasperation at the Government's embarking 'on the Mission 
without fully realising what it was certain to lead to' maintaining 
that 'the chances of difficulty and danger were far greater than any 
possible benefit that could be gained by the Mission'. Tweedmouth 
remained highly critical of Government conduct and rightly believed 
that should 'the Government call for the support of men of all parties 
to get them out of this trouble, the least they can do is to take the 
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country into their confidence and tell us exactly the position and 
policy they mean to pursue'. (11) Tweedmouth's request was not 
unreasonable; the degree of confidence the Government was prepared to 
show the country had unfortunately already been shown in its behaviour 
towards the Commons. 
Closing the debate for the Government, Lansdowne argued that the 
Tibetans were now reaping the 'cumulative effect' of their bad 
neighbourliness. Throughout, Lansdowne explained, the Government had 
been aware of the 'seriousness of the task' Younghusband had to 
perform, which was why he had been provided a 'considerable escort, 
the presence of which was so much criticised by noble Lords opposite 
as inconsistent with the peaceful character of the Mission'. 
Regret~bly, the Foreign Secretary seemed unaware that this 
'considerable escort' had clearly contradicted the 'peaceful' nature 
of the Mission from its very inception. 
Believing that the Opposition had sought this debatet to e: licit 
'a declaration of our Tibetan policy .... so far as the future is 
concerned', Lansdowne assured the Opposition that when His Majesty's 
Government 'have deliberately adopted and announced a policy that they 
should be driven from it merely because their Mission has been 
attacked by a lot of ragged barbarians' was inconceivable. 
Unfortunately Government policy had been indelibly altered by 'ragged 
barbarians'; the Guru incident had forced the Government to 
acknowledge before Parliament its evasion of the 1858 India Act, and 
the Tibetan refusal to negotiate with the Mission had led to an 
advance on Lhasa, thereby breaching the policy of the November 6th 
telegram. Lansdowne asserted: 
It seems to me that whether at Gyangtse or at Lhasa, the policy 
remains the same - the policy of obtaining a satisfactory 
settlement from the Tibetans and the injuries they have done us. 
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By its own admission, Government policy had constantly been stated as 
the November 6th telegram; the telegram clearly denied the possibility 
of any British advance beyond Gyangtse. The advance to Lhasa had 
obviously changed British policy, and in pretending otherw1se, 
Lansdowne was not truthful. Indeed, virtually in his next breath, 
Lansdowne endeavoured to distance the Government from the intentions 
expressed in the November 6th telegram. Emphasising Hardwicke's non-
committal comments about the precise nature of any settlement, 
Lansdowne reserved for the Government a 'certain amount of discretion' 
in achieving 'an honourable and satisfactory conclusion' to the Tibet 
expedition<12). Clearly Lansdowne remained hopeful that the November 
6th telegram would become sufficiently eclipsed for the Mission to 
obtain a bargaining chip against Russia. 
Balfour, however, had no wish to go back on his word to the 
Commons; on May 19th Samuel Smith, Liberal MP for Flintshire, 
demonstrated Commons anxiety as to: 
Whether the Prime Minister could tell the House if, under the 
altered conditions in Tibet, he was still able to renew the 
pledges given a short time ago that nothing would induce the 
Indian Government to establish a protectorate in Tibet nor send 
an expedition to Lhasa? 
Parliament clearly remembered the Prime Minister's previous 
assurances; however Balfour did not have to answer Smith's question as 
the Speaker interjected: 
I am bound to say that the Hon Member <Smith> will be precluded 
from discussing that question in consequence of the Motion that 
now stands0~Paper<13). 
Once again, the Blocking Motion had provided a convenient way out for 
the Government. 
However, the Government remained unable to prevent extra-
parliamentary criticism. On May 17th Cotton wrote to The Times 
expressing deep concern that there could now be no guarantee for a 
British convention with Tibet without 'some form of intervention'. 
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Should Britain be forced to take 'Curzon's remedy', Cotton foresaw a 
British Resident in Lhasa and commercial residents at Gyangtse, Phari 
and Yatung supported by hundreds of troops. Cotton was in no doubt 
that such an int~rvention would lead to a protectorate and 'in the 
natural course merge into annexation'. Cotton also remained 
apprehensive about the international ramifications of such a policy; 
British actions in Tibet would not only be 'throwing China into the 
arms of Russia', but 'I need say no more of Russia than that our 
interference is not likely to be regarded as a friendly act'. Clearly 
Cotton saw Curzon's 'forward' designs on Tibet approaching a 
disastrous fulfilment. Unfortunately Cotton's impassioned appeal at 
the end of his letter suggests that Cotton and other Radicals had yet 
to stir public opinion strongly against intervention in Tibet. Cotton 
asserted: 
Our policy has been a crime and a blunder from the hour when the 
advance to Gyangtse was sanctioned, and the blood of more than a 
thousand slaughtered monks and husbandmen calls upon Parliament, 
on the Church, on all ministers of religion, to rise from their 
apathy and prevent the further perpetration of avoidable 
wrong<14). 
The Times dryly commented that Cotton's call to arms expressed remarks 
'of the kind with which he has already made us familiar' <15). Clearly 
Cotton's criticisms of Government Tibet policy were struggling against 
Unionist disdain and public indifference. 
On May 23rd, however, Bryce expressed Opposition frustration and 
dismay in a blistering attack on the Government's Tibet record at 
Aberdeen. Denied an opportunity to speak on the matter in Parliament, 
the former Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs claimed that the 
Tibetans had 'asked nothing better than to be let alone' adding 'they 
valued their splendid isolation; they wished, like Mr Chamberlain, to 
exclude foreign goods, and like the Government, to exclude alien 
immigrants, except Chinese'. On the question of Russian influence in 
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Tibet, Bryce sophistically contended that 'the Government had declared 
that they accepted the assurances of the Russian Government so that 
the matter was out of the question'. Rather Bryce believed that the 
situation had become such that 'if it was hard to retire no~ it might 
be still harder to leave Lhasa without maintaining a Resident there, 
and a Resident meant a garrison - perhaps a protectorate - endless 
expense, endless annoyance'. Bryce concluded his speech with a 
sentiment that most MPs would have shared; the Government's Tibet 
policy was 'a curious instance of the truth that the troubles men 
bring on themselves were often worse than those which fortune 
sent'. <16) 
If Bryce had clearly demonstrated Opposition displeasure at the 
drift of Tibet policy, The Times shared little sympathy for such 
criticisms; rather it accused Bryce's speech of rhetoric 'constructed 
on the most narrow party lines'. The Times had particularly taken 
umbrage at Bryce's 'flippant' attitude towards the question of Russian 
intrigue, believing 'Mr Bryce's experience at the Foreign Office ought 
to have suggested to him that no question of foreign policy is in fact 
so simple'. <17> Indeed, Russian activity in Tibet was an issue The 
Times had been clearly vexed about, as reports of Dorjieff's intrigues 
in Tibet had been relayed from the Mission throughout May by Times 
correspondent Perceval Landon. On May 17th, The Times devoted an 
editorial to Dorjieff, and while it wished to believe Russian 
assurances nothing other than 'perfectly sincere', the Thunderer still 
believed 'the Russian propQganda in Tibet, whether at present in 
abeyance or not, has been active enough in the past, and this kind of 
activity, once started, usually gains fresh momentum as it goes'. <18) 
On the same day <May 24th) as it had denounced Bryce, The Times 
considered reports that Dorjieff had led the Tibetans to believe that 
the Tsar would become a great Buddhist prince; it commented 'The 
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methods employed on the banks of the Neva are beyond the pale of 
praise or blame, but surely no shrewder or more daring bait was ever 
offered in the annals of diplomacy'. <19) The Times knowingly added: 
We know the varying degrees of independence which the Russian 
Government sometimes finds it convenient for its agents to 
assume; and we know also the ease with which such a method lends 
itself to repudiation, when repudiation becomes essential for 
the supreme authority. <20). 
Plainly The Times had its doubts concerning Russian behaviour in 
Tibet; however only one of The Times' readers took issue over the 
unattributable nature of Landon's reports of Russian intrigue. Cotton 
wrote to The Times on May 31st questioning 'How far that information 
is based on fact, and how far on the wild Asiatic rumours which our 
Indian officers swallow as Gospel truth'. Rather Cotton believed that 
'Dorjieff is the Russian bogey who must be "exorcised"', and entirely 
declined to accept 'the fantastic narrative of your correspondent' 
until evidence was produced. <21) The Times was unmoved by Cot ton's 
objectio~s; Cotton's demand to see proof of Russian intrigue was 'a 
condition which men with much less experience of public affairs know 
may well be impossible'. <22) 
Clearly the truth or otherwise of reports of Russian subterfuge 
in Tibet had become an issue of public controversy; it was no 
coincidence that on June 8th, Schwann, MP for Manchester North, asked 
Brodrick: 
Whether, looking to the declaration of Lord Lansdowne and the 
First Lord of the Treasury that they accept the assurances of 
Russia that there has been no Russian interference in Tibet, he 
will state whether the Government are in possession of any 
information, not contained in the Blue Book, implicating Dorjieff 
as the authoritative representative of Russia. 
Cryptically Brodrick replied: 
The statements to which the Hon Member refers represent the 
views of His Majesty's Government. It would be contrary to the 
public interest to add anything to them. <23) 
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Conspi~uously, Brodrick did not deny that Dorjieff had been involved 
in the services of Russia. For the Government to allow such reports 
to continue either suggests that the Government had clear evidence of 
Russian complicity with Dorjieff, or else the existence of such 
rumours gave its decision to advance to Lhasa some badly needed 
justification. Certainly, in the interests of better Anglo-Russian 
relations, it is surprising that Brodrick did not scotch such rumours. 
On June 11th Cotton wrote to The Times repeating Schwenn's question 
and Brodrick's answer, and made a specific accusation against the 
Thunderer: 
You have, through your special correspondent, not only added 
very remarkably to these <Lansdowne's and Balfour's) 
declarations, but have affirmed that the assurances of the 
Russian Government were false. 
Cotton felt that so serious were these imputations of Russian intrigue 
that before the public could accept the information as true, 'some 
evidence should be furnished of the authority on which it rests'. (24) 
Unsurprisingly, in view of the necessarily shady nature of Dorjieff's 
activities, The Times was unable to comply with Cotton's request. 
However, .Cotton was unwilling to let the matter rest; on June 
20th at a Council meeting of the Metropolitan Radical Federation, 
Cotton addressed the question of Tibet, but particularly in the light 
of alleged Russian involvement. The motion moved reflected the 
Russian dimension of the meeting: 
That this Council protests against the invasion of Tibet by 
this country. The Government, in accepting the Russian 
Government's assurances on the matter, have admitted that they 
have no pretence for intervention, and such intervention is a 
violation of the rights .of nations which can only result in 
disaster for the people of Tibet and involve the Indian tax-
payer in ruinous expense. 
In considering the 'question of fear of Russia in Tibet', Cotton did 
not believe Russia to be 'inimical to our Indian Empire'. Therefore 
'he could not conceive', particularly in view of the Himalayan divide 
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between India and Tibet, how 'anyone should think Russia ever 
contemplated sending considerable force into India by way of Tibet'. 
As for Dorjieff, Cotton contended 'No Russian had ever been to Lhasa' 
<Dorjieff was a Russian Buriat). Cotton believed any Russian 
explanation for the Mission to be implausible; rather the British 
Government had committed 'an act of the grossest morality' in invading 
Tibet which would ultimately lead to 15,000 or 20,000 (!)troops being 
stationed in that country. <25) If Cotton's figures were more 
improbable than Russian intrigue in Tibet, Cotton's audience was not 
overly concerned and the resolution was passed unanimously. Although 
Cotton could not single-handedly sustain the controversy over the 
precise nature of Dorjieff's activities, nevertheless The Times had 
been unable to produce evidence to support reports of Russian intrigue 
in Tibet. Certainly, this lack of evidence would have confirmed 
Radical suspicions that Dorjieff was a red herring, intended to cover 
the scent of British expansionism. 
• • * • • • • * • • 
With the Mission fully empowered to advance on Lhasa, it was 
inevitable that anxious Liberals and Irish Nationalists would seek 
further Government assurances of no annexations in Tibet. On 21st 
June Charles Devlin, Nationalist MP for Galway, asked Brodrick 'If in 
the event of success attending the Mission, it is the intention of His 
Majesty's Government to annex Tibet'. Brodrick's reply was hardly 
reassuring in view of the Government's departure from the November 6th 
telegram, namely 'There is no change of policy on the part of His 
Majesty's Government'. <26) It was perhaps not surprising that the 
question would be asked again, albeit rephrased; Liberal Herbert 
Samuel questioned 'whether the Tibetans had been made fully aware that 
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it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to annex the 
country'. A vexed Brodrick answered 'Yes, Sir; in every way-in which 
the Government could make it clear'. (27> Indeed Brodrick was to 
become increasingly testy with the House as the Mission prepared to 
advance on Lhasa~ a condition doubtless caused by the difficulty of 
defending the ad hoc development of Government Tibet 'policy'. 
On July 6th Dalziel, Liberal MP for Kirkcaldy Burghs, asked Brodrick 
for information concerning the outcome of the latest military 
operations in Tibet. Airily Brodrick replied 'If there had been any 
important communication to be made to the House he would not have 
failed to be present' at the despatch box. (28> Unfortunately he did 
not realise that Balfour had already read a telegram to the House from 
Younghusband, announcing an attack on the Tibetans at Gyantse 
fort; (29) Dalziel had sought to learn the conclusion of these 
operations. Brodrick compounded his poor manners towards the House by 
adding that if 'any information' was received 'he would communicate it 
through the Press <loud cries of 'To the House of Commons')'. An 
angry Lough spoke immediately after Brodrick, stating: 
The point he wished to draw attention to was, that if the 
Government had received no special news from India, how was it 
that the Prime Minister had possessed himself of a telegram which 
he read to the House that afternoon? 
Lough was emphatic that 'when serious warlike operations of this kind 
were being undertaken, the Government ought to afford the House some 
information'. <30> However, Brodrick remained unchastened by Lough's 
criticism of his poor conduct towards Parliament. Later, on this same 
occasion, Brodrick remarked: . 
An Hon Gentleman <Flynn) had asked a question as to the policy 
of His Majesty's Government. He thought it too late an hour-
Cloud Opposition cries of "No, No!") to enter on a disquisition 
as to the works of His Majesty's forces in Tibet. 
Clearly, Brodrick had little desire to mend his ways, so far as 
defending the Government Tibetan policy was concerned; evidently 
prevarication rather than explanation would remain characteristic of 
the Government's behaviour towards the House. 
On July 18th Swift MacNeill, Nationalist MP for Donegal South, 
submitted the last major Tibetan question of the 1904 session to 
Brodrick. If MPs had previously believed the Government's Tibetan 
policy to be somewhat ad hoc, Brodrick's reply could only corroborate 
that sentiment. MacNeill asked whether: 
An understanding had been arrived at between the British and 
Russian Governments regarding the British Expedition to Tibet, 
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on the basis of an undertaking by Lord Lansdowne that the Mission 
will be withdrawn from Tibet as soon as its object had been 
accompli shed. 
He also desired to know if: 
The Russian Government had been assured that if the object of the 
Mission can otherwise be obtained no occupation of Lhasa is 
intended. 
Brodrick equivocally replied, in the most vague terms possible: 
His Majesty's Government could not undertake that they would not 
depart in any eventuality from the policy that commended itself 
to them. <31) 
Clearly such an assurance would satisfy the Russian Government as 
little as the British Parliament. All Brodrick could promise 
Parliament and Russia was that: 
So long as no other power endeavours to intervene in the 
affairs of Tibet they would not attempt either to annex it, 
to establish a protectorate over it, or to control its 
internal administration. <32) 
Apparently, only the assurance of no British involvement in Tibet's 
government remained of the November 6th telegram. Moreover, 
Brodrick's answer, significantly or otherwise, did not preclude the 
possibility of a British Resident in Lhasa; either this omission was 
considered unnecessary to include in Brodrick's <pre-written) answer, 
or else the Government was inclining to Lansdowne's <and of course, 
Curzon's) view that Britain might need guarantees in an Anglo-Tibetan 
settlement. A British Resident in Lhasa would be an obvious guarantee 
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ANOTHER SIDE-SHO\V. 
M.&.sn:Ji Jom.J.."T Bt'l.L. " ~'1:ED WE GO LX' HERE, SIR ? ~· 
MR. BP.-Dn.a. "YES, MASTER JOID\""NY. YOU MUSTN'T MISS THIS ON J..:l:\'Y ACCOUl·rr." 
llisT£a J. B. "OH, ALL RIGHT. I SAY, IT lS.."''T A...,._"1'1'HlNG LIKE THE SOliUJ O~E. IS lT?" 
Mr Punch depicted Brodrick leading Great Britain into another Imperial 
'side show'. However, .it might have been closer to the truth to have 
portrayed Curzon as 'ringmaster' of the Tibetan spectacle. 
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for such a settlement. Certainly Brodrick's statement lacked the 
clarity of Balfour's assurances of Government policy to the House; MPs 
could but speculate as to the state of Anglo-Tibetan relations when 
Parliament re-met in February 1905. The Opposition, including 
prospective candidate Sir Henry Cotton, might only hope that the 
result of a forthcoming General Election would enable them to salvage 
Britain's relations with Lhasa . 
* * * • • * • * * * 
At the close of the 1904 session of Parliament, it was apparent that 
the Government had made an inglorious defence of its Tibet policy, 
based on its entrenched aversion to debate and unwillingness to 
concede information. It says much for the Government's behaviour that 
a Tibetan debate was only granted in the Commons after the 
Government's glaring violation of the 1858 India Act had been exposed 
beyond repair. Admittedly Lansdowne in the Lords demonstrated a 
greater readiness to allow debates on British policy in Tibet; 
however, Unionist behaviour in the Upper Chamber should in no way 
exonerate Unionist conduct in the Lower Chamber. Moreover, the 
Government also remained undeservedly fortunate in its unchivalrous 
defence; even when forced to concede the debate in the Commons, it 
still enjoyed ten days parliamentary recess for passions from the Guru 
disaster to subside, and then it savoured the unexpected windfall of 
an Opposition walk-out. Yet the most exaggerated example of 
Government good fortune, in terms of escaping a parliamentary 
reckoning over the Tibet intervention, was that the 1904/5 
Parliamentary recess coincided with Younghusband's conclusion of the 
Lhasa Convention. 
Following his successful advance on Lhasa from Gyangtse, on 
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September 7th Younghusband achieved a Convention with the Tibetan 
authorities which, if accepted by the Government, would make a mockery 
of all previous assurances to Parliament and Russia. Article vii of 
the nine point Convention provided for a British occupation of Tibet's 
Chumbi Valley until a 750,000 Rupees (£50,000) indemnity had been paid 
over a 75 year period. Effectively Younghusband had achieved an 
occupation, if not annexation, of Tibet's strategic southern valley 
for at least three quarters of a century; so much for Government 
assurances of territorial abstinence in Tibet. Moreover, in a 
separate agreement appended to the Convention, a British Agent at 
Gyangtse would henceforth have the right to visit Lhasa 'to consult 
with high Chinese and Tibetan Officials on such commercial matters of 
importance as he had found impossible to settle at Gyangtse'. Clearly 
Younghusband had won a British Resident in Tibet, with a right of 
access to Lhasa, and Government assurances of a British resolve to 
avoid political contact with Lhasa stood exposed as hollow promises. 
Although the Government did not have to face a Parliamentary furore 
over the Convention, as Parliament remained in recess until February 
1905, nevertheless it was evident that the Government in London had 
lost control of Younghusband. Chosen to lead the Mission by the 
Viceroy, there was little doubt that Younghusband was Curzon's man; 
for this reason the Home Government could never entirely trust 
Younghusband, a suspicion that events proved right. For his part, 
Younghusband deeply resented the incoherence of the Government's Tibet 
policy, and believed the Government's politicking with the Mission 
frequently compromised its security. Having risked his life to reach 
Lhasa, Younghusband held that something worthwhile should come from 
the Mission's exertions. Younghusband negotiated in e~emely 
difficult conditions a Convention which he hoped would prove 
acceptable to the Government and achieve something concrete for 
Brit a in. No doubt he overstepped his powers; but in the face of an 
unconstructive Government attitude, he still managed to negotiate an 
outcome to the Tibet Expedition which would have appeared 
inconceivable in the dark days of April 1904. 
Naturally, above all else, the Government was concerned at the 
effect the Convention would have on Russia; how far did the British 
occupation of the Chumbi Valley, and the British Agent at Gyangtse, 
undermine British promises to Russia? In concluding the Convention 
Younghusband believed that these controversial provisions had been 
couched in terms that did not go against previous British assurances 
to Russia. As he later wrote: 
The question was whether they can counter to any pledge we had 
given Russia, and I had a private and very confidential letter 
from Lord Curzon written from England after an interview with 
Lord Lansdowne saying that in Lord Lansdowne's opinion the 
pledge we had given Russia not to occupy Tibet did not prevent 
us from accepting the Chumbi Valley. (33) 
Even if Lansdowne's contention is correct about Chumbi, the 
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appointment of a British Resident at Gyangtse was clearly in violation 
of British assurances to Russia. 
Certainly Balfour's reaction was more characteristic of the 
Government's response to having had its assurances to Russia clearly 
broken. Balfour believed that Younghusband's Convention was 
insupportable. He could not see how Britain was to avoid the 
imputation- 'greatly unjust' though he felt it to be- that in 
disavowing one portion of the Treaty which Younghusband had 
negotiated, they were acting 'not in obedience to the principles of 
International good faith, but to pressure from Russia'. Plainly 
Balfour believed Younghusband had acted irresponsibly; he opined: 
The only chance of any permanent arrangement with that power in 
Central Asia depends upon the mutual confidence that engagements 
will be adhered to, and if, as I fear, Colonel Younghusband, in 
acting as he has done, wished to force the hand of the 
Government, he has inflicted upon us an injury with which any 
loss to our material interests affected by our Tibetan policy 
is absolutely insignificant. <34) 
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Balfour was right to be anxious about how Russia might interpret such 
a clear instance of 'perfidious Albion'. It was only sensible that 
Balfour disallowed Britain's controversial gains by the Lhasa 
Convention, otherwise Britain would be little better than Russia in 
Manchuria, and would jeopardise her chances of an eventual 
understanding with Russia. Brodrick shared Balfour's vie~ 
unfortunately, doubtless as part of his increasing antipathy towards 
Curzon, Brodrick endeavoured to victimise Younghusband, as his squalid 
efforts to deprive Younghusband of any Honours for leading the Mission 
indicated. Such was Brodrick's desire to 'blacken' the reputation of 
the Lhasa Convention that in his autobiography he wildly claimed: 
Had Curzon been allowed to ratify the proposed treaty with 
Tibet . . . . the suspicion of Russia would have rendered loyal 
co-operation in the Great War most difficult. (35) 
In an effort to allay Russian anxiety, the Government therefore 
reduced the indemnity toRs 250,000 to be paid over 3 years; it was 
possible that British forces could vacate the Chumbi Valley by the end 
of 1908. Article ix, which sought to preclude all foreign 
interference in Tibet, remained Britain's chief guarantee against a 
resumption of Russian intrigue. It was ironic that, in the 
controversy surrounding the Lhasa Convention, it was largely 
overlooked that, when the Mission had approached Lhasa, Dorjieff 
<accompanied by the Dalai Lama) had taken flight. If nothing else, 
Younghusband had driven from Lhasa the one individual who had done so 
much to spur Curzon into advocating a Tibet expedition. Yet neither 
Dorjieff's departure from Lhasa, nor the proposed Lhasa Convent ion, 
provoked a violent remonstration from Russia; obviously St Petersburg 
could not protest over the fate of its secret agent, and clearly 
wished to apprise how the British Government would react to 
Younghusband's unauthorised sanctioning of a British Agent at Gyangtse 
and an occupation of the ChumbL Although placated by the 
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Government's disallowing of the Convention in its original form, 
Russia did register a protest over Article ix, <36) on the basis of a 
report in The Times of 17th September 1904. The Times had failed to 
make clear that this Article, designed to prevent foreign penetration 
of Tibet, also applied to Britain. Mistakenly believing Britain to be 
excluded from this Article, Russia protested that the Convention 
amounted to a British Protectorate. Russia cited the <temporary) 
British occupation of Chumbi, and the construction of a telegraph line 
to Gyangtse from the Indian frontier, as evidence that Britain 
considered herself exempted from Article ix. Nevertheless, Russia's 
reaction to the conclusion of a Mission that she must have suspected, 
if not known, was directed against her influence in Lhasa, was 
demonstrably mild. Immersed in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia had no 
wish to encourage British antipathy to her; moreover, the Government's 
maladroit conduct of Tibet policy culminating in Younghusband's 
insubordination, showed that the British Government <if not Curzon) 
lacked a master strategy in Tibet. Clearly, in St Petersburg's <and 
London's) eyes, a minor issue such as Tibet could not justify a breach 
in Anglo-Russian relations; in any case, China's refusal to ratify the 
amended Lhasa Convention would frustrate the legitimacy of the 
Convention for the immediate future. 
Indeed, the efforts the Balfour Government made to allay Russian 
anxieties over Tibet provide a marked contrast with its casual 
attitude to Westminster. The Unionist Government was clearly more 
d l::c O.'k>\J. · th · t t th T · t concerne ~ ~~ .. reneg1ng on e assurances 1 gave o e sar1s 
regime than those it had given to the British Parliament. Rather, 
with Parliament in abeyance, and with no recall due until February 
1905, Westminster could be conveniently ignored for the duration; 
there was to be no question of an emergency debate in which the 
Government justified its Tibetan conduct. Indeed, there was only 
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limited scope for domestic criticism of the confusion that had come of 
the Government's Tibet policy; once again it fell to Cotton to lead 
extra-parliamentary opposition to intervention in Tibet. Writing to 
The Tim~s on September 19th Cotton did pay tribute to Younghusband's 
Tibetan work, co'nfessing: 
It must be admitted, indeed, that we have got more by dealing 
with the Tibetans than we should ever have attained by diplomacy 
with the Chinese. 
However, as to the terms of the revised Lhasa Convention, Cotton 
remained inveterately hostile; on ~he occupation of the Chumbi Cotton 
believed British forces would stay in situ 'until the Greek Kalends! 
Is any one so fatuous as to suppose that the Tibetans will be able to 
lS\t ~ c. ~o.rc.t.,terutx ~~" ex-~va.h10"~) 
pay Great Britain Rs 7, 500,000?' Cotton also expressed dismay that 
'the pledges of His Majesty's Minister should have been so completely S~t 
aside'. C37) The Times was sceptical of Cotton's belief that Tibet 
would be unable to pay the indemnity, remarking 'We require something 
more than Sir Henry's assertion on this point, when we remember how 
constantly his predictions have been refuted by events'. <38) Cotton 
wrote once more to The Times, on February lOth 1905; clearly Cotton 
chose this occasion to coincide with the opening of the 1905 
Parliament, and doubtless to remind MPs of the Government's Tibetan 
difficulties. Cotton congratulated Brodrick 'on the firmness with 
which he has withstood the insistence of the Government of India and 
Colonel Younghusband, carried to the verge of insubordination, to 
adhere to the policy of Lord Curzon'. He also noted, with a touch of 
irony, that since Britain was now negotiating with China for China's 
recognition of the Lhasa Convention 'we have come back to the point 
from which we ought to have begun'. Finally, the Government's arch-
Tibetan protagonist concluded the end of his Tibetan correspondence 
with an appeal that, since the Tibet issue was wider than Indo-Tibetan 
relations, . would it not be an 'act of dubious just ice' for the 
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Government to bear a substantial proportion of the Mission's cost. (39) 
Cotton was to be disappointed; on February 17th Weir, Liberal MP for 
Ross and Cromarty, questioned Balfour on this very point. Balfour 
assured Weir that since the Tibet Mission 'was essentially an Indian 
interest' clearly 'it was was neither just nor expedient' that Britain 
should foot any of India's bill'. <40) It was ironic that the 
Government had used precisely the opposite argument - that India must 
take account of Imperial interests- in seeking to curb the Viceroy's 
enthusiasm for a Tibetan expedition. 
Indeed, as Cotton had shown, whatever one's political hue, there 
was a definite respect for Younghusband's endeavours in Tibet; 
unfortunately for the Government, there was little sympathy for its 
distressingly gauche handling of the Tibet question. Upon publication 
of a third and final Blue Book, The Times captured the public mood by 
stating: 
It will be an evil day for the Empire when Ministers at home 
shall set about to discourage by churlish strictures the 
readiness of public servants abroad to assume responsibility in 
cases of extreme difficulty and urgency. (41) 
Having had ample time to reflect on Tibetan difficulties, a re-
convened Parliament also affirmed its sympathy for Younghusband, 
whilst finding the Government's overall conduct lamentably wanting. 
In the Commons, Campbell-Bannerman was in no doubt that the Tibetan 
intervention had been a 'tragic comedy from beginning to end'. He 
refused to accept that Younghusband alone was culpable for the Lhasa 
Convention melee 'But why rebuke the agent? Why was not your censure 
carried higher to the Principal?" Clearly Campbell-Bannerman viewed 
the Government's wayward Viceroy as entirely deserving of censure. 
Campbell-Bannerman also believed Younghusband to have been 'well aware 
of the reasons of the enterprise, and evidently regarded the permanent 
occupation of the Chtimbi Valley as the minimum to be obtained'. The 
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Leader of the Opposition could only conclude that Government tales of 
'naughty and recalcitrant' Tibetan behaviour as justifications for the 
Mission had been a ruse; an aggrandising of Chumbi and any other 
advantages that could be won had been the Government's intent all 
along. Campbell-Bannerman added 'I do not think that is treating the 
House fairly'. <42) Although Campbell-Bannerman ascribed darker 
motives to the Government than necessary, nevertheless, the occupation 
of Chumbi certainly gave the impression that Britain had viewed the 
valley as a suitable reward for her Tibetan exertions. 
Yet the most trenchant observant of the Government's Tibetan 
vicissitudes came from its own backbenches, in the person of Gibson 
Bowles. He was despondent that: 
When they went into a country like Tibet and destroyed the moral 
authority, the physical power of the Government of that country, 
and in fact the Government itself, they incurred a responsibility 
which in the end would force them to take further steps, and 
eventually to send a Resident and occupy territory. 
Gibson Bowles saw 'a very ambitious Viceroy' as culpable for the state 
of affairs'. He imagined the Viceroy, surveying all the Great Powers 
annexing territory, and thinking: 
I will go one better, I will annex not territory but the 
incarnate Buddha; I will have a divinity in my service. That is 
what I will do for my country. 
In pursuing such a policy, Gibson Bowles accused the Viceroy of 
endeavouring to force down the Government's throat a treaty 'contrary 
to their policy'. Thus he could only conclude that 'the hard words of 
"defiance'', "disobedience" and "disregard of authority"' ought to have 
been applied to the Viceroy rather than the 'able and gallant officer 
who conducted the expedition'. (43) Clearly Gibson Bowles' criticism 
of the Viceroy reflected a sincere frustration and annoyance amongst 
less imperialistically orientated Unionists at the needless 
difficulties Curzon's Tibetan designs had caused the Government. 
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Balfour himself remained unwilling to blame the Viceroy <at least 
in public) for embroiling the Government in its Tibetan melee. In 
answer to a suggestion that 'the Government at home should have passed 
a censure motion on the Government of India', he laconically stated: 
I see no ground for that suggestion. The Government of India 
recognised, as I am sure they will always recognise, that the 
Government at home must be supreme. <44) 
Nevertheless it was unfortunate the Government proved incapable of 
exercising its supreme authority in either an effective or intelligent 
development of Tibet policy; its achievement was to embarrass itself 
and frustrate Curzon. 
As for reaction in the Lords to the Government's Tibetan 
difficulties, Spencer, in a much less impassioned speech than 
Campbell-Bannerman's, held that 'Sir Frank Younghusband exceeded his 
instructions in many respects, but he did fine work and deserves our 
thanks'. Spencer believed that Younghusband 'may have been somewhat 
badly treated, considering the enormous difficulties with which he had 
to contend, and the manner in which he overcame them'. <45) If Spence~ 
was alluding to Brodrick's mean-spirited vendetta against 
Younghusband, a generous Lansdowne accepted that Younghusband had 
acted 'as he believed best ... we regretted in any way to discourage 
so valuable and brilliant an officer'. Nevertheless Lansdowne 
expressed the questionable belief that 'before the whole world, we 
have scrupulously and strictly adhered' <46) to the November 6th 
telegram. Lansdowne was too intelligent a man to believe such a 
sentiment, and it is also unlikely any one else in the Chamber took it 
literally. 
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THE L\JAGE OF BUDDHA 
(\\"h~ .. , ,!,._. Fn~li!"h lo-ft Llu!'~a an old monk-affected to 
tears-presented Culond \"ounghusband with a golden image 
of Buddha.) 
\VITI! te;trs tn his eye;; 
The old monk cr:es, 
. "Farewell, my most Christian bruclda. 
But, ere you depart. 
Accept from my he:trt 
This beautiful I mage of Buddha. 
"You have \\"Orried our land 
\Vith your famed ':\Iission' Band, 
And you've spilt a good deal of our blood, ah! 
But though we must sever, 
Remember for c\·cr 
To cherish this I mage of Buddha." 
So 110\V with one \·oicc, 
Let us sing and rejoice 
With delight at this gift from our bruclda: 
As the statue's of gold, 
Sure it needn't be told 
Henceforth we shall all worship Buddha. 
Sir Wilfred Lawson MP had his own suspicions as to why Britain was 
interested in Tibet. 
125 
126 
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lu\!.A.. " HAS HE GONE ? TilA 1' 'S ODD; I !JO~'T REME)JBER SIG!\~G A .. 'I\YTHING. WELL, 
AXYHOW, I 'M GOI!\G R\CK HOME." 
Mr Punch's view of Tibet's likely attitude to the Lhasa Convention. 
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EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSIONS 
There can be little doubt that its behaviour over Tibet proved 
detrimental to the Balfour Government's standing with the electorate. 
For many voters who had followed events in Tibet, irrespective of 
their political persuasion, Government Tibetan policy would surely 
have seemed to be an ungainly, and confused, rearguard action against 
Curzonism. To more progressive and radical voters, once again the 
bankruptcy of Unionist rule had been demonstrated. Even Unionist 
supporters were perplexed; many Unionists considered Younghusband's 
Lhasa Convention to be a national triumr,h, and were dismayed at the 
Government's disavowal of so much of what it had achieved. Moreover, 
it might have occurred to those Unionist who remained ambivalent about 
the whole Tibetan episode, since the Government had already taken the 
political flak for going to Lhasa, where was the logic in throwing 
away the Convention? It was perhaps as well that the Unionist rank 
and file did not know the extent to which their leaders were prepared 
to go to accommodate Russian sensitivities. 
It would of course be overstating the case to argue that the 
Government's inept handling of Tibetan policy was a~ issue in 
determining the outcome of the 1906 election. However, it would not 
be wide of the mark to maintain that the Balfour Government's conduct 
of Anglo-Tibetan relations did contribute to that national climate of 
opinion which was becoming thoroughly disenchanted with the Unionists. 
In that sense, Lhasa was clearly a staging post on the road to the 
Liberal landslide. 
Fittingly, the Liberal victory in the 1906 election was to see 
Sir Henry Cotton, the Balfour Government's arch-opponent over Tibet, 
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come out of the wilderness. Not only did he win Nottingham East, but 
many of the views he had expressed during his Tibetan agitation, were 
to be adopted as Liberal Government policy. The new Secretary of 
State for India, John Morley, shared Cotton's whole-hearted aversion 
to British inte~ference in Tibet's internal affairs. Morley had no 
time for 'adventurism' on India's borders; rather his belief was that 
it endangered the real basis of India's security: 
In a poor country like India, Economy is as much an element of 
defence as guns and forts, and to concentrate your vigour upon 
guns and forts, and upon a host of outlying matters in Tibet, 
Persia, the Gulf etc., which only secondarily and indirectly 
concern you even as a garrison, seems to me a highly lnJurious 
dispersion from the other and more important work of an Indian 
Government. < 1 ) 
In office, Morley was intent on redressing the balance in Indian 
Government from that of frontier 'excesses' to a more internally 
concerned regime. In effect, the advent of Morley at the India Office 
heralded the fruition of Cotton's Tibetan views into British 
Government policy. And Morley was not alone in working for British 
disengagement from Tibet; rather he worked alongside Sir Edward Grey 
in this endeavour. As Foreign Secretary, Grey was anxious to follow 
through the logic of the recent Anglo-French entente; namely an 
entente with France's ally, Russia. Tibet had clearly been an example 
of how a marginal diplomatic question could erupt and jeopardise the 
prospects for such a rapprochement. Balfour had plainly voiced deep 
concern at the Lhasa Convention's likely repercussions on Anglo-
Russian trust, and Grey was determined that, in future, foolhardy 
enterprises on India's frontiers could not be allowed to destabilise 
Anglo-Russian relations. Therefore if he could achieve a diplomatic 
arrangement with Russia, the need for forward moves into areas such as 
Tibet would fall to the ground. Indeed, as Grey said of the 
negotiations leading to the 1907 Anglo Russian Convention: 
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The cardinal object in these negotiations was to secure ourselves 
for ever, as far as a treaty could secure us, from further 
Russian advances in the direction of the Indian frontier 
The gain to us was great. We were freed from an anxiety that 
had often preoccupied British Government. <2> 
In effect, if Grey could deliver a Convention that moved Anglo-
Russian relations in Asia beyond their point of entrenched antagonism, 
then mutual goodwill could begin to develop. Given such a diplomatic 
revolution, calls by radicals and Liberals for a British evacuation of 
Tibet were pressing not only on moral and financial grounds; rather 
such calls could also reinforce the view that a prompt departure from 
Tibet would be a useful token of British good faith to Russia. In 
fact, insofar as Tibet was concerned, there was a genuine convergence 
of official British foreign policy with the views that Cotton had 
canvassed. So, not only did the Anglo-Russian Convention on 31 August 
1907 represent the consummation of Grey's efforts for a new 
understanding between London and St Petersburg, it also held out a 
non-interventionist future for Tibet. Under the terms for the Tibetan 
Convention, Britain and Russia proclaimed a mutual disinterest in 
Tibet, agreed to observe Chinese suzerainty over that country, and to 
enter into negotiations with Tibet only through Chinese channels. 
There was also to be a moratorium for three years on any 'scientific 
mission' entering Tibet from British or Russian territory. Clearly, 
in the wider interests of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement, the 
Campbell-Bannerman Government had given up whatever 'morally dubious' 
advantages it had inherited in Tibet from its Unionist predecessor. 
Yet, from a Russian and a radical perspective, the acid test of 
Britain's real intentions towards Tibet remained whether the British 
Government would evacuate Indian forces from Tibet's strategically 
vital southern flank, the Chumbi Valley. Deprived of the Chumbi, 
Indian forces would lack the obvious entry point into Tibet; British 
India would thus lose its key pressure point on Lhasa. The Campbell-
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Bannerman Government did accept, in an annexe to the Convention, that 
Indian forces would evacuate the Chumbi as soon as Tibet had paid, 
according to the revised Lhasa Convention, her indemnity in three 
instalments; the one other condition of British withdrawal was that 
Tibet's trade marts should be functioning correctly. Unsurprisingly 
la)\,o \-..c.c\. ~\ tQ_c!'\ ("~ \~1\e,c,t c.~ \hc..e.ro~ ~~ \:k Lt~~ 1-oo\t. ~U! 1 Curzon~w~s implacably hostile to a British evacuation of the Chumbi, 
and using tactics not dissimilar to those of the Balfour Government, 
Morley sought to abandon the Chumbi when Opposition criticisms would 
be least effective; namely whilst Parliament was in recess. Even when 
Tibet had finally 'satisfied' the Lhasa Convention, Morley was still 
concerned at the domestic reaction to the British departure from the 
Chumbi. On 20 December 1907 he reflected on the forthcoming session 
of Parliament: 
The business of the Chumbi Valley and its evacuation will be 
settled, I hope before Parliament meets, and if Curzon were there 
we should hear his voice against us for certain. <3> 
Yet where Morley and Grey really differed most from the Balfour 
Government was in the simple fact that they had a strategy for, and a 
vision of, Tibet's future. Both men appreciated the significance of 
evacuating the Chumbi, not only as a pledge of British goodwill to 
Russia, but also as an unequivocal declaration of British intent 
towards Tibet. Indeed it is important to recognise how mutually 
interwoven were Morley and Grey's Tibetan policies. This symbiosis 
was well shown on 17 February 1908 in the debate on the Anglo-Russian 
Convention. Rejecting Opposition criticisms of the British evacuation 
of the Chumbi, Morley stated that, since Tibet had fulfilled her 
obligations under the Lhasa Convention, and as Britain had promised 
Russia that the Chumbi would be evacuated at this juncture: 
Therefore we were bound, if we were to face Russia or to maintain 
our own self respect in Asiatic politics, to come out of the 
Chumbi, and come out we have. (4) 
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It must therefore appear that the Tibetan policy of Morley and 
Grey represented the final emergence of a coherent Liberal strategy 
for Tibet. Indeed, had the Balfour Government ever achieved a similar 
degree of decisiveness on Tibet, it might have been considerably more 
successful in handling Tibetan affairs. One particularly significant 
area of Liberal Tibetan policy was the weight it was prepared to 
attach to Russian sensitivities; by a more sensitive understanding of 
Russia's Tibetan position, Britain could at least try to solve the 
question of Tibet by diplomatic rather than military means. Grey, 
indeed, sought to explain Russia's attitude to Tibet to the Commons: 
Although Tibet is near to India and far from Russia it has to be 
borne in mind that the Russian interest in Tibet is a real one. 
Russia has many Buddhist subjects in Lhasa, and if we had pushed 
a forward policy in Tibet and had occupied a predominant 
political influence over the internal affairs of Tibet, we should 
have been in a position to make trouble with Russian subjects at 
a distance through our holding the centre. C5) 
Thus the hallmarks of Liberal Tibetan policy after the 1906 election 
clearly included British withdrawal and abstention from Tibet, respect 
for Chinese suzerainty and a willingness to understand Russia's 
perspective on Tibet. It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude 
that it was Morley and Grey's efforts at the India and Foreign Office 
respectively that realised Cotton's hopes for Anglo-Tibetan relations. 
But if Cotton should be regarded as the progenitor of Liberal policy 
on Tibet, how did he himself view the Campbell-Bannerman Government's 
Tibetan record? In the debate of 17 February 1908, Cotton spoke of 
the Anglo-Russian Convention and its effects on Tibetan policy: 
He regarded with complacency those clauses (pertaining to 
Tibet) for substantially they gave effect to the identical 
position which he had preached in the Press and on public 
platforms three or four years before at a time when he was 
not supported by any official sympathy. (6) 
Cotton also held that the Convention's Tibet provisions were 'the 
death knell of the policy followed by Lord Curzon when he embarked on 
that ill starred expedition'. Yet the Tibet policy pursued by the 
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Campbell-Bannerman Government signalled more than simply the demise of 
Curzonism. Rather it was a vindication of Cotton's role as the 
conscience of Liberal Tibet policy. Cotton's single minded interest 
in this issue (in the 1906 Parliament alone he submitted 18 questions 
concerning Tibet) made it virtually impossible for Liberals not to 
have an opinion on this topic. Through his public crusade against 
British intervention in Tibet, he had helped to transform a dry and 
obscure foreign policy question into a potent political issue. In 
short, Cotton was C.e..f\\:~rg,l to the establishment of a Liberal agenda 
for Tibet. Even though at times he may have been imprudently 
vociferous and impulsive, nevertheless Cotton can be seen as the 
unofficial spokesman for the Government's Tibetan policy in the years 
following the Liberal landslide. Morley and Grey gave effect to the 
ideas that Cotton had canvassed, and made real the British evacuation 
of Tibet. Thus, Sir Henry Cotton may now be acknowledged as the 
progenitor of Liberal policy in Tibet. 
Yet if overall Cotton and the Campbell-Bannerman Government can 
be said to emerge with an appreciable amount of consistency on the 
question of Tibet, the same cannot be said for the Balfour Government. 
Unlike its Liberal adversaries, the Balfour Government never really 
had an agreed Tibetan policy. Admittedly, it did claim that the 
November 6th telegram was a policy, yet the telegram was intended to 
restrain Curzon's forward impulses in Tibet rather than to represent a 
genuine Government position. Unsurprisingly, nowhere was the Unionist 
lack of a Tibetan policy more obvious than in Parliament, and the 
Government's shabby attempts to frustrate Tibetan debate paid eloquent 
witness to their policy void. Indeed, the Government was patently 
guilty of breaking an Act of Parliament, the 1858 Government of India 
Act; it apparently preferred to remain in a constitutionally 
illegitimate position until, at last, the April 1904 Tibet Revenues 
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Bill provided it with a convenient fig leaf. Yet, judging from 
contemporary political comment (especially the Political Notes of The 
Times), it would seem that the Government was reluctant to grab even 
that fig leaf; it believed that to admit to Parliament that 
Younghusband's expedition was of a military character would be to 
further Curzon's 'master plan' of an ever-deeper Tibetan involvement, 
primarily aimed against Russia. Only when it was obvious that MPs of 
all parties had been so outraged by the Guru massacre did the 
Government finally move the Tibet Revenues Bill; and even then, it was 
reacting to the prospect of Lough moving the adjournment of the House, 
to call attention to Tibet, 'on the grounds of public urgency'. Many 
Unionists were deeply unhappy about the Government's whole Tibetan 
conduct; had it still sought to frustrate a debate after the Easter 
1904 recess, and had it failed to provide assurances of no long term 
British involvement in Tibet, it is clear that Gibson Bowles would 
have led a backbench revolt. 
Unfortunately the Balfour Government still retained an innate 
aversion to parliamentary debate on Tibet, and supported this 
lamentable tendency with a widespread use of the blocking motion. As 
Sir Robert Reid suggested, it lay within the Government's power to 
remove such motions preventing debate on Tibet; nevertheless, as MPs 
· were all too aware, the Government . used blocking mot ions as a 
substitute for debate. Even after the Tibet Revenues debate, use of 
the blocking motion remained the Government's preferred method of 
Tibetan 'business', as far as the Commons was concerned. In short, 
the Government's behaviour towards the lower House was no more 
honourable than its untoward treatment of-Younghusband. However, at 
least its conduct in the Lords was somewhat different. Under 
Lansdowne's auspices, debates on Tibet were more readily conceded, and 
Unionist peers proved more able in debate than Brodrick. Yet even so, 
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as speeches by Lansdowne demonstrate, Government 'policy' towards 
Tibet was really only justifiable by sophistical contortions. Indeed, 
overall the Government's Tibetan record in Parliament involved a 
considerable degree of furtiveness and evasion. 
Of course the extent to which the Unionist's Tibetan foray, 
inspired by an anxious Curzon, was a justified response to Russian 
intrigue remains open to question. Certainly Curzon would have been 
failing in his viceregal duties if he had dismissed out of hand 
reports of Russian intrigues in Lhasa. Similarly it is worth 
remembering that he was not alone in his suspicions about what Russia 
might be up to in Tibet; indeed some of the sparse intelligence which 
Curzon received also reached sympathetic domestic journals. Ular's 
reports of Russian involvement in Tibet, published in the Contemporary 
Review, reached a sizeable audience, and may have encouraged many in 
their suspicion of Russia in Asia. It also has to be admitted, as 
Curzon himself argued, that Russia's past record in terms of 
encroaching southwards towards India, was profoundly worrying. When 
Ular reported that a new Anglo-Russian border hundreds of miles long 
<the Indo-Tibetan border) had emerged, readers were naturally 
intrigued to know what substance lay behind such assertions. But, if 
we want evidence that Ular's reports were read by eminent figures in 
British politics, we need look no further than Rosebery's speech in 
the Lords on 26 February 1904: 
Now of course I accept the denial of the Russian Government that 
there is no agreement or treaty between Russia and Tibet. There 
is an article in one of the monthly magazines, I think it is the 
Contemporary Review, signed by a name <A Ular) which is not known 
to me, which categorically states that such a treaty has been 
signed and that a friend of the author's was actually present at 
the signature. (7) 
Even though Rosebery could attach 'no authority to a statement of that 
kind' since he did not know 'the position of the person who makes it', 
nevertheless he did not discount the possibility of there being truth 
135 
in the report. It is, with hindsight, easy to criticise Curzon for 
being over exercised about developments beyond India's frontiers; yet 
given the magnitude of the events that were claimed to be unravelling 
in Tibet, and given the probability that there was at least a grain of 
truth in the rumours, then the despatch of the Younghusband Mission 
becomes a comprehensible response. Certainly Curzon did ensure, 
through Younghusband' s efforts, that by August 1904 it was the Union 
Jack rather than the Russian Standard that flew over Lhasa. Indeed, 
had it been the Russian flag that had been hoisted in Lhasa instead, 
Curzon would surely have faced severe Parliamentary censure for 
failing to defend India's interests. 
In fact, there seems to be little doubt that Dorjieff was a 
Russian spy; the only issue at stake is how injurious were his 
activities to Britain. Assuredly Dorjieff's counsels had worked to 
Britain's disadvantage by aligning, in the Lamaist hierarchy's eyes, 
Tibeto-Russian friendship with the Tibetan's natural desire to be 
independent; Shata, according to Kawaguchi, very much subscribed to 
this line of thought. Since the Tibetans had come to believe Britain 
to be a threat to their independence, a view which was reinforced by 
British encroachment in Sikkim, Dorjieff's intrigues had the potential 
to cause great difficulty for Britain on the North Eastern frontier. 
Moreover, if Dorjieff's theological justification for Russo-Tibetan 
friendship became commonly believed amongst Tibetans, <namely that 
Russia was the Chang Shambhala of Tibetan folklore and the Tsar was 
its ruler), it would only be a matter of time before Tibet's Lamaist 
hierarchy acceded to Russian 'protection' from Britain. Indeed the 
prospects for Britain in a situation in which the Dalai Lama, the 
pontiff of the Buddhist world, clearly became a Russian ally, were 
worrying. At the very least Asia's Buddhists would look to Russia as 
the ally of Buddhism, and at the very worst, Russian domination ·of the 
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Dalai Lama would convince Buddhists <and others) that British power 
was waning; not only would this last scenario be unsettling to British 
influence throughout Asia but in a restive country, such as Burma, it 
could be particularly dangerous to British rule. In short,· it can be 
argued that, with Dorjieff installed in Lhasa, there were cogent 
reasons for the Younghusband Mission. 
Ultimately though, the question of Anglo-Tibetan relations came 
down to the question of Anglo-Russian relations. If Grey and Isvolsky 
were able to defuse Tibet as a point of mutual controversy, it was 
primarily because shifts in great power politics to the advantage of 
Mitteleuropa had rendered obsolete the solutions which Curzon or 
Ukhtomsky would have preferred. Anglo-Russian confrontation over who 
was top dog in Lhasa was an indulgence neither side could afford when 
Germany's power in Europe seemed menacing. Even so, given the 
mistrust that had long existed between Russia and Britain, the Anglo-
Russian Convention was an impressive change of direction. Whereas in 
1907 Tibet was an issue to be discussed in a cautious but constructive 
manner by both Governments, three years before in 1904 it was still 
very clearly a symptom and cause of Anglo Russian mistrust. Indeed in 
1904 it would not have been unreasonable to assume that Anglo-Russian 
suspicion would continue indefinitely; in this mutual suspicion both 
sides would ascribe all manner of intentions to the other, with a 
combination of neurosis and occasional truculence. An example of such 
thinking can be found in Ukhtomsky's journal in 1896: 
England threw obstacles in our path in China and Japan, in 
Chitral and Armenia, and now her conduct in Egypt is growing 
ever more hostile to Russia. The trouble created by Englishmen 
in the Armenian province of Turkey <ie the Armenian Massacres!) 
were planned in view of many objects, among others the · 
establishment of direct communications overland between India 
and the Mediterranean. <8> 
Clearly if such absurd levels of suspicion in Anglo-Russian 
relations had, ten years later, been successfully exorcised, at least 
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in Government circles, then the climate of mistrust that led to the 
British invasion of Tibet no longer existed. Naturally this exorcism 
was not an easy task; an unexpected incident, such as that at the 
Dogger Bank, could at any time bring Britain and Russia to· the brink 
of war. Indeed Grey knew that even though the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
Convention was a watershed in improving relations, many in Parli~ent 
would still oppose him; it was no coincidence that the Convention was 
signed just into the long parliamentary recess. Even if this was 
arguably a questionable tactic, more reminiscent of Balfour's than of 
Campbell-Bannerman' s treat .ment of Parliament, it is clear that had 
such a convention existed five years previously, the Younghusband 
Mission would never have happened. In the event, the Younghusband 
Mission turned out to be the last major British thrust in the Great 
Game before 1917. If nothing else, it is evident that this British 
enterprise ultimately but overwhelmingly owed more to British 
insecurity and uncertainty about Russia's intentions towards Tibet 
than to any substantial quarrel with Lhasa. In short, the resolution 
of Anglo Tibetan difficulties lay not on the road to Lhasa but by the 
banks of the Neva, and in the reorientation of British as well as 
Russian policy. 
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION <pp 1 - 3) 
1. Curzon to Percy, 25th September 1907, quoted Earl of Ronaldshay, 
Life of Lord Curzon, Vol III <London, 1923) p 38. 
138 
2. Earl of Midleton, Records and Reactions 1856 -1939 <London, 1939) 
p 208. Hereafter cited as Midleton, Records. 
139 
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
Britain and the Struggle for Central Asia 1885 - 1903 (pp 4 - 22) 
1. Nicholas II to Grand Duchess Xenia Alexandrova, 21 October 1899, 
Krassnii Archive - t2 (63), quoted, E Kandyba-Foxcroft, Russia 
and the Anglo-Boer War <Roodepoort, 1981) p 295. Hereafter cited 
as Kandyba-Foxcroft, Russia/Anglo-Boer. 
2. Krassnii Archive, Vol 19, pp 53- 63, cited by W Walsh 'The 
Imperial Russian General Staff and India' in the Russian Review, 
April 1957. Quoted D Dilks, Curzon in India, Vol I <London, 
1969) p 177. Hereafter cited as Dilks, Curzon. 
3. Sir C Scott, 27 June 1900, British Foreign Office Documents, 
Vol 207 - 284, No 1599 <microfilm). Quoted Kandbya-Foxcroft, 
Russian/Anglo-Boer War, p 316. 
4. Stevens to Lansdowne, 13 February 1900, F. 0. 65 1604. Quoted 
Kandyba-Foxcroft, Russia/Anglo-Boer War, p 314. 
5. Salisbury to Northcote, 8 June 1900, cited by J A S Grenville, 
Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy (London 1964) pp 296 - 6). 
Quoted Dilks, Curzon, Vol I, p 178. 
6. Documents Diplomatiques Francais <1871 - 1914), D. D. F., 1s, 
Vol XV, pp 3 - 4, 85 - 90. Quoted Dilks, Curzon, Vol I, p 172. 
7. W H W Waters to G J Goschen, 13 October 1896, Foreign Office 
Confidential Print; reprinted in British Documents on Foreign 
Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential 
Print, Part 1, Vol II <University Publications of America 1983) 
pp 305 - 7. This reprint selection hereafter cited as BD: FOCP. 
8. J Gooch, The Plans of War, <London 1974), p 213. Hereafter cited 
as Gooch, The Plans. 
9. Gooch, The Plans, p 199. 
10. Gooch, The Plans, p 200 - 3. 
11. Gooch, The Plans, p 198. 
12. J A C Tilley, 14 January 1905, BD: FOCP, Part 1' Vol II, p 424. 
13. W H W Waters, 13 October 1896, BD: FOCP, Part 1' Vol II, p 311. 
14. Sir H Gerard, 8 November 1901, British Foreign Office Document 
No 1636. Quoted Kandyba-Foxcroft, Russia/Anglo-Boer War, p 309. 
15. C Spring-Rice to Curzon, 17 September 1903. Quoted Dilks, Curzon 
Vol II, p 66. 
16. Hansard, 4S, 79 (Lords), 15 February 1900, p 43. 
140 
17. H Norman, All the Russias <London 1902) p 414. Hereafter cited 
as Norman, Russias. 
18. Norman, Russias, p 414. 
19. H Norman, The Peoples and Politics of the Far East, <London 1895) 
p 591. 
20. Hansard, 45, 101 <Commons>, 22 January 1900, p 600. 
21. W H W Waters, 13 October 1896, BD: FOCP, Part 1, Vol II, p 311. 
22. Hansard, 45, 101 <Commons), 22 January 1900, pp 600 - 01. 
23. Hansard, 45, 101 <Commons), 22 January 1900, p 625. 
24. Hansard, 45, 101 <Commons), 22 January 1900, pp 609 - 10. 
25. Hansard, 45, 110 <Commons), 3 July 1902, p 706. 
26. Hansard, 45, 110 <Commons), 3 July 1902, p 726. 
27. Hansard, 45, 119 <Commons), 10 March 1903, p 349. 
28. Hansard, 45, 119 <Commons) 10 March 1903, p 402. 
29. Norman, Russias, p 437. 
30. Hansard, 45, 95 <Commons), 21 June 1901, p 1060. 
31. Hansard, 45, 96 <Commons), 2 July 1901, p 590. 
32. Hansard, 45, 99 <Commons), 12 August 1901, p 425. 
33. Hansard, 45, 110 <Commons), 3 July 1902, pp 719- 20. 
34. Punch, 27 April 1904, p 304. 
35. G Monger, The End of Isolation; British Foreign Policy 
1900 - 1907 <London, 1963) pp 160 - 61. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
Curzon and the Russian Threat in Tibet <pp 23 - ·40> 
1. G Curzon, Russia in Central Asia <London, 1889), p 333. 
2. A Lamb, 'Some notes on Russian intrigue in Tibet', Journal of 
the Royal Central Asian Society, 1959, p 50. Hereafter cited as 
Lamb, 'Russian intrigue', JRCS, 1959. 
3. Lamb, 'Russian intrigue', JRCS, 1959, p 50. 
4. Curzon to Hamil ton, 29 January 1903. Quoted Dilks, Curzon, 
Vol II, p 76. 
5. P E Roberts, History of British India <London, 1921>, p 538. 
6. Dilks, Curzon, Vol II, p 74. 
141 
7. P Mehra, The Younghusband Expedition; an interpretation, <London, 
1968>, p 360. Hereafter cited as Mehra, Younghusband Expedition. 
8. E Kawaguchi, Three Years in Tibet <Benares and London, 1909) 
p 496. Hereafter cited as Kawaguchi, Three Years. 
9. Kawaguchi, Three Years. p 497. 
10. J MacGregor, Tibet; a Chronicle of Exploration <London, 1970) 
p 277. Hereafter cited as MacGregor, Tibet. 
11. Kawaguchi, Three Years, p 497. 
12. Kawaguchi, Three Years, p 499. 
13. Kawaguchi, Three Years, p 499. 
14. Kawaguchi, Three Years, p 500. 
15. Kawaguchi, Three Years, p 503. 
16. Kawaguchi, Three Years, pp 502 - 3. 
17. Kawaguchi, Three Years, p 509. 
18. W Filchner, 'A summary of Sturm uber Asien, anon, entitled 
A Story of Struggle and Intrigue in Central Asia', Journal of 
the Central Asian Society, 1927, p 359. Hereafter cited as 
Filchner, 'Sturm uber Asien', JCAS, 1927. 
19. Quoted by Indicus Olim in The iimes, 18 June 1904, p 4. 
20. Lamb, 'Russian intrigue', JCAS, 1959, p 54. 
21. E Candler, The Unveiling of Lhasa <London, 1905> p 13. 
22. Kawaguchi, Three Years, p 506. 
23. Filchner, 'Sturm uber Asien', JCAS, 1927, p 364. 
24. A Lamb, British India and Tibet <London, 1986), p 216. 
Hereafter cited as Lamb, British India. 
25. Lamb, British India, pp 216 - 7. 
26. Lamb, British India, p 217. 
27. A Ular, 'England, Russia and Tibet', Contemporary Review, 
LXXXII, December 1902, p 847. Hereafter cited as Ular, 'ERT', 
IT, Dec 1902. 
28. Ular, 'ERT', CR, Dec 1902, p 581. 
29. Ular, 'ERT', IT, Dec 1902, p 853. 
30. Ular, 'ERT', CR, Dec 1902, pp 858- 9. 
31. Ular, ' ERT' , CR, Dec 1902, p 859. 
32. A Ular, 'The Tibetan Puzzle', Contemporary Review, LXXXIII, 
January 1903, p 24. Hereafter cited as Ular, 'Tibetan Puzzle', 
IT, Jan 1903. 
33. Ular, 'Tibetan Puzzle', ~ Jan 1903, p 25. 
34. Ular, 'Tibetan Puzzle', ~ Jan 1903, p 34. 
35. Ular, 'Tibetan Puzzle', ~ Jan 1903, p 30. 
36. Ular, 'Tibetan Puzzle', ~ Jan 1903, p 32. 
37. Lamb, Brit ish India, p 218. 
38. Lamb, Brit ish India, pp 218 - 9. 
39. Curzon to Hamil ton, 11 June 1901. Quoted Dilks, Curzon, Vol I, 
p 191. 
40. Kawaguchi, Three Years, p 509. 
41. P Mehra, 'Kazi U-gyen - a paid Tibetan spy?', Journal of the 
Royal Central Asian Society, 1964, p 301. 
142 
42. Curzon's minutes of 23 February and 17 May 1899, Foreign Affairs 
file III, C. P. 2. Quoted Dilks, Curzon, Vol I, p 189. 
43. Mehra, Young-husband Expedition, p 161. 
44. Brodrick to Balfour and reply, 27 October 1903. Quoted Dilks, 
Curzon, Vol II, p 81. 
45. MacGregor, Tibet, p 310. 
46. Lamb, British India, p 230. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 
The Agitation Against the Younghusband Expedition; Debate Frustrated 
<pp 41 - 69) 
1. Sir F Younghusband, India and Tibet <London, 1910) p 133. 
Hereafter cited as Younghusband, India. 
2. Younghusband, India. p 133. 
3. Younghusband, India. p 133. 
4. The Times, 3 December 1903, p 8. 
5. Hansard 4S, 129 <Commons), 2 February 1904, pp 171 - 2. 
6. H J S Cotton, Indian and Home Memories <London, 1911> p 284. 
Hereafter cited as Cot ton, IHM. 
7. Cotton, IHM, p 284. 
8. Cotton, IHM, p 284. 
9. Cotton, IHM, p 284. 
10. The Times, 29 December 1903, p 8. 
11. Cotton, IHM, p 282. 
12. Hansard, 4S, 126 <Commons>, 23 July 1903, pp 180 - 1. 
13. Hansard, 4S, 131 <Commons), 13 April 1904, p 113. 
14. Lamb, British India, p 246. 
15. Dilks, Curzon, Vol I, p 32. 
16. Dilks, Curzon, Vol I, p 186. 
17. Hansard, 4S, 129 <Commons), 2 February 1904, p 171. 
18. Hansard, 4S, 127 <Commons>, 6 August 1903, pp 130 - 2. 
19. The Times, 30 November 1903, p 3. 
20. The Times, 2 December 1903, p 8. 
21. The Times, 3 December 1903, p 8. 
22. The Times, 3 December 1903, p 8. 
23. The Times, 3 December 1903, p 7. 
24. The Times, 4 December 1903, p 6. 
25. The Times, 9 January 1904, p 10 
143 
144 
26. The Times, 16 January 1904, p 11. 
27. The Times, 16 January 1904, p 11. 
28. The Times, 11 January 1904, p 10. 
29. The Times, 16 January 1904, p 9. 
30. The Times, 18 January 1904, p 7. 
31. The Times, 19 January 1904, p 5. 
32. Contemporary Review, LXXXIII, 1904, p 623. 
33. The Times, 28 January 1904, p 13. 
34. J A Hobson, Imperialism <London, 1902) p 223. 
35. The Times, 28 January 1904, p 7. 
36. Hansard, 45, 129 <Lords), 2 February 1904, p 8. 
37. Hansard, 45, 129 <Lords), 2 February 1904, pp 25 - 6. 
38. Hansard, 45, 129 <Lords), 2 February 1904, pp 42 - 4. 
39. Hansard, 45, 129 <Commons), 2 February 1904, p 179. 
40. Hansard, 45, 129 <Commor,s), 2 February 1904, pp 171 - 2. 
41. Hansard, 45, 129 <Commons), 17 February 1904, p 338. 
42. Hansard, 45, 130 <Commons), 17 February 1904, p 12. 
43. Hansard, 45, 130 <Lords>, 26 February 1904, pp 1110 - 22. 
44. Hansard, 45, 130 <Lords), 26 February 1904, pp 1122- 31. 
45. Hansard, 45, 130 <Lords>, 26 February 1904, pp 1131-38. 
46. Hansard, 45, 130 <Lords>, 26 February 1904, pp 1138 - 44. 
47. Hansard, 45, 130 <Lords), 26 February 1904, pp 1144 - 50. 
48. Hansard, 45, 129 <Commons>, 4 February 1904, p 337. 
49. Hansard, 45, 131 <Commons>, 9 March 1904, p 591. 
50. Hansard, 45, 131 <Commons), 17 March 1904, p 1399. 
51. Hansard, 45, 132 <Commons), 28 March 1904, p 835. 
52. Hansard, 45, 132 <Commons), 28 March 1904, pp 835 - 6. 
53. Hansard, 45, 132 <Commons), 29 March 1904, pp 929 - 31. 
54. Hansard, 45, 132 <Commons>, 29 March 1904, p 1043. 
55. Hansard, 45, 132 <Commons), ·29 March 1904, pp 1044 - 5. 
145 
56. J Redlich, The Procedure of the House of Commons; a stud~ of its 
histor~ and Rresent form, Vol I <London, 1908)' pp 204 - 5. 
Hereafter cited as Redlich, Procedure/Commons. 
57. Hansard, 45, 132 <Commons) 29 March 1904, p 1045. 
58. Redlich, Procedure/Commons, p 205. 
59. The Times, 2 April 1904, p 7. 
60. The Times, 8 April 1904, p 5. 
61. The Times, 11 April 1904, p 5. 
62. The Times, 12 April 1904, p 7. 
63. The Times, 12 April 1904, p 7. 
64. The Times, 12 April 1904, p 7. 
146 
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 
Debate Achieved: The Tibet Revenues Bill of April 1904 <pp 70 - 99) 
1. P Fleming, Bayonets to Lhasa <London, 1961), pp 153 - 4. 
Hereafter cited as Fleming, Bayonets. 
2. Hansard, 45, 129· <Commons), 2 February 1904, p 172. 
3. The Times, 13 April 1904, p 10. 
4. The Times, 13 Apri 1 1904, p 10. 
5. Westminster Gazette, 13 April 1904, p 1. 
6. Manchester Guardian, 13 April 1904, p 4. 
7. Hansard, 45, 133 <Commons), 12 April 1904, p 133. 
B. The Times, 13 April 1904, p 10. 
9. Hansard, 45, 133 <Commons), 13 April 1904, p 89 - 91. 
10. The Times, 15 April 1904, p 6. 
11. Lamb, British India, p 245. 
12. Lamb, British India, p 242. 
13. Midleton, Records, p 189. 
14. Midleton, Records, p 193. 
15. Midleton, Records, p 200. 
16. Midleton, Records, p 187. 
17. Fleming, Bayonets, p 92. 
18. Fleming, Bayonets, p 93. 
19. Hansard, 45, 133 <Commons), 13 April 1904, pp 85 - 98. 
20. K Young, Arthur James Balfour <London, 1963> p 238. 
21. Hansard,, 4S, 133 <Commons>, 13 April 1904, pp 99 - 105. 
22. The Times, 14 April 1904, p 7. 
23. Hansard, 45, }33 <Commons), 13 April 1904, pp 105 - 110. 
24. Hansard, 45, 133 <Commons>, 13 April 1904, pp 110 - 12. 
25. Hansard, 45, 133 <Commons), 13 April 1904, pp 112- 14. 
147 
26. Hansard, 45, 133 <Commons), 13 April 1904, pp 114 - 17. 
27. Hansard, 45, 133 <Commons), 13 April 1904, pp 117 - 22. 
28. Hansard, 45, 133 <Commons), 13 April 1904, pp 122 - 5. 
29. Hansard, 45, 133 <Commons), 13 April 1904, pp 125 - 32. 
30. The Times, 14 April 1904, p 7. 
31. The Times, 14 April 1904, p 4. 
32. The Times, 14 April 1904, p 4. 
33. Westminster Gazette, 14 April 1904, p 2. 
34. Manchester Guardian, 14 April 1904, p 6. 
35. Manchester Guardian, 14 April 1904, p 6. 
36 .. Westminster Gazette, 14 April 1904, p 2. 
37. Hansard, 45, 133 <Lords>, 19 April 1904, pp 488 - 91. 
38. Hansard, 45, 133 <Lords>, 19 April 1904, pp 491 - 93. 
39. Hansard, 45, 133 <Lords>, 19 April 1904, pp 493 - 98. 
40. Hansard, 45, 133 <Lords>, 19 April 1904, pp 498 - 502. 
41. Hansard, 45, 133 <Lords), 19 April 1904, p 500. 
148 
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 
Government, Parliament and the Lhasa Convention <pp 100 - 126> 
1. The Times, 11 May 1904, p 11. 
2. ·The Times, 11 May 1904, p 9. 
3. Hansard, 45, 134 <Commons), 12 May 1904, pp 1166 - 9. 
4. The Times, 13 May 1904, p 9. 
5. Hansard, 45, 134 <Commons), 16 May 1904, pp 137 - 9. 
6. Hansard, 45, 134 <Commons), 16 May 1904, p 1484. 
7. Hansard, 45, 135 <Commons>, 18 May 1904, p 185. 
8. Hansard, 45, 134 <Commons>, 16 May 1904, pp 1492 - 3. 
9. Hansard, 45, 135 <Lords), 17 May 1904, pp 12 - 15. 
10. Hansard, 45, 135 <Lords), 17 May 1904, pp 15 - 18. 
11. Hansard, 45, 135 <Lords), 17 May 1904, pp 18 - 20. 
12. Hansard, 45, 135 <Lords), 17 May 1904, pp 20 - 22. 
13. Hansard, 45, 135 <Lords), 17 May 1904, p 386. 
14. The Times, 17 May .1904, p 5. 
15. The Times, 17 May 1904, p 9. 
16. The Times, 24 May 1904, p 10. 
17. The Times, 24 May 1904, p 7. 
18. The Times, 17 May 1904, p 9. 
19. The Times, 24 May 1904, p 7. 
20~ The Times, 31 May 1904, p 3. 
21. The Times, 31 May 1904, p 9. 
22. Hansard, 45, 135 <Commons>, 8 June 1904, p 1053. 
23. The Times, 11 June 1904, p 9. 
24. The Times, 20 June 1904, p 9. 
25. Hansard, 45, 136 <Commons), 21 June 1904, p 694. 
26. Hansard, 45, 136 <Commons), 21 June 1904, pp 694 - 5. 
149 
27. Hansard, 4S, 137 <Commons), 6 July 1904, pp 914 - 16. 
28. Hansard, 4S, 137 <Commons), 6 July 1904, pp 806 - 7. 
29. Hansard, 4S, 137 <Commons), 6 July 1904, p 916. 
30. Hansard, 4S, 137 <Commons), 6 July 1904, p 915. 
31. Hansard, 4S, 138 <Commons), 18 July 1904, pp 263 - 4. 
32. G Seaver, Francis Younghusband <London, 1952> pp 251 - 2. 
33. Mehra, Younghusband Expedition, p 352. 
34. Midleton, Records, p 208. 
35. Lamb, British India, pp 249 - 50. 
36. The Times, 19 Sept ember 1904, p 8. 
37. The Times, 19 September 1904, p ~. 
38. The Times, 10 February 1905, p 8. 
39. Hansard, 4S, 141 <Commons), 17 February 1905, p 469. 
40. Fleming, Bayonets, p 287. 
41. Hansard, 4S, 141 <Commons), 14 February 1905, pp 134 - 5. 
42. Hansard, 4S, 141 <Commons), 14 February 1905, p 149. 
43. Hansard, 4S, 141 <Commons), 14 February 1905, p 154. 
44. Hansard, 4S, 141 <Lords), 14 February 1905, pp 22 - 3. 
45. Hansard, 4S, 141 <Lords), 14 February 1905, pp 32 - 4. 
46. Hansard, 4S, 184 <Commons), 17 February 1908, pp 539 - 40. 
150 
NOTES TO EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSIONS <pp 127 - 137> 
1. Morley, Viscount, Recollect ions, Vol I, London 1918, pp 240 - 1. 
Hereafter cited as Morley, Recollect ions. 
2. Grey, Viscount of Falloden, Twent~-Five Years 1892 - 1916, Vol I I 
London 1928, pp 159 - 160. 
3. Morley, Recollect ions, Vol I, p 239. 
4. . Hansard, 45, 184, 17 February 1908, p 560. 
5. Hansard, 45, 184, 17 February 1908, p 493. 
6. Hansard, 45, 184, 17 February 1908, p 539. 
7. Hansard, 45, 130, 26 February 1904, p 1143. 
8. Dillon, E J, The EcliRse of Russia, London 1918, p 235. 
151 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
Contemporary Review 
Foreign Office Confidential Print, 1896 - 1907. 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, Vols 79- 184 (1900- 08) 
Manchester Guardian 
Papers Relating to Tibet 1904, (Cd. 1920) 
Further Papers Relating to Tibet 1904 <Cd. 2054) 
Further Papers Relating to Tibet 1905 <Cd. 2370) 
Further Correspondence Relating to Tibet 1910 <Cd. 5240) 
The Times, 1899 - 1907, especially 1903 - 05 
Westminster Gazette 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Abramsky, C and Williams, B J. Essays in Honour of E H Carr, London 
1974. 
Becker, S. Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia 1865 - 1924, 
Harvard, 1968. 
Bell, Sir C. Tibet, Past and Present, Oxford, 1924. 
Bell, Sir C. 'The Dalai Lama; Lhasa 1921' Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 1924. 
Beloff, M. Imperial Sunset Vol I: Britain's Liberal Empire 
1897 - 1921, London, 1969. 
Churchill, R P. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Cedar Rapids, 
1939. 
Cotton, H J S. Indian and Home Memories, London, 1911. 
152 
Curzon, G N. Russia in Central Asia, London, 1889. 
Deitrich, G. Russian Imperialism; The Interaction of Domestic and 
Foreign Policy 1860 - 1914, Leamington Spa and Hamburg, 1987. 
Dilks, D. Curzon in India, 2 vols, London, 1969 - 70. 
Edwardes, M. High Noon of Empire, London, 1965. 
Filchner, W. 'A Summary of Sturm uber Asien, anon, entitled A Story 
of Struggle and Intrigue in Central Asia', Journal of the Central 
Asian Society, 1927 and 1928. 
Fleming, P. Bayonets to Lhasa, London, 1961. 
Gillard, D. The Struggle for Asia 1828 1914, A Study in British and 
Russian Imperial ism, London, 1977. 
Gooch, J. The Plans of War, London, 1974. 
Grenard, F. Tibet and the Tibetans, London, 1904. 
Grey, Viscount of Falloden, Twenty Five Years, 1892 - 1916, 2 vols, 
London, 1928. 
Hamilton, Rt Han Lord G. Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections 
2 vols, London, 1916 and 1922. 
Hopkirk, P. Trespassers on the Roof of the World, London, 1982. 
Husain, A. British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal 
1857 - 194 7, London, 1970. 
Kandyba-Foxcroft, E. Russia and the Anglo-Boer War 1899 - 1902, 
Roodepoort, 198 1. 
Kawaguchi, E. Three Years in Tibet, Benares and London, 1909. 
Lamb, A. 'Some Notes on Russian Intrigue in Tibet', Journal of the 
Royal Central Asian Society, 1959. 
Lamb, A. Britain and Chinese Central Asia; the Road to Lhasa 
1767 - 1905, London, 1960. 
Lamb, A. British India and Tibet 1766 - 1910, London, 1986. 
Landon, P. Lhasa, 2 vols, London 1905. 
Landor, A H. In the Forbidden Land; Tibet, 2 vols, London, 1898 
Lawson, Sir W and Carruthers Gould, Sir F. Cartoons in Rhyme 
and Line, London 1908. 
MacGregor, J. Tibet, A Chronicle of Exploration, London, 1970. 
Mason, K. 'Sir Francis Edward Younghusband', The Dictionary of 
National Biography, 1941 - 50, London, 1959. 
Mehra, P. 'Tibet and Russian Intrigue', Journal of Royal Central 
Asian Society, 1958. 
Mehra, P. 'Kazi U-gyen; a paid Tibetan spy?', Journal of Royal 
Central Asian Society, 1964. 
Mehra, P. The Younghusband Expedition, An Interpretation, London, 
1968. 
Mehra, P. The North-Eastern Frontier, A Documentary Study of the 
the Internecine Rivalry between India, Tibet and China, Vol I, 
New Delhi, 1979. 
Midleton, Earl of Records and Reactions 1856 - 1939, London, 1939. 
Monger, G. The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900 - 1907 
London, 1963. 
Morgan, G. 
1981. 
Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia 1810 - 95, London, 
Norman, H. Peoples and Politics of the Far East, London, 1895. 
·Norman, H. All the Russias, London, 1902. 
Oukhtomsky, Prince E. 
American Review, 
'The English in Tibet; a Russian View', North 
179, 1904. 
Porter, B. Critics of Empire, London, 1968. 
Porter, B. The Lion's Share, London, 1983. 
Ra.o, P R. Modern Central Asia, New Delhi, 1979. 
Roberts, P E. History of British India, Oxford, 1921. 
Ronaldshay, Earl of. Life of Lord Curzon, 3 vols, London, 1923. 
Rose, K. Superior Person, London, 1970. 
Seaver, G. Francis Younghusband, London, 1952. 
Seton-Watson, H. The Russian Empire, Oxford, 1967. 
Singhal, D P. India and Afghanistan, 1876 - 1907, Queensland, 1963. 
Skrine, C P and Nightingale, P. New Light on British Chinese and 
Russian Activities in Sinkiang 1890 - 1918, London, 1973. 
Thornton, A P. For the File on Empire, London, 1968. 
153 
154 
Ular, A. Un Empire Russo-Chinois, Paris, 1902. 
Ular, A. 'England, Russia and Tibet', Contemporary Review, 1902. 
Ular, A. 'The Tibet Puzzle', Contemoorary Review, 1903. 
Ular, A. 'The Solution of the Tibetan Problem', Contemporary Review, 
1903. 
Waddell, L A. Lhasa and its Mysteries, London, 1905. 
Wolpert, S A. Morley and India 1906 - 1910, California, 1967. 
Woodruff, P. The Men Who Ruled India; The Guardians, London, 1954. 
Young, K. Arthur James Balfour, London, 1963. 
Younghusband, F E. The Heart of a Continent, London, 1896. 
Youri.ghusband, Sir F E. India and Tibet, London, 1910. 
